ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

VIOLET PARANJOTI

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IN THE MEYKAṆḌA ŚĀSTRA

BY

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PREFACE

This book is the thesis submitted by me for the Ph.D. Degree of the University of Madras. It seeks to give an account of the Śaiva Siddhānta system, as presented in Tamil literature, and evaluate it in the light of critical idealism. This latter aspect together with other critical considerations, and a comparison of the Siddhānta with the alien schools constitute the original contribution of the book. The author's own personal religious convictions, which are Christian, have as far as possible been kept in the background, in the interests of an objective presentation.

Besides the Tamil Śaiva Siddhānta works, a few other sources were also consulted. In the case of the 'Pauṣkara Āgama' and 'Pauṣkara Bhāṣya', which are in Sanskrit, some manuscript translation notes made by Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, (Reader, Department of Philosophy, Madras University), were used. An article entitled, 'Truth in Śaiva Siddhānta' by the same author was also found valuable. The only detailed and critical presentation of the Śaiva Siddhānta in a European language is 'Der Çaiva Siddhānta' by H. W. Schomerus. A study of this in the original German proved useful in more than one way. It helped to make more impressive certain Siddhānta conceptions. The analogy, for instance, of the umbrella, which hides only us who open the umbrella, while not affecting the sun, to illustrate the position of the mūla mala obscuring the soul, while God is unaffected by the same, helped to emphasise the Siddhānta position. Further, several questions were suggested for consideration, such as whether the appearance of Śiva to the soul is an incarnation, and what happens to the three malas after general release is effected. All such aid is acknowledged in the footnotes. For answers to such questions, however, the Siddhānta works themselves have been consulted.

It is with sincere and deep-felt gratitude that I acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. I was fortunate to have him as my adviser for my research work, as his sympathetic attitude was a great encouragement to me in my big undertaking, while his scholarly attainments and high standard of work made for a rigorous training for me.

I take this opportunity of expressing my gratitude to the University of Madras for granting me a research studentship for two years and subsequently permitting me to publish the thesis.

I thank Mr. V. A. Devasenapathi, M.A., for reading the proofs, and appreciate his help, especially as his task has been more arduous than usual. I have also to thank Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan for help in preparing the index.

While offering this book to the public, I am fully aware of its many imperfections and apologise to my readers for the same. I am assured by those who ought to know that even as it stands the book is likely to satisfy a real need. It is because of this I venture to send it forth. I trust that the imperfections will not prevent the realisation of my aim in publishing the book, which is that it may arouse in the readers an interest in Śaiva Siddhānta, which constitutes a noble response made by a certain section of humanity in the dim past to the challenging facts of life.

V. PARANJOTI.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.R.	..	Appearance and Reality by Bradley.
B.L.	..	Buddhist Logic by Stcherbatsky.
C.H.	..	The Crown of Hinduism by Farquhar.
E.H.	..	Essentials of Hinduism by Nallaswami.
F.D.G.	..	Fruit of Divine Grace by Śivapāda Sundaram, 3rd edition.
E.E.	..	Emergent Evolution by Lloyd Morgan.
E.H., L.Ś.S.	..	Essentials of Hinduism in the Light of Śaiva Siddhānta by S. Sabāratna Mudaliar.
H.B.	..	Hinduism and Buddhism by Eliot.
H.T.Ś.S.	..	Hymns of Tamil Śaivite Saints (Heritage of India series).
H.I.	..	Heart of India by Barnett.
I.P.	..	Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan.
J.A.O.S.	..	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
Jk.	..	Jñānamṛtakkaṭṭaḷai.
J.O.R.M.	..	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
N.L.I.P.	..	New Light upon Indian Philosophy, by Gopaul Chetty.
O.R.L.I.	..	Outline of Religious Literature of India by Farquhar.
P.Ā.	..	Pauṣkara Āgama.
P.B.	..	Pauṣkara Bhāṣya.
P.K.	..	The Pandyan Kingdom by K. A. Nīlakanta Sāstri.
P.I.L.	..	Primer of Indian Logic by Kuppuswami Sāstri.
P.P.	..	Peria Purāṇam (Śaiva Siddhānta Mahā Samājam, 1934).
Schomerus	..	Der Çaiva Siddhānta by Schomerus.
S.D.	..	Siddhānta Deepika.
S.K.	..	Sāṅkhya Kārikā.
Snk.	..	Saṅkarpanirākaraṇam by Umāpati.

Ś.P.	.. Śiva-prakāśam by Umāpati (Tiruvilaṅgam, 1st edition).
Ś.J.B.	.. Śiva-jñāna-bōdham.
Ś.J.B.Ck.	.. Śiva-jñāna-bōdha Curukkam.
Ś.J.B.Cu.	.. „ „ Ciṟṟurai (Ārumukanāvalar, 3rd. edition).
Ś.J.B. Mā	.. „ „ Māpāḍiyam (Pālvaṇṇam Pillai).
Ś.J.S.	.. Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār (P. Muthiah Pillai, 2nd edition).
Ś.S.	.. Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha by Suryanarayana Sāstri.
Ś.S.P.	.. Śaiva Siddhānta Paribhāṣā (P. Muthiah Pillai, 1928).
Ś.S.V.	.. Śaiva Siddhānta Varalāru by S. Anavirata-vinayagam.
S.W.K.	.. Six Ways of Knowing by Datta.
T.	.. Tirumantiram.
Tv.	.. Tiruvācagam (Pope's translation).
T.Ś.S.	.. Truth in the Śaiva Siddhānta by Surya-narayana Sastri.
Tp.	.. Tattvaprakāśikā.
Ts.	.. Tattvasaṅgraha.
Uv.	.. Uṇmai Viḷakkam.

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I

ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA LITERATURE.

Though in India the religions appear to be as diverse as the people, yet the religions that have the largest number of devotees are Śaiva, Vaiṣṇava, and Śākta. Among these, Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava are the two religions largely prevalent over the whole of India, from north of Ceylon to the foot of the Himalayas; and they are very prominent especially in the Tamil country. Śaivism upholds Śiva as the one supreme being, and being one of the orthodox Hindu religions, accepts the authority of the Vedas. Some Śaivites recognise the Āgamas as authority for their religion. Beyond this it is difficult to say what Śaivism is as it embraces various shades of thought that are maintained by its different schools. Though these are recognised as sister schools by the Śaiva Siddhānta, yet this is not without its own features, which constitute its claim to be an independent school. The name, 'Śaiva Siddhānta' coined from the terms, 'Śaiva' and 'Siddhānta' both points out the kinship of this school with the other schools of Śaivism, and also differentiates it from them. In being one of the Śaiva systems, it is in agreement with those sects for whom the supreme being is Śiva. The point of divergence from these schools is denoted by the term, 'siddhānta' which means 'Accomplished End'.[1] These other schools of thought are considered to maintain positions described as 'pūrva pakṣa' (*prima facie* view) which must be transcended by a proved conclusion; they are on the way to the final truth, but have not reached it yet. This final end or 'siddhānta' has been attained by the highest faith, 'Śaiva Siddhānta' which signifies the 'Śaivite Accomplished End.'

1. Ś.S.P. p.11.

The attainment of the ultimate truth espoused by the Śaiva Siddhāntin has been accomplished chiefly by the Śaiva Āgamas. The Āgamas fall into the three groups of

1. Śākta Āgamas	..	77 in number,
2. Pāñcarātra Āgamas	..	28 ,,
3. Śaiva Āgamas	..	108 ,,

named thus after the three religions Śākta, Vaiṣṇava and Śaiva to which they have given rise.[2] The Āgamas on which the Śaiva Siddhāntin takes his stand are the following twenty eight :

'God-taught'.

1. Kāmika.
2. Yogaja.
3. Cintya.
4. Kāraṇa.
5. Ajita.
6. Dīpta.
7. Sūkṣma.
8. Sāhasraka.
9. Amśumān.
10. Suprabha.

'Man-realised.'

11. Vijaya.
12. Niśvāsa.
13. Svāyambhuva.
14. Āgneyaka.
15. Bhadra.
16. Raurava.
17. Mākuṭa.
18. Vimala.
19. Candrahāsa.
20. Mukhayugbimba.
21. Udgīṭa.
22. Lalita.
23. Siddha.
24. Santāna.
25. Nārasiṃha.
26. Parameśvara.
27. Kiraṇa.
28. Para.

The first ten are regarded as root Āgamas, and as such are taught by God, while the rest of them, though from the same divine source, are 'man-realised'. According to tradition, the Vedas sprang from the four lower faces of Śiva and the Āgamas from these and the upper face of Śiva. The Vedas

2. Schomerus, p.14,

were sent to Brahmā through Ananta. The twenty-eight Āgamas were given one each to the ten Praṇavas, and to the eighteen Mahā Rudras. Afterwards the twenty-eight Āgamas were given to Ananta, who gave them to Śrīkaṇṭha-rudra, the chief of the Rudras, and they were then passed on to Nandi Perumān in order that he in his turn might pass them on to the rest of the gods and ṛṣis.[3] Beyond this fanciful account of the origin of the Āgamas, there is not very much known regarding this point in spite of the investigations of scholars. It has been said[4] that the Āgamas represent the oldest products of Dravidian literature, that in pre-historic times they were written in the Dravidian (Tamil) language, and that a great part of them was lost in a flood which swept over the land south of the present Cape Comorin, the chief dwelling place of the old Drāviḍas. Only remnants of the older Āgamas were translated into Sanskrit and preserved in this form. But as has been urged,[5] all that one can say is that the home of the Āgama was in the land of the Drāviḍas i.e. the south of India. From the south they seem to have pushed up north, and then later to have turned back to the south where they helped to drive out Jainism and Buddhism. It has been further said that should one incline towards the theory that the Āgama literature was of Dravidian origin, one must at the same time admit that it came under the influence of Sanskrit literature very early. What is preserved to us of the Āgamas bears unmistakably the stamp of Sanskrit literature, for the Āgamas that are preserved are in the Sanskrit language, and the systems based on the Āgamas and written in the non-Sanskrit language employ Sanskrit terms, so that as matters now stand, we have to consider the Āgama literature as a part of Sanskrit literature. Regarding this much disputed point as to whether the Āgamas were originally written in Tamil or Sanskrit, another scholar[6] writes: "The Āgamas were originally written in Sanskrit, and with one ex-

3. Ś.J.B. Mā. Introduction p.10.
4. Schomerus, pp.9-10.
5. Schomerus, pp.9-10.
6. Hoisington.

ception, if they exist at all, they are to be found in that language. It is stated by the learned, that only one of the twenty-eight has ever appeared in Tamil, and of that one, only a part, the doctrinal portion, has been translated."[7]

With regard to the dates of the Āgamas, as there is no direct information that can be availed of, indirect methods have to be adopted for the purpose of ascertaining them. Considering that the Śaivāgamas are spoken of in the Sūta-saṃhitā,[8] the date of this work is likely to offer a clue to the date of the Āgamas. This work also refers to Buddhism and Jainism,[9] which flourished even as early as the 3rd and 2nd centuries B.C. By this time then, the Śaivāgamas were in existence. A further confirmation of such a hoary antiquity being ascribed to the Āgamas is the tradition that Śaṅkara repeatedly read the Sūta-saṃhitā before writing his Bhāṣya. Since the date ascribed to Śaṅkara is the middle of the 6th Century A.D.,[9a] the Bhāṣya and the Sūta-saṃhitā could not have been later than the close of the 6th Century. We may venture an even slightly earlier date for the Āgamas. Māṇikkavācaga, who is claimed by some scholars to be the eldest of the four santāna ācāryas, and who is placed earlier than the 6th Century refers to the Āgamas in his works; and hence, the Āgamas must have been in existence even before the 6th Century.

There is no consensus of opinion regarding the relative importance of the Vedas and Āgamas as sources of authority. It is pointed out[10] that the Sūta-saṃhitā considers this point and concludes that the Vedas represent a higher authority than the Āgamas, and that the latter are meant only for those

7. J.A.O.S. Vol. II. 'Syllabus of the Śiva-jñāna-bōdha' by Hoisington, p.137.

8. Ś.S.D. Vol. IV. Article entitled 'Sūta Saṃhitā on the Śaivāgamas.'

9. Ś.J.B. Mā. Introduction p.13.

9-a. J.O.R.M. III, p.396.

10. Schomerus, p.11; Ś.S.D. Vol. IV, article on Sūta Saṃhitā.

who have made less progress. The Siddhānta writers, however, are of opinion either that the two sources are of equal importance, or if one has more merit than the other, it is the Āgamas that rank comparatively higher. To Śrī-Nīlakaṇṭha Ācārya, there being no difference between the Veda and Āgamas, the one is the other.[11] Tirumūlar, although attaching equal value to the two sources, points out the different features of the two works. Thus he says: "The Vedas and the Āgamas are true, revealed by the highest. Know that the one is general, and the other special. Both are revelations of God. When one says that a difference exists, know that for the great no difference exists."[12] The majority of the Siddhānta writers hold that the Śaivāgamas are of greater value, and constitute the more important authority. It is worthy of note that of the schools considered as alien to the Siddhānta system, those that bear the closest approach to it are those that recognise the Śaivāgamas in addition to the Vedas. The Siddhāntin considers that revelation of the truth to souls is made in proportion to their spiritual advancement, and hence, far from being on a par with regard to their spiritual enlightenment,[12a] they may be seen to range from the lowest grade of knowledge to the highest stage of perfection. Corresponding to this gradual progress of the soul from partial truth to the whole truth, are the religions ranging from the outermost to the Śaiva Sidhānta itself. The authority common to most religions is the Veda, but the guide to truth for those who have attained the higher stage is the Śaivāgama. As pointed out, the truth for the highest stage is also contained in the Vedas, but it is difficult to be discerned therein as in that setting it bears the general character appropriate to the Vedas, which being meant for all the stages of development, do not contain these truths in a clear and knowable form; the Śaivāgamas, on the other hand, being revealed especially for the

11. Ś.J.B. Mā. pp.16-17 of Introduction; Ś.Ś. p.9.
12. T. VII, 276.
12-a. Ś.J.B. Mā. p.15 of Introduction.

highest stage, contain the truth in a form clear and easy to be understood by ripe souls.[13] Lastly, the fact that the 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham', an important Siddhānta treatise, being a complete presentation of the Siddhānta system, is only a translation (with Commentator's notes) of the twelve sūtras which form part of the 'Raurava Āgama', which is one of the Śaivāgamas, indicates that for the Śaiva Siddhānta, it is the Āgamas that are more significant than the Vedas.

Every Āgama consists of four parts or kāṇḍas:[14] (1) Vidyā or jñāna kāṇḍa, (2) Yoga kāṇḍa, (3) Kriyākāṇḍa and (4) Caryā kāṇḍa.

The jñāna kāṇḍa is considered to lead to the knowledge of God, and the yoga kāṇḍa to the concentration of the soul on an object. Kriyā kāṇḍa gives information about all performances ranging from the consecration of idols to laying the foundation stones for temples; the caryā kāṇḍa teaches the method of worship. The contents of the last two kāṇḍas relate to details of ritual etc. Only the jñāna kāṇḍa appears to be of philosophic worth; and the yoga kāṇḍa has value for the understanding of Indian psychology.[15] The Āgamas are very comprehensive and versatile and meet every requirement of souls, giving instructions for their practical religious life, and guidance for their religious and metaphysical speculations. And thus answering every purpose, they, more than either the Vedas or the Upaniṣads, colour the life of the people. The authority cited[16] in support of this view states[17] that though the Vedas are reverenced by the Hindus as eternal, and the Upaniṣads are preferred to other literature for discussion, the actual outlook and usages of the Hindus are derived from the Āgamas. In another place, the same writer

13. Schomerus, p.22.
14. H.B. Vol. II. p.189; O.R.L.I. p.194.
15. Schomerus, p.15.
16. P. T. Srīnivāsa Iyengar in Schomerus, p.16.
17. Outlines of Indian Philosophy by P. T. Srīnivāsa Iyengar, p.iv, pp.130, 131.

notes that the influence of the Āgamas or tantras, by which name also they are called, on Indian life is very deep. The living religion of the Hindus of to-day is especially tantric from Cape Comorin to the edge of Tibet. Śaṅkara was an adherent of the Śākta sect, and his system of Advaita, though to all appearances independent of the Śākta Āgamas, is yet influenced by the tantric theory. Rāmānuja was a Vaiṣṇava, and considered the Vaiṣṇava Āgama as the authority although he seldom quotes from it to support his statements. Madhva stands so much under the influence of the Āgamas that his commentary on the Vedānta-sūtra is nothing further than a chain of Āgamic texts with here and there a word thrown in to connect them.

That to the Śaiva Siddhānta, the Śaivāgamas are all-sufficing is further proved by the meaning they confer on the word, 'Āgama'. Since Ā = pāśa, ga = paśu, ma = pati, 'Āgama' comes to mean for them a book treating of the three eternal verities, matter, soul and God, in other words, a work that explains everything. According to another definition of the word 'Āgama', one understands by *Ā* śiva-jñāna, *ga* mokṣa and *ma* casting aside of mala.[18]

These Āgamas were meant to meet the needs of souls at different stages of religious development, and hence, the teachings of some of them seem to conflict with each other;[19] and Nandi Perumān feeling confused by these differing accounts, sought for help in the matter.[20] He was then taught the twelve sūtras said to occur in the Raurava Āgama, as giving a concise account of the highest truths of the Āgamas.[21] These effectively dispelled his doubts,[22] so that having a clear grasp of the teaching concerning the three padārthas of the Śaiva Siddhānta

18. Schomerus, pp.22-23.
19. S.J.B. Mā. Introduction, pp.9-10; O.R.L.I. p.195.
20. Ś.J.B. Mā. Introduction, pp.10; 29.
21. „ „ „ p.9.
22. „ „ „ p.11.

system, he was able to expound these twelve sūtras to his scholar, Sanatkumāramuni, who then taught it to Satya-jñāna-darśani, who in his turn passed it on to Parañjotimuni.[23]

At about this time, there dwelt in Tirukaḍantai, also known as Tiruppeṇṇākaḍam, Accutan, a saintly man, and his wife. Though they were crowned with many blessings, they were not blest with a child. Accutan went to his family priest, Śakalāgama Paṇḍita (learned in all the Vedas and the Āgamas), to consult him in the matter, and he coming across a certain verse in Sambandhar's Tēvāram that seemed to presage hope, advised Accutan to proceed with his wife to Tiruveṇkāḍu, and dwell there in order to offer prayers to Śvetāraṇya for the blessing of a child. Accutan and his wife carried out all these instructions so that later they were blest with the child they yearned to have. In later years, Parañjotimuni, who had been instructed in the twelve sūtras from the Raurava Āgama, came up to the child, who was named Śvetavanan after Śvētāraṇiyar, taught him what had been handed over to him, and asked him to translate the twelve sūtras from the Sanskrit language. The accounts current that the child was not one actually born to Accutan, but that while on a certain day he performed ablutions, the child intended in answer to his prayers was placed at the edge of the tank where he rejoiced to find it when he was through with his cleansing and religious rites, and that the child was filled with jñāna even in his second year, and was given to meditation, are considered as tales fabricated by those who thought that unless the man responsible for the formulation of the Śaiva Siddhānta faith were made out to be an extraordinary personality, the faith would not gain ground.[24] Apart from these traditions, whose veracity cannot be established, Śvētavanan was a historical personality, who because of his initiation into the true faith, was renamed Meykaṇḍa Deva. He lived sometime in the 13th Century in Tiruveṇṇainallūr. He is the

23. Ś.J.B. Mā. Introduction, p.11.
24. Ś.S.V. pp.19-20.

author of 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham', the most important of the fourteen Śaiva Siddhānta writings, which are known by the collective name of 'Meykaṇḍa Śāstram.' These are as follows :[25]

1. Tiruvuntiār by Uyyavanda Deva of Tiruviyalūr.
2. Tirukkaḷiṟṟupaḍiar by Uyyavanda Deva of Tirukkaḍavūr.
3. Śiva-jñāna-bōdham by Meykaṇḍa Deva.
4. Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār by Aruḷ-nandi.
5. Irupāvirupatu „ „ „
6. Uṇmai-viḷakkam by Manavācakam-kaḍanda Deva.
7. Śiva-prakāśam by Umāpati.
8. Tiruvaruḷ-payan by Umāpati.
9. Vinā-veṇbā by Umāpati.
10. Pōṟṟipaḥroḍai by Umāpati.
11. Koḍikkavi by Umāpati.
12. Neñjuviḍutūtu by Umāpati.
13. Uṇmai-neṟi-viḷakkam, authorship not known.
14. Saṅkaṟpanirākaraṇam by Umāpati.

Meykaṇḍa's family guru, Sakalāgama Paṇḍita, was annoyed that Meykaṇḍa had not come to honour him. Hoping that perhaps if he went to Meykaṇḍa's city, he would be honoured at least there, he arrived there. Though the city was decorated in honour of his arrival, Meykaṇḍa did not come to pay his respects to the guru, who being of opinion that he was superior to Meykaṇḍa, considered it his due to be reverenced by the young saint. Once when Meykaṇḍa was instructing his disciples, the senior guru walked close by and overheard the discussion that was going on regarding āṇava. The guru proudly asked Meykaṇḍa if he knew the form of Āṇava, and he by way of prompt reply pointed his finger at Sakalāgama himself, whose pride was instantly humbled, and instead of expecting to be honoured by the young guru, he paid him his sincere respects. Meykaṇḍa re-named him Aruḷ-nandi, and

25. Ś.S.V. pp.34-35 ; O.R.L.I. p.258.

accepting him for his disciple instructed him in 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham.' Helped by this instruction, and filled with the inspiration of the great saint, Aruḷ-nandi contributed the two Śaiva Śiddhānta works: 'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār,' and 'Irupāvirupatu'

The first two works mentioned in the list are considered to be the works of a single author. Another view is that the authors of 'Tiruvuntiār' and of 'Tirukkaḷiṟṟupaḍiār' were teacher and pupil respectively, and that 'Tiruvuntiār' is the sūtra, and 'Tirukkaḷiṟṟupaḍiār' is the commentary. The internal evidence of the two works supports this view. The story current about these authors is that Uyyavanda Deva of Tirukkaḍavūr, who was in eager search of a guru, was informed that in Tiruviyalūr was a great saint also called Uyyavanda Deva, who would answer his purpose. Uyyavanda of Tirukkaḍavūr, who went in search of the saint, was at first inclined to doubt the reputed greatness of the guru, whom he discovered after considerable search; but his misgivings were soon dispelled so that he willingly sat at the feet of the teacher for instruction. In order to help his pupil to remember the instruction given, the guru composed the poem, 'Tiruvuntiār'.

Very few particulars are known concerning Manavācakam Kaḍandār, the author of 'Uṇmai Viḷakkam.' He was born in Tiruvāḍi and was one of the disciples of Meykaṇḍa. His name signifies that he was a man of great enlightenment, for 'Manavācakam Kaḍandār' means 'he who has transcended thought and speech.'

The majority of the Meykaṇḍa Śāstras were contributed by Umāpati, who was born in Cidambaram in the Cōḷa country. He was accustomed to going to the temple with all due ceremony, and to return thence likewise. One day when he went as usual in all his glory, he heard a man say, "There goes one who is blind in the day time." Umāpati, who had always had a secret yearning for one who would be his guru, knew by intuition that this man was worthy of honour and accept-

able as his guru. He therefore descended from his palanquin, and paid homage to the stranger, who happened to be Marai-jñāna-sambandhar, probably the author of 'Śaiva-samaya-neṟi,'[26] but before Umāpati could rise to his feet, the saint hastened away in order to offer a further test to prove the faith and fitness of his pupil. Sambandhar arrived in front of a weaver's house ostensibly to allay his hunger, and while partaking of the liquid offered him, some of it dribbled through his fingers, and Umāpati considered it a privilege to partake of what thus trickled down, which another in his place would have considered beneath his dignity to do. Sambandhar, quite content with him, accepted him as his pupil, and instructed him in 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham' and 'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār' and made him competent to make a handsome contribution to the Siddhānta Śāstras. The following are his works :

1. Śiva-prakāśam,
2. Tiruvaruḷpayan,
3. Vināveṉbā.
4. Pōṟṟipaḥroḍai.
5. Koḍikkavi.
6. Neñjuviḍutūtu,
7. Saṅkaṟpanirākaraṇam.

The writers of the Meykaṇḍa Śāstram are known by the general name of 'santāna kuravar.' In dealing with what is known of their biographies, their dates have not been mentioned, and this is because the dates of birth and death of each author cannot be established with certainty, and at the most we can only arrive at the probable century within which they all flourished. Those responsible for collecting and editing the Meykaṇḍa Śāstras have given the dates of the different works as follows[27] computed according to the Sālivāhana era :—

26. O.R.L.I. p.257. The work, 'Śaiva-samaya-neṟi' is contained in Ś.S.D. Vol. VI.

27. Ś.S.V. pp.34-35.

1.	Tiruvuntiār	.. 1070
2.	Tirukkaliṟṟupaḍiār	.. 1100
3.	Śiva-jñāna-bōdham	.. 1143
4.	Śīva-jñāna-siddhiār	.. 1175
5.	Irupāvirupatu	.. 1176
6.	Uṇmai-neṟi-viḷakkam	.. 1177
7.	Śiva-prakāśam	.. 1228
8.	Tiruvaruḷpayan	.. 1229
9.	Vināveṇbā	.. 1230
10.	Pōṟṟipaḥroḍai	.. 1231
11.	Koḍikkavi	.. 1232
12.	Nēñjuviḍutūtu	.. 1233
13.	Uṇmai-neṟi-viḷakkam	.. 1234
14.	Saṅkaṟpanirākaraṇam	.. 1235

But there are certain difficulties,[28] which make one doubt the correctness of these dates. According to these dates, Umāpati appears to have composed his works at the rate of one each year. Was this really the order in which they appeared, or is this order based on any tradition that as Tirumūlar was believed to have written the 3000 verses of his 'Tirumantiram' at the rate of one verse each year, so Umāpati's works appeared also at the rate of one each year? This is perhaps not as great a difficulty as the next one. Between the dates assigned to 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham' and 'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār' there is a lapse of 32 years. If it be true that the author of 'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār,' Aruḷ-nandi, was the family guru, Sakalāgama, who gave Accutan the counsel that led to his being blest with Meykaṇḍa for his child, then there cannot possibly be such a long interval between the date of composition of 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham' by Meykaṇḍa and that of 'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār' by Aruḷ-nandi who must have been old enough to be the father of Meykaṇḍa. Inconsistencies such as these compel us to refrain from accepting the dates given above.

28. Ś.S.V. p.35.

There are two other dates which are of help in deciding the approximate dates of these writers. The Tiruvāvaḍuturai Abbey, which came into existence about 600 years ago, was founded by Namaśivāya Deśikar, who claims to be a follower of Meykaṇḍa. According to this account, we have to place Meykaṇḍa in the early part of the 13th Century. A similar conclusion is arrived at by reckoning according to another date that is available. In the introduction to his work, 'Saṅkaṟpanirākaraṇam', Umāpati gives as the date of composition of this work, the year 1235 of the *Sālivāhana* era, which according to the Christian era would be A.D. 1313. Considering that Umāpati was the third in order of the santāna kuravar, reckoning back allowing about 25 years between each guru, we arrive at the first third of the 13th Century as the time when Meykaṇḍa lived. We may safely conclude that the 13th Century and the first half of the 14th Century constitute the period when the santāna kuravar flourished.[29]

The 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham' is a work consisting of twelve sūtras, each of which is a verse translation of the Sanskrit sūtra. The twelve sūtras (refer to diagram given) are divided into two main parts or chapters of six sūtras each ; the first part is indicated as general, and the second as special. The first part or general section deals with the metaphysics and psychology of the Śaiva Siddhānta, and the second or special section is of a practical character. Every chapter further deals with the topics noted against each of them in the diagram given. Each sūtra is further divided into separate theses or arguments or adhikaraṇas, which range from two to seven in number. Each adhikaraṇa has also a commentary or vārtika in very terse prose. The thesis and commentary of each sūtra are illustrated by udāharaṇa consisting of analogies. The value of this book is that it is a full if concise presentation of the Śaiva Siddhānta system.

29. Ś.S.V. pp.33-36 ; Schomerus, pp.25-26.

FIGURE 1.

- **Twelve sūtras.**
  - **Chapter I.** General—Consists of 6 sūtras.
    - **Pramāṇa-viyal.** i.e. Proof part.
      - Sūtra I. — 1. Proofs of exist-ence of God.
      - Sūtra II. — 2. Of trans-migration or the relation of God to the world and to the souls.
      - Sūtra III. — 3. Proofs of the exist-ence of souls.
    - **Lakṣaṇa-viyal.** i.e. Description of nature of soul, etc.
      - Sūtra IV. — 1. The soul in its rela-tion to the organs.
      - Sūtra V. — 2. The soul in its depend-ence on God.
      - Sūtra VI. — 3. The na-ture of matter is essen-tially dif-ferent from that of God.
  - **Chapter II** Special—Consists of 6 sūtras.
    - **Sādhana-viyal** i.e. Means to release.
      - Sūtra VII. — 1. The nature of soul as seeking release.
      - Sūtra VIII. — 2. Means to be used for attain-ment of re-lease.
      - Sūtra IX. — 3. Process of cleans-ing of the soul.
    - **Payaniyal** i.e. The nature of the fruit.
      - Sūtra X. — 1. Casting aside of the fetters of the soul.
      - Sūtra XI. — 2. Union of soul with God.
      - Sūtra XII. — 3. Descrip-tion of life of released souls.

Commentaries:

1. Pāṇḍi Perumāḷ Virutti. By Pāṇḍi Perumāḷ. It is a very clear one for the beginner.

2. Śiva-jñāna-bōdha Ciṟṟurai. By Śiva-jñāna-yogi who died in 1785 A.D.

3. Śiva-jñāna-bōdha Bhāṣyam. By the above.

'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār' consists of two parts called 'Parapakṣam' and 'Supakṣam'. The first part, 'Parapakṣam' is a controversial work like 'Saṅkaṟpanirākaraṇam', and states the positions of fourteen of the alien schools, and refutes them. The schools thus criticised are:

Lōkāyata, Buddhists-four sections, Jainas-two sections, Bhaṭṭācārya, Prabhākara, Śabda-brahmavādin, Māyāvādin, Pariṇāmavādin, Sāṅkhya, Pāñcarātri.

The second part, 'Supakṣam' is the commentary on the 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham'. Following the order of the original work, the commentary also is divided into the chapters, iyals, sūtras, and adhikaraṇas indicated above. The 'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār' is a very exhaustive treatise of the Siddhānta system containing very clear accounts and explanations of what is tersely expressed in the 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham'. The style of the commentary, 'Śiva-jñāna-siddhiār' is much easier than that of the original work. For these reasons, the 'Siddhiār' has won greater fame than the 'Bōdham' so much so that there is a proverb that beyond Śiva there is no greater being, and surpassing 'Siddhiār' there is no śāstra.

Commentaries for 'Supakṣam.' (By six people).

1. Joint Commentary by Drāviḍa Māpāḍiyar (Śiva-jñāna-yogin) and Subrahmaṇya Deśikar.
2. Commentary. By Nirambavaḻakiar.
3. Commentary. By Śivāgra Yogin.
4. Commentary. By Marai-jñāna Deśikar.
5. Commentary. By Jñāna-prakāśar.

The last mentioned commentary being a Śiva-sama-vāda work, Śiva-jñāna-munivar wrote a work refuting Śiva-sama-vāda.

Commentaries for Parapakṣam. By Tattvaprakāśa-tambirān Svāmi.

The poem 'Irupāvirupatu' also written by Aruḷ-nandi, is in some respects similar to Umāpati's 'Vināveṇbā.' As Umāpati dedicates his poem to his guru, Sambandhar, so Aruḷ-nandi dedicates his poem to his guru, Meykaṇḍa ; and each of these poets regards his guru as God himself, who for the purpose of guiding him has taken on the human form. Both works deal with some of the important topics of the Śaiva Siddhānta system, but of the two works, 'Irupāvirupatu' is more thorough. It is written in the form of a dialogue between teacher and pupil who discuss the topics of the nature of God, soul and of the malas, and their connection with the soul. Comparatively more space is given to the treatment of the fetters that bind the soul, and the way in which the soul is freed of these bonds, and attains release. Some interesting problems concerning the avasthās and transmigration are also discussed.

The poem, 'Tiruvuntiār' written by Uyyavanda Devar of Tiruviyalūr reminds one of the poem bearing the same name written by Māṇikkavācaga. Though both works use the term 'unti,' used in a certain game, they differ in their purpose and subject matter. Whereas Māṇikkavācaka intends his work to be a poem of praise, and sings of the triumphs of Śiva over his presumptuous foes, Uyyavanda Dēva wrote his work to be a spiritual guide to his pupil, and he therein expounds the means of attaining release, on studying which, one is deeply impressed with the vastness of the grace of God. This work consists of 45 verses, the last of which mentions the name of the author.

'Tirukkaḷiṟṟupaḍiār' consisting of 100 verses is a commentary on 'Tiruvuntiār'. Some of the topics treated here are not contained in the text on which this is a commentary.

Some of the noteworthy points dwelt upon are the forms taken by Śiva for the purposes of the release of the soul, the means of release, one stage of which namely, yoga, is dealt with at length, the fruits of grace, of which one is the bliss of the jīvanmuktas, and problems of the unchanging nature of God in spite of His contact with the world, and of His immanence and transcendence. The last few verses describe the poet's own salvation.

'Uṇmai viḷakkam' by Manavācagam Kaḍandār is a poem consisting of 54 verses in the form of a dialogue between the guru Meykaṇḍa and the disciple, who is the author himself. The first verse makes clear the purpose of the author which is to set forth in this short work a faithful account of the Āgamas for the benefit of the soul seeking release. The topics dealt with are the tattvas, āṇava and karma, the self, God, the Lord's sacred dance, the five letters, the nature of mukti union, and the means of attaining release. The poem ends with the author's indebtedness to his guru for help in attaining release.

The chief of Umāpati's works is 'Śivaprakāśam', which, consisting of 100 verses, is divided into two main sections, the first being a general treatment of the topics selected, and the second a detailed exposition of the same. The first part contains an introductory section, and a general treatment of the main Siddhānta topics of God, souls and matter, and the avasthās. The second part mainly deals with the soul, its avasthās, the way in which it attains knowledge, the benefits it experiences on coming to have enlightenment, and the happiness of those who, knowing the true nature of the soul, so direct their ways of life that they may be called the sons of God. The last verse but one summarises the general features of the whole work; and the last verse sets forth the way in which the truth contained in this work ought to be taught to deserving pupils.

Commentaries are by (1) Śivaprakāśar, (2) Cidambaranāda munivar, and (3) Tiruviḷaṅgam.

3

'Tiruvaruḷpayan' consists of ten chapters, each of which deals with the topic noted against it: Chapter 1. the nature of the supreme being; 2. the nature of souls; 3. the nature of āṇava; 4. the nature of grace; 5. grace through a guru; 6. the way of knowledge; 7. the cleansing of the soul; 8. ways of attaining bliss; 9. the five letters; 10. the bliss of the jivānmuktas. This work abounds in analogies that make it easy to understand the teaching expounded.

'Vināveṇbā' has already been compared with 'Irupāvirupatu'. As its name indicates, it is a poem containing questions regarding the main principles of the Siddhānta system. These teachings ought to be familiar to every Siddhāntin; and any of them who owing to lack of wisdom is unable to read the great and advanced sacred books ought to study at least this work. Addressing his tutor, Sambandhar, who, as noted above, is identified with God Himself, Umāpati requests Him to answer the questions which arise in his mind. The one that presents itself foremost to the poet is how God, who is pure, could dwell in him, a vile sinner, and how in spite of God's presence in himself, he was unaware of it. Verses 2-7 express the despair of the human soul which knowing the finite nature of its mind, realises that many things are beyond its grasp. The poet seeks to know from his guru, whether the human intelligence, which is thus feeble, can ever come to have knowledge of God's grace and of God Himself. Verse 10 questions about the relationship between the soul and God in the future life. Are they one, or are they two? Verse 11 is an enquiry into whether monism or pluralism is the correct view of the world. Verse 12 inquires into how the actions of the soul can become one with those of God. Verse 13 contains the author's estimate of the importance of his work, 'Vināveṇbā'.

Commentary. By Namaśivāya-tambirān Svāmi.

The poem, 'Pōṟṟipaḥroḍai' is a token of the poet's deepfelt gratitude to God for all His fatherly care of souls. He is very deeply impressed with the fact that in everything that

God does, He seeks only the welfare of the soul. So from beginning to end, the poem rings with praises of Śiva, considered as the father of all souls, who out of His benevolence seeks to redeem them. The nature of God is described as being inscrutable. Apart from this complimentary introduction, the poem strictly keeps to the purpose of showing that every act of Śiva is for the sake of doing good to souls. Tracing the career of an individual soul from the time it is born in this world, and through all its several births up to the time it attains mukti, it will be seen that every event that happens to the soul is conducive to its well-being, and is due to the will of God. The poet finally pays his highest tribute to God by despairing of rendering meet praise to Him for His love of mankind.

With regard to the circumstances in which 'Koḍikkavi' was composed, there is a story current that because Umāpati, a Brahmin, paid homage to Sambandhar, who was not a Brahmin, he was refused admission into the temple. After this incident, when the Brahmins at a certain festival attempted to rear the flag, it would not go up. They then heard a voice say to them that unless Umāpati were present, it would not go up. The Brahmins were therefore obliged to beg Umāpati to come to the temple. On the occasion of hoisting the flag, Umāpati is said to have composed this poem. With regard to this tradition, it is pointed out[30] that in chronicling events, the Tamilians who had not disciplined their minds to sifting fiction from fact, often mixed up the two. This leads one to conclude that no divine voice would have uttered things, but that the Brahmins would have felt uneasy in mind at having insulted Umāpati, and that one of them would have voiced his feeling that the poet should be invited to come.

In this short work, 'Koḍikkavi', the poet says that he rears this flag of verse for the purpose of uplifting the soul, which must fight its way through doubts regarding the existence of God, śakti, soul etc. The soul is linked with impurity,

30. Ś.S.V. pp.26-30.

but this initial stage of the soul can soon be outstripped with the help of divine grace. The fact of light and darkness, āṇava and divine grace, dwelling in the same place, the soul, is no cause for despair, for āṇava can never overwhelm light, though the reverse happens. Does the soul thirst for communion with God? The unceasing utterance of the sacred letters leads one into the right path of such union with God, for a conscientious effort in uttering these letters finally brings on the stage where Śiva and Śakti ever stay with the soul, which is thus blest with the perfect oneness with God, that it yearned to have. That the soul may thus attain the summit of perfection, and supreme bliss, the poet rears his flag of verse.

'Neñjuviḍutūtu,' means the message sent by the heart. As a maid would send a message of love to her lover, so Umāpati dedicates a poem of devotion to his guru, Sambandhar. The poem treats of the three entities God, soul and matter, and gives a brief exposition of the Śaiva Siddhānta system. Some of the alien schools are criticised. The reverence and affection with which Umāpati abounds for his guru are brought out in some of the verses. The general impression left on the reader's mind by this poem is that God, who is inaccessible except to those seeking Him in humility and love, is full of grace and compassion towards souls. In a mysterious way He regulates all the events of the world for the benefit of souls, and one is left wondering at all His ways that are past man's understanding.

'Saṅkaṟpanirākaraṇam' presents the position of some of the alien schools, and also points out their weaknesses. In his preface to this work, Umāpati relates how the controversies here presented arose between the representatives of the various sects. In 1235 of the *Sālivāhana* era, a certain festival brought together the learned ṛṣis of various faiths. In the hall of Cidambaram were assembled these learned ones ranging from the Māyāvādin at one end to a disciple of Meykaṇḍa at the other. At this moment, came one urgently seeking their help to enlighten him regarding the means

whereby he might snap the wearisome chain of births and deaths. The Māyāvādin promptly arose to expound his view, and the moment he had finished, the Aikyavādin refuted the position he had heard presented, and presented his own view as the correct one. The next to rise was the Pāṣāṇavādin, who in his turn refuted the last school and presented his own view; and thus the chain of refuting the previous speaker's position and presenting one's own was continued in succession by the Bhēdavādin, Śivasamavādin, Saṅkrāntivādin, Nimitta-kāraṇa-pariṇāmavādin and Śaivavādin.

'Uṇmai-neṟi-viḷakkam' whose authorship is not definitely known, is an exposition of the true path for those in eager pursuit of mukti. The progress of a soul following along these lines from the lowest to the highest stage is delineated. At the very elementary stage, the soul distinguishes the whole range of evolutes or the thirty-six tattvas, and in doing so, it perceives its true form. The next step is to note that these products are impure and inert; and herein, the soul has a darśana. The soul undergoes purification when with the help of God, it realises that its nature is different from these gross and material tattvas. The soul has a darśana of itself when, overcoming āṇava mala, and, being guided into all truth by Śivajñāna, it sees that it is akin to God and identifies itself with Him. The soul progresses further along the path of virtue and then has a Śiva-darśana when it finds out the beneficient nature of God, who for the sake of the soul, performs the function of creation, preservation and destruction of the world. When the soul makes a further advance, it gets steeped in Śiva, and sees everything in His light, thus experiencing a darśana of the truth of Śiva. Further movement along this line leads to identifying one's very actions and thoughts as God's and this is none other than the soul's experience of Śiva. When the soul yields itself to God, He takes His permanent abode in the soul, so that the soul, losing sight of itself and the world, is aware of Śiva alone and the bliss He imparts, and it is at this final stage that the soul is said to have the great experience of Śiva. Thus the soul that is in earnest search of the good is

led step by step along the true path so that from distinguishing the material things of this world, its capacity for discerning the subtle truth is enhanced so that it is finally suited for perfect communion with God, and this union with the God-head is the goal of the path of virtue.

Besides these works that have been reviewed, there are still a vast number of Śaiva Siddhānta works, which being devotional works, are placed in a class of their own apart from the Siddhānta Śāstras. These works were compiled by Nambi-āṇḍār-nambi to form *the twelve Tirumuṟai* :[31]

1-7. are known by the common name of 'Aḍaṅgan Muṟai,' and consist of

(a) the Tēvārams of Sambandhar forming Tirumuṟai 1-3 ;
(b) the Tēvārams of Appar forming Tirumuṟai 4-6 ;
(c) the Tēvārams of Sundarar forming Tirumuṟai 7 ;

8. 'Tiruvācagam', 'Tirukōvaiār'. By Māṇikkavācaga.

9. Joint works called 'Tiruviśaipākkaḷ' of nine Śaivites from Tirumāḷikai Dēvar to Śētirāyar, and 'Tirupallāṇḍu' by Śēntanār.

10. 'Tirumantiram'. By Tirumūlar.

11. Works of poets ranging from Tiruvālavāyuḍaiār to Paṭṭinattaḍikaḷ and the works of Nambi-āṇḍār-nambi.

12. 'Peria Purāṇam' by Śēkkilār.

Of these different writers, those most noteworthy for the Śaiva Siddhānta system are those known as the 'samaya kūravar', who are the following poets :

Māṇikkavācaga,
Tirunāvukkarasu,
Tirujñāna-sambandhar,
Sundarar.

31. O.R.L.I. p.256 ; H.B. Vol. II, p.215 ; Ś.S.V. pp.5-6.

As the four santāna kuravar expounded the truths of the Āgamas in their works, so these samaya kuravar, by means of the 'Tēvārams' and 'Tiruvācagam' shed light on the truths contained in the jñāna-kāṇḍa of the Vedas.[32]

Māṇikkavācaga, who was born in Tiruvādavūr, near Madura, was early reputed to be learned in all the Śaivāgamas. The king of Madura, who had heard of his fame, was much impressed with his ability when he met him, and lost no time in engaging him as prime minister. He graced the office so well that the king soon delegated all responsibility to him. Māṇikkavācaga proved himself able to discharge all duties and worthy of every one's trust. The minister's greatest interest, however, lay in an entirely different direction. He reflected on the teaching of the Āgamas, which he had so assiduously studied; and deep in his heart was a great yearning for a guru, who would give him further guidance that would lead him to the highest spiritual plane. As the days rolled on, it happened that news came of the arrival of merchants from a neighbouring country bringing with them the most splendid horses conceivable. The king of Madura, eager to possess them, sent Māṇikkavācaga with much treasure to purchase these horses. The prime minister, with a vast retinue, set out in all magnificence to the port where the foreigners were said to have landed. While travelling thither, there came suddenly into his view a glorious scene where a host of saints, with heads bent in reverent meditation, had assembled around their leader, who looked like Śiva Himself. Māṇikkavācaga, who was transported into the region of bliss when he came to know that under the direction of a holy guru, the rest led prayerful lives, could not resist the call that now came to him to become one of the band. Heedless of what had brought him thus far, and of the unfulfilled mission of the king of Madura, Māṇikkavācaga, discarding his rich robes, wore those of an ascetic, and after the initiation ceremonies, became a disciple entitled to hear the teachings about Śiva, and His grace,

32. Ś.S.V. p.9.

which leads to Him. His followers were furious over this incident, and unable to persuade Māṇikkavācaga to resume his neglected duties, returned to the king with the news of all that had happened. Meanwhile, Māṇikkavācaga tarried with the guru, who was none other than Śiva Himself, who with the other ascetics, being gods from heaven, had come down to earth in answer to the prayers of the saintly Māṇikkavācaga that he should have a guru. Māṇikkavācaga, however, was not to have this goodly company for very long, for Śiva left this company, and soon He was followed by the gods, leaving Māṇikkavācaga alone. He now had to reckon with the king of Madura, whose service he had so lightly waived aside. The king was anxious to do justice to his minister, but he was for long ignorant of the true state of affairs ; and it was due to this ignorance that he imprisoned Māṇikkavācaga, and later even tortured him, for his late minister had neither purchased the horses, nor had returned the money. When ultimately the king had unmistakable proofs of the innocence of Māṇikkavācaga, he granted to the poet his request that he should be free to live a religious life. Then followed the period of his visits to sacred shrines, of his further religious experiences, and of his literary productions. He did not visit as many shrines as Sambandhar visited, and he did not have as hard a struggle with alien faiths as Tirunāvukkaraśu had, yet in his contribution to the Śaiva Siddhānta writings, he takes a leading place among the samaya kuravars. "Among Tamil Śaivite writers, none makes a stronger devotional appeal than Māṇikkavācaga. There is a common Tamil saying that nothing can melt the heart of the man who is not melted by the 'Tiruvācagam'"[33]

Having surveyed the life of the saint of the 'ruby-utterances,' we may pass on to consider the life of the 'king of the sacred tongue', the poet, 'Tirunāvukkaraśu', who was born in answer to the prayer of his parents, Pukaḷanār and Mātiniār, that it should be their privilege to have a child, who would be a powerful champion of Śaivism and would establish

33. H.T.Ś.S. p.87.

it as the true faith against the encroaching advances of Buddhism and Jainism. Though religiously inclined, he did not at first fulfil the expectations of his parents, but on the contrary, did what would have grieved them had they lived to see it, for instead of championing Śaivism, he supported Jainism, which was one of the faiths they longed to stamp out. However, this state of affairs was not to continue long; for in answer to the prayers of his elder sister, the poet arrived at the turning point in his life. He was afflicted with a grievous illness, and his sister now turned the patient's thoughts to Śiva. The poet then sang to Śiva the beautiful hymn which earned him the name he came to bear.

He came into conflict with the Jainas whose hatred for him knew no bounds as he had deserted their faith. They persecuted him in many ways, but he was in no way hurt by all this. At one time, he was imprisoned in a hot room which, after an interval of seven days, the Jainas opened expecting to find his corpse, but the prisoner, sustained by Śiva, was none the worse for this. He was tied to a stone pillar, and cast into the sea, but instead of sinking, he floated on the water.

His younger contemporary was the poet, Tiru-jñāna-sambandhar. In Shiyāli, also known as Brahmapuram, which is in the Cōḷa country, there lived a saintly man by the name of Śivapādavirudayar. He prayed that he and his wife, Bhagavatiār, should be blest with a son, who would be filled with the grace of Śiva, that would enable him to overcome the alien faiths. Accordingly, the child he desired was born in the world to gladden his life. One day, when the boy was three years old, he followed his father, who went out to have his bath. The father placed the child at the edge of the tank, while he went further for his ablutions. Meanwhile, the child growing impatient began to weep. Śiva, in order to comfort the child, appeared before him along with his consort, whom he asked to feed the child with food consisting of milk and Śiva-jñāna. The child that was now pacified, was destined to have a remarkable career. The father coming up to take his

child home, and seeing the milk dribbling down the lips, upbraided the little one for taking milk from some one unknown. It was then that the inspired babe sang to the father the hymn which explained the auspicious event that had occured in his absence. The father on knowing what had happened was over-joyed. The boy visited many temples, and sang hymns to the astonishment of even the most learned ṛṣis. The Tēvārams written by him may be classified into those written on the occasion

1. of the poet visiting the sacred shrines in different cities;

2. of the poet contending against the Jainas and Buddhists;

3. of the poet performing miracles.

The wisdom contained in these compositions proved beyond doubt that the author quite merited the name of 'Tiru-jñāna-sambandhar' that was given to him.

Tirunāvukkaraśu and Sambandhar, the militant champions of Śaivism, having mutual admiration, spent much time in the company of each other, and visited many holy shrines together. They were the two saints that more than the others of their group came into conflict with the Buddhists and Jainas, and did much to establish Śaivism, that was menaced with being wiped out.

Sundarar, according to tradition, was at one time a god, who in attempting to gather flowers for the worship of the Supreme, met two beautiful goddesses with whom he fell in love, and who responded to his love. However, they all tried to overcome their feelings and forget the incident. Śiva, whom Sundarar approached to worship, decreed that since he had desired the ladies he must go down to the earth and in his earthly career, have them as his wives. Sundarar was unhappy to hear this sentence passed, but prayed that he might not get entangled in worldly temptation. Apart from this tradition,

the historical Sundarar married two wives, and experienced the domestic unhappiness that is inevitable. His biography abounds in tales in which Śiva taking on the guise suited to the occasion, helps his devotee or gives evidence of His deep concern for him ; and many of the 'Tēvārams' written by the saint are to express his gratitude to Śiva for His kindly thought of him. It will be noted that the lives of all these saints were marked by miracles. Those witnessed by the saints Tirunāvukkaraśu and Sambandhar both in their personal lives, and in their contest with the alien faiths, served to reveal the power of Śiva. When, for instance, it was proposed that Sambandhar was to heal one half of the body of the Pāṇḍyan king, while the Jainas healed the other half, Sambandhar uplifted his heart in prayer to Śiva, and while rubbing the body of the patient with the sacred ash, he sang :

> The sacred ash has mystic power,
> 'Tis worn by dwellers in the sky.
> The ash bestows true loveliness.
> Praise of the ash ascends on high.[34]

Śiva, in prompt answer to the prayer made to Him, enabled Sambandhar not only to heal the half of the king's body that he was expected to heal, but also the half which the Jainas proved themselves unable to heal. Again, when Tirunāvukkaraśu prayed that he should be relieved of the agonising sickness with which he was aflicted, a miraculous cure of the same followed, and the poet in gratitude remembers the event saying :

> "The spotless pure, the holy one, my fell disease He healed."[35]

The revelation of God obtained from these miracles is that of God as a king, who being omnipotent, graciously does the needful for His devotees that turn to Him for help.

34. H.T.Ś.S. p.23.
35. „ p.47.

In connection with Māṇikkavācaga, we see that God out of His exceeding love for His devoted disciple manifests Himself as a guru, and instructs him in the true faith. He later takes on the form of a horse-dealer to present the horses to the king of Madura, so that the king, receiving his due, may release Māṇikkavacaga. For the rest of the saint's life, God comes to be his kinsman and friend. This intimate relation between God and His devotee comes into greater prominence in the life of Sundarar. Śiva does the mad act of taking on the form of a Brahmin preferring the absurd claim that Sundarar is His slave. Sundarar meetly commemorates the event in a poem addressing Śiva as 'Oh madman'. The devotee draws nigh to God so much that even for his domestic difficulties, he seeks the aid of God. On one occasion, when rice was wanted for his two wives, Śiva not only provided the rice, but had it carried to his place in answer to His devotee's prayer as follows :

> Thou art half woman Thyself ;
> Gaṅgā is in Thy long hair.
> Full well can'st Thou comprehend
> Burden of women so fair.
> Kuṇḍaiyūr, circled with gems,
> There didst Thou give rice to-day.
> Source of all, wonderful one,
> Bid it be sent me, I pray.[36]

Yet in response to all this familiar condescension on the part of Śiva, the poet cherishes for his redeemer nothing but reverent devotion.

> Henceforth for me no birth, no death,
> No creeping age, bull-rider mine.
> Sinful and full of lying breath
> Am I, but do Thou mark me Thine.
> Veṇṇey-nallūr, in 'Graces shrine'

36. H.T.Ś.S. p. 81.

South of the wooded Peṇṇai, there
My Master, I became all thine ;
How could I now myself forswear ?[37]

The dates of these saints can as in the case of the writers of the Meykaṇḍa śāstras, be only approximately fixed. Such divergent accounts are given with regard to the dates of Māṇikkavācaga that they range from the 1st Century A.D. to the 8th or even later. Those who fix on the earliest date do so on the assumption that as the Buddhists with whom Māṇikkavācaga disputed came from Ceylon, the event must have occured before Buddhism began to prevail in south India.[38] Others still place him much later in the 7th or 8th Century when Buddhism was dying out or rather had decayed in India.[39] Apart from these conjectures, there is the fact that there is internal evidence to prove similarity in some places between the works of Appar and Māṇikkavācaga. Thus :[39a]

யாமார்க்கும் குடியல்லோம் யாதுமஞ்சோம்
நாமார்க்கும் குடியல்லோம் நமனையஞ்சோம்

சிந்தையே கோயில் கொண்ட வெம்பெருமான்
நினைப்பவர் மனங் கோயிலாக் கொண்டவன்

To help one to decide which of these saints modelled his lines on those of the other, there is the fact that Appar refers to the miracle of the jackals being converted into horses, and since the story occurs only in the life-history of Māṇikkavācaga,[39a] it would not have been available to Appar unless Māṇikkavācaga had been either his contemporary or forerunner. Māṇikkavācaga, cannot therefore be placed later than Appar to whom the date assigned is the close of the 6th Century A.D.

37. H.T.Ś.S. p.77.
38. Ś.S.D. Vol. III, Article entitled, 'The Age of Māṇikkavācaga,' p.36 ; P. K. p.67.
39. Tv. Introduction p.xvii.
39-a. Ś.S.D. Vol. III, p.36 ; P. K. p.67.

If this early date be assigned to him, the question arises as to why this saint of the 'ruby utterances' is not commemorated by Sundarar in his versified list of saints contained in his 'Tiruttoṇḍattokai' (on which is based Śēkkiḻār's 'Peria Purāṇam'). Of the numerous explanations offered[40] to account for this serious omission, the one worthy of acceptance is that for the sake of brevity, he classified a large number of saints and made mention of the group names, and that Māṇikkavācaga is included in the group known as, 'Poyyaḍimai illāta pulavar', which being translated means, 'Poets who acknowledge no false authority.'

The date assigned to Sambandhar is the early part of the 7th Century A.D.,[41] because his contemporary Siruttoṇḍan took part in the battle of Vātāpi which was fought in 642 A.D.[42] He must be placed before the decline of Jainism and Buddhism, because he was one of those that worked to bring about this change. If the beginning of the 7th Century be assigned to Sambandhar, Appar, being his earlier contemporary, must be placed not later than the close of the 6th Century. As all these saints are mentioned by Sundarar, he was the last of them, and is generally said to have lived in the first quarter of the 9th Century A.D.

40. Ś.S.D. Vol. V. Article entitled, 'Saint Māṇikkavācaga,' pp.202-205.

41. H.T.Ś.S. pp. 11; 29; H.B. Vol. 2, p. 215.

42. H.T.Ś.S. pp.11, 29. The false authority referred to in the case of Māṇikkavācaga, is that of the king of Madura, whose service he left to enter the service of God, thus acknowledging Him as the true authority.

CHAPTER II

ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA EPISTEMOLOGY.

It was noted in the previous chapter that truths constituting the Śaiva Siddhānta system are expounded in the Vedas and Śaivāgamas. Since these Scriptures are meant for souls at various levels of spiritual advancement, the revelations contained therein rank in a hierarchical order. The highest of these is that disclosed to the Śaiva Siddhāntīn, who for that reason claims that his system is the 'Accomplished End'. According to this supreme revelation, there are the three padārthās, God, soul and matter, which are the ultimate principles of the universe. If valid knowledge of these ultimate realities is to be attained, it is of great importance to scrutinise the instruments whereby knowledge is attained to see that they are genuine means of approach to truth.

The instrument of valid knowledge is named 'pramāṇa' by the Siddhāntin. This term, which is used by other schools as well, comes to have a very distinctive sense in the hands of the Siddhāntin; and unless a good deal of what is significant in his epistemology is to be missed, it is important to know this term as differentiated from the sense it has in certain other systems. As defined by certain thinkers, 'pramāṇa' is the means of knowledge. As defined by the Siddhāntin, however, pramāṇa is that instrument of knowledge in the absence of which no object of knowledge whatever becomes known.[1] The grounds on which he is obliged to offer this definition as superseding the other are set forth.[2] Should 'pramāṇa' be understod as the 'means of knowledge' then the sense organs and even outside accessories, such as light etc., would claim to be pramāṇas. These help to attain knowledge,

1. P.B. p.524.   2. P.B. pp.524-527.

but they are not indispensable. The Siddhāntin's desire for such preciseness cannot be explained away as whimsical. It becomes necessary to confine oneself to what is indispensable, as otherwise, the attempt to embrace every element that serves as a means to knowledge in whatever way cannot stop until the whole of the universe is embraced, so that the distinction between means of knowledge and object of knowledge gets annulled. By a process of elimination, the Siddhāntin excludes whatever falls short of his norm. The senses of sight, hearing etc., come short of the requirement set up by the Siddhāntin because though the sense of sight plays a part in the process of seeing, it is not required in the process of hearing; and this latter, again, may drop out in the process of tactual perception. Thus in the case of all senses, it can be proved that none of them is an indispensable instrument of knowledge. Further, the senses are inferred through their effects, sound etc., and being thus objects of inferential cognition, they cannot themselves be instruments of knowledge.

The claim of being an indispensable instrument of knowledge cannot be made even for buddhi, which appears to be invariably present in all processes of cognition. For in those cognitions where buddhi itself is the object cognised, it cannot serve in the two-fold capacity of an object of knowledge and an instrument of knowledge. The object of knowledge and pramāṇa being mutually exclusive, the one cannot be the other. The claim made for buddhi, that in its essential nature it is not an object of knowledge, cannot be allowed, for being an evolute of prakṛti, it is non-intelligent; and the condition of anything inert not being an object of knowledge, is as non-existent as the horns of a hare.

Thus when all the sense organs, which to the Siddhāntin are mere auxiliaries to knowing, are ruled out, it may yet be contended that, though individually the karaṇas have failed to be instruments of knowledge in the more precise sense of the Siddhāntin, yet the conjunction of all these, could be a pramāṇa. In considering this possibility, the Siddāntin points out

that such an assemblage of conditions could not be permitted unless the distinctions of knower, known and knowledge are to be ignored.

Though judged by the norm of an instrument of knowledge without which no object of knowledge can be known, the senses, buddhi and the conjunction of all these are to be passed over, there is yet one residual means that promises to stand the test. This is self-luminous cit-śakti, or intelligence, free from doubt and error. Of this alone it can be said that it is that instrument of knowledge without which no object of knowledge can be known. This distinctive feature of being an instrument of knowledge cannot characterise it unless at the same time it be also intelligent, and be not an object of knowledge. The supreme nature of cit-śakti with reference to the karaṇas is brought out by the expression, 'I see'. Here the sense organ is shewn to be merely an auxiliary. Such auxiliaries find their place in the process of cognition because cit-śakti is beginninglessly associated with mala. If this limitation did not exist for the intelligence, these karaṇas would not be required. However, their office is but for a time. When cit-śakti is freed of obscuring impurities, these karaṇas would have no need to continue.

So long, however, as it continues to be mala-covered, cit-śakti is obliged to function with accessories. As these accessories are numerous and varied, as are also the objects of knowledge, in any particular cognition, the intelligence together with certain accessories etc., makes a combination different from that obtained in yet a different cognition when cit-śakti works with the help of other karaṇas, forming a different setting. These various combinations, into which cit-śakti enters when cognising objects, are the subsidiary pramāṇas recognised by the Siddhānta.

Of these, certain thinkers discriminate three, others six and still others ten. The pramāṇas that have gained recognition at the hands of all groups are the following:

Śabda, Anumāna, Pratyakṣa.

The supreme place is given to śabda-pramāṇa because the Śaivāgamas are the authority for knowledge concerning the entities of Pati, paśu and pāśa, made known to the Śaiva Siddhānta system. These Scriptures are wholly reliable as Śiva Himself is their author,[3] and His intelligence being free from obscuring impurities, is able to function without any foreign accessory. To attain true knowledge, the Siddhāntin must get his instruction from an ācārya. If it be asked whether the ācārya, who though leading a dedicated life, and well-versed in all the Scriptures, can be entirely depended on by the disciple for giving him valid knowledge alone, it is replied that the ācārya is Śiva Himself, who is omniscient. Śiva has no body, but for the sake of bestowing grace on His creatures, appears in the form of a guru to the advanced souls in the class of sakalas. As Śiva takes on this form for instructing souls, the terms 'Guru' and 'Śiva' are used interchangeably so that by Śiva is meant the Guru, and by Guru is meant Śiva.[4]

Śabda-pramāṇa is thus the highest means of attaining true knowledge. There is no need to revolt against giving the highest place to śabda-pramāṇa as there is no cleavage between śruti and reason. In fact, the ācārya recognises that every faculty of the disciple should be called into play in his search for truth; and hence, he himself urges the disciple to discover for himself whether what is taught him can stand the light of reason, testing every statement made, by all the criteria known to him.[5] If the disciple tried merely to accumulate unquestioningly what is taught him, he would get little profit from this, as he would soon forget what he had heard; moreover, such knowledge would soon be undermined by doubts that rise in every thinking mind. If, on the other hand, he tested the validity of every one of his beliefs, he would find such knowledge become his permanent possession as, being acquired through his experience, and based on reason, it would not be overthrown by doubts.

3. Ś.S.P. p.5.
4. „ p.6.
5. „ pp. 20-21.

In the wake of śabda-pramāṇa, which is given the highest status, come the two other means of attaining knowledge, namely, pratyakṣa and anumāna. For the purpose of attaining knowledge by these means, the disciple must undergo sufficient preparation. He should not dare to undertake the sacred task of the study of the Scripture without going through certain graded purificatory rites.[6] Man is human, and God divine, but man has in him a spark of the divine, and hence, if he will nurture the divine flame in him, he will be endowed with new powers of vision that will guide him to the whole truth. The best of human efforts while separated from God, can never lead to true knowledge. On questions of ultimate realities, the most contradictory opinions are set forth.[7] Some declare that all things are eternal; others hold just the opposite view that all things are transitory. A life of detachment from this life's sordid attractions, and a growing desire for the exalted life of the spirit gradually lead one in the path of truth. Soon, the śakti of Śiva, which is immanent in the soul, functioning as a revealing agent, dispels all ignorance, doubts and contradictions, and gives to the soul the highest truths of the Siddhānta.

It was noted above that whereas some maintain that the pramāṇas are three in number, others add as many more to constitute six valid pramāṇas, and others still hold that there are ten of them.[8] Those that recognise six, give the following list:

1. Pratyakṣa. .... observation.
2. Anumāna. .... mediate inference.
3. Āgama. .... testimony or authority.
4. Abhāva or anupalabdhi. .... non-perception.
5. Arthāpatti. .... presumption.
6. Upamāna. .... comparison.

6. Ś.S.P. p.7.
7. „ p.37.
8. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v. I.

Others still add the following four to the list, making a total of ten :

7. Pāriśeṣa. ....inference by elimination.
8. Sambhava. ....probability.
9. Aitihyam. ....tradition.
10. Svabhāva-Liṅga. ....natural inference.

The majority of the Siddhānta writers hold that the extra seven pramāṇas which they do not recognise can be reduced to the three pramāṇas admitted by all writers of the Siddhānta.[9] Abhāva is to be included in pratyakṣa ; arthāpatti, upamāna, pāriśeṣa, sambhava and svabhāva-liṅga under anumāna ; and aitihyam in śabda pramāṇa[10] as shewn below :

1. Abhāva. ....pratyakṣa.
2. Arthāpatti. ....anumāna.
3. Upamāna. ....anumāna.
4. Pāriśeṣa. ....anumāna.
5. Sambhava. ....anumāna.
6. Svabhāva Liṅga. ....anumāna.
7. Aitihyam ....śabda.

These seven pramāṇas which are ruled out as having no claim to recognition may now be considered to see whether they have been justly dismissed.

Regarding the pramāṇa of abhāva, varied opinions have been expressed by different schools of thought. Of these, three main trends of thought are worthy of note :

1. *That abhāva is a case of perception.*

Sāṅkhyas and Prābhākaras maintain that there is perception of the mere locus.

9. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v. 1 ; Ś.S.P. p.38,
10. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v. 1

2. *That abhāva is an independent pramāṇa.*

Vedāntins and the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsakas maintain this view on the ground that there is not merely the locus, but also an element of non-existence.

3. *That abhāva is a perception of a peculiar type.*

This is the Nyāya view as also the Siddhānta view.

The Sāṅkhyas and Prābhākaras hold that the judgment, 'There is no pot on the ground now', is an instance of perception, and that therefore, a separate pramāṇa, such as abhāva, is not required.[11] The reason set forth by them in support of their view that the cognition of non-existence is a case of perception is that, as in pratyakṣa one is concerned purely with what is present to sense-perception, so in the cognition of non-existence, one is met with the mere locus or ground that is present to sense-perception. On this ground, abhāva, as an indepedent pramāṇa is dismissed, and the cognition of non-existence classified as an instance of pratyakṣa.

Before such a conclusion can be accepted, the ground on which it is based needs to be tested. If the perception of the mere locus be considered to give rise to the cognition of non-existence, then the occasions when in spite of observing the locus, some time elapses before the pot is missed, conflict with the assumption. On analysing the process of missing the pot, it will be found that it comes about when from the subconscious there gradually comes up to the region of full consciousness the fact that formerly there was a pot on the ground. On looking to find it on the ground, one misses it. It is this conjunction of the two elements, the recollection of a past experience and the present perception of the bare locus, that gives rise to the cognition of non-existence. When either of these is absent, there is no cognition of non-existence. The lapse of time that sometimes occurs before such a cognition

11. S.W.K. pp.157-158.

takes place, in spite of the presence of the locus, is explained by the non-functioning of the memory element concerned, or in other words, the absence of the recollection of the former presence of the pot on the ground. Thus the presence of the mere locus does not suffice to explain the cognition of non-existence. In fact, there are cases of abhāva wherefrom the perceptive element is totally absent, at the time of making the judgment. E.g., when a certain person is asked if he saw Maitra at the sacrificial theatre, and he after an attempt to recollect the past event replies that Maitra was not at the theatre, he need not be at the place mentioned when the query arises, and need not go there before giving his reply. If so, the claim that the cognition of non-existence is a case of perception, as it has to do only with what is present to the senses, is spurious.

In examining the reasons offered for the view that the cognition of non-existence is a case of perception, we have noted some of the facts which make it impossible to reckon this cognition as an instance of perception. Among those who refuse to reduce abhāva to perception are the Advaitins and the Bhāṭṭa School of Mīmāṃsakas. Of the objections urged by them against the Sāṅkhya view, one has already been mentioned, which is that the perception of the bare locus cannot be counted as the only requisite for the cognition of non-existence, for the instances where the perception of the locus does not engender the cognition of non-existence lead one to search for the other element or elements required to bring about the cognition. The second fact pressed by them against their opponents is that should perception of the mere locus be the condition required for the cognition of the non-existence of the pot, such cognition could not be expected to be experienced when there is, for instance, a cloth on the ground, for in that case, the condition required, viz., of existence of a bare locus, is not had. The *reductio ad absurdum* of this position is that the pot will not be missed so long as there is some other object on the ground. Apart from these objections raised by the Vedāntins against the view that abhāva is none other than

pratyakṣa, they point out a very significant fact in support of their own view. The inadequacy of the view that there is only the locus required for the cognition in question has been realised. The Advaitin proceeds to say that the other element is the non-existence of the pot. The ground and the non-existence on it of the pot are considered to be mutually irreducible elements concerned in cases of the cognition of non-existence. Since in this process of cognition, there are more elements than are present in ordinary pratyakṣa, the Advaitins contend that the process concerned is not perception, but a further kind of cognition denoted by the term, 'abhāva.'

The Nyāya takes up a middle position between the two views presented above, of the Sāṅkhya saying that the cognition of non-existence is a case of perception of the mere locus, and of the Advaitin maintining besides the locus an added element of non-existence, the cognition of which requires the independent pramāṇa of abhāva. In agreement with the Advaitin, the Naiyāyika holds that besides the locus, there is a further element, but he does not hold with him in his contention for an independent pramāṇa. With the Sāṅkhya, the Nyāya agrees to the extent of maintaining that no separate pramāṇa is required, but dissents from the view that besides the mere locus, there is no further element in the cognition of non-existence.

The Nyāya maintains that the cognition of non-existence is an instance of perception.[12] In taking up this position, it has to answer certain objections. The Nyāya admits that the mere locus does not suffice for the matter in hand. The further element of non-existence is also required. If, as the Nyāya contends, the cognition in question is a case of perception, then as perception occurs only when the object concerned is present for cognition, so the perception of non-existence can also come about only when both the elements concerned, the locus and the non-existence of the pot, are present. The

12. S.W.Ḳ. pp.158-159.

presence of an absent article is admittedly absurd. The Naiyāyika attempts to meet this difficulty by his rather novel view-point expressed by the term, 'viśeṣaṇatā' or adjectivity. According to this theory, non-existence is an attribute of the ground, and the senses come into contact with this attribute through contact with the locus. This view has to prove that non-existence is an attribute of the ground and that a special mode of contact (sannikarṣa) makes possible the perception of non-existence. Those attributes such as colour, that are readily admitted to be attributes of the ground are the elments that constitute the ground, so that where they are, there also is the ground, and apart from them, the ground is not thinkable. Further, these attributes can all be perceived. Can these features characterise non-existence too ? For if non-existence is an attribute of the ground, it must have these features in common with them. Non-existence, however, has exactly the opposite features to those mentioned. Non-existence cannot be claimed as one of the constituents of the ground. Nor is it present to perception as the other elements are present to perception. If in these important respects non-existence differs from the other attributes of the ground, the assumption that it is an attribute of the ground proves groundless. The further assumption of a special sannikarṣa proves equally groundless both because non-existence is not an attribute of the ground, and because whereas the other attributes of the ground are perceived without delay on seeing the ground, non-existence is sometimes not cognised at once. These difficulties prove that the theory of viśeṣaṇatā is without foundation.

The Siddhāntin, in examining the problem sets forth various arguments[13] which point out that in abhāva there is besides the locus an additional element. For instance, the knowledge of abhāva involves that of its correlate, which however, is absent from the locus. Further, it may happen that an identical locus serves as the basis for cognitions of more than one kind of abhāva, e.g., (i) The ground is not the pot,

13. P.B. pp.535-537.

(ii) The ground is characterised by absence of the pot. If the cognitions of these different types of non-existence depended on the same substrate, then the diversity of the cognitions would remain unexplained.

The judgments of abhāva are expressed either in the form 'The ground is characterised by the absence of the pot', or in the form, 'There is absence of the pot on the ground'. In the first example, non-existence occurs as the predicate, and in the second as the subject. If the locus alone served to lead to abhāva cognition, then in such a judgment as the first example, the relation existing between the 'ground' and 'non-existence' (as substance and attribute) would be left unexplained. If the Siddhāntin had examined the second example, he might have given a more conclusive argument than the former in proving his point that the mere locus does not suffice in abhāva cognition. The judgment expressed in the form, 'There is absence of the pot on the ground', has for its subject an element other than the locus.

The fact that in abhāva there is more than the locus constitutes for the Siddhāntin the necessity for deviating from a view such as that upheld by the Prābhākaras that abhāva is due to perception of the mere locus. However, this recognition of the element that exists besides the locus in abhāva, which he admits in agreement with the Advaitins, does not lead to the further agreement with them that an independent pramāṇa is required for the cognition in question. His position like that of the Naiyāyika is one of compromise between the view of the Prābhākara and that of the Advaitin. The points of contact with and the points of divergence from these schools are identical for the Siddhānta and the Nyāya. The similarity traced thus far between the Siddhānta and the Nyāya on the question of abhāva is seen to develop into identity in the solutions offered to the problem of abhāva. As the Nyāya maintains that the cognition of abhāva is due to perception involving a special kind of contact described as 'viśeṣaṇatā', the Siddhānta also explains abhāva by the same special kind of sense contact, 'viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva.'

In tracing the theories that have proved themselves a failure, it was noted that the element which in the cognition of non-existence refuses to be reduced to anything else or to be ignored wholly, is that which exists besides the bare locus. It was noted also that often there was delay in this element asserting itself. This other constituent, as said before, is the recollection of the past experience of the perception of the pot on the ground. Since perception does not include within itself previous knowledge, the cognition of non-existence, which, having such previous knowledge as one of its essential elements, refuses to be compromised in any way, cannot be a case of perception. The attempts to reduce it to that have resulted in absurdities.

Nor yet does it seem possible to deny it independent status, and reduce it to any of the other pramāṇas. In one respect, it bears a great resemblance to upamāna. As in saying, 'This gavaya resembles my cow', the recollected image of the cow is compared with the present perception of the gavaya, so in saying, 'There is no pot on the ground now', there is comparison between the previous experience of the ground as seen with a pot, and the present experience of the ground as seen without a pot. Yet the one process cannot be said to be the other. In upamāna, comparison is the main thing, but in abhāva, comparison is only one of the elements, and the interest centres round the absence of the object concerned. If these differences are not to be ignored, abhāva must be recognised as an independent pramāṇa.

As in the case of abhāva, so also in the case of upamāna, there has been no agreement as to whether it should have independent status; and among those that consider it to have no claim for recognition, there is lack of agreement again as to the pramāṇa to which it should be reduced. Certain of those, who deny its claim to independence, hold that it is a case of perception. The judgment, 'This gavaya is like my cow', is considered by them to be a judgment of perception of similarities. The Vedāntins contending for the recognition of upamāna as an independent pramāṇa point out that though the

example, 'This gavaya is like my cow', may be considered an instance of perception of similarities, the judgment, 'My cow is like this gavaya' cannot be reckoned another example of the same process, as, in this case, the subject of the judgment, 'my cow', is not present to perception, and there can be no perception of a non-present object. In addition to this criticism by the Vedāntin, it may be said that in such a judgment of comparison as 'King Edward I was wiser than his son, Edward II,' neither of the persons between whom the comparison is made, is present. Thus though in the process of comparison, perception at times is one of the elements, it is not the only element so as to justify one in reducing the process to one of perception; nor is it one of the essential elements invariably present.

The Siddhāntins who do not recognise the claims of upamāna as an independent pramāṇa maintain that it is an instance of anumāna. Those who are in agreement with this view seek to justify it by maintaining that as in anumāna, so also in the case of upamāna, there is mediate reasoning, which may be expressed as follows:

If an object resembles another object, then conversely, the latter resembles the former.

The gavaya resembles the cow.
Therefore, the cow resembles the gavaya.[14]

Since anumāna is a process of mediate syllogistic reasoning proceeding from general to particular, the process of comparison, which does not attempt to bring any particular under any accepted vyāpti, cannot be said to be an instance of anumāna. On the contrary, just as anumāna has its own distinctive mental processes of proceeding from vyāpti and, through exhibiting the middle ground, arriving at the conclusion, so also upamāna has its own distinctive features that justify its recognition as an independent pramāṇa. In all cases

14. S.W.K. p.142.

of upamâna whether resulting in judgments such as, 'This gavaya is like my cow', or in judgments such as, 'My cow is like this gavaya', or in judgments even more simple such as, 'This is a deeper blue than that', there is a certain cognitive process which is the distinctive feature of cognitions of similarity. Other features may or may not be present, thus proving that they are not essential; but there is one unfailing feature which constitutes the distinctive mark of cognitions of similarity. This is the process of comparing two or more objects concerned in respect of a particular criterion. In the simple judgment, 'This is more blue than that', the two objects concerned are judged in respect of the criterion blue colour. Similarly, in asserting, 'This gavaya is like my cow' or 'My cow is like this gavaya,' the animals are compared with regard to their appearance. To make explicit the process of comparison involved, the assertions made may be expressed in other words as 'The appearance of this animal is like the appearance of that.' It is not necessary that either one or all of the objects concerned should be present to perception. Even in the case of absent objects that are being compared, it is possible to review in mind one object and then the other, and back and forth like this to see how they stand in relation to each other in respect of a particular criterion. This is the distinctive feature of comparison which cannot be distorted to take the form of syllogistic reasoning to favour those who would regard upamāna as an instance of anumāna, or be dismembered to retain only the element that is sometimes present, to favour the theory that the process is an instance of perception. This warrants the recognition of the independence of this pramāṇa which, at the hands of the Advaitins and the Mīmāṃsakas, receives the name of 'upamāna' which, "etymologically means comparison or knowledge of similarity".[15]

For arthāpatti or postulation, the usual example given is "Devadatta is fat though he fasts by day, so he

15. S.W.K. p.142.

must eat at night"; and the assumption here is that he eats by night. A second example is as follows: "A man who is alive is not at home; therefore, he is out." In all cases of arthāpatti, there is an apparent inconsistency between two well-established facts, and this inconsistency leads us to presume a third condition, which is the sole ground that can reconcile the apparent conflict between the two facts. Thus, in the first example, the two well established facts are that Devadatta fasts by day, and that he is fat. How can a man be fat when he does not eat? The only condition that can reconcile these two facts is that he eats at night. This postulate or presumption, which reconciles the apparently conflicting statements, is what is arrived at through arthāpatti.

Those Siddhāntins who refuse the claim of independence to arthāpatti maintain it to be an instance of anumāna. This view is effectively criticised by the Mīmāṃsakas who maintain the pramāṇa to be independent. The 'Pauṣkara Bhāṣya' also makes a considerable contribution by way of justifying its position that arthāpatti is one of the recognised pramāṇas. The Mīmāṃsakas point out that the distinctive feature of arthāpatti is that an element of conflict enters into the facts observed, which can be removed only by postulating something else.[16] It is strange that Devadatta should be fat even though he fasts by day. These facts, however, cease to clash when the assumption is made that he eats by night. Thus the distinctive feature on the basis of which arthāpatti can be recognised as an independent pramāṇa is that it reconciles two apparently inconsistent facts. Those who would reduce it to anumāna should note that there is no such inconsistency between well ascertained facts in inference. The 'Pauṣkara Bhāṣya' maintains that if arthāpatti were the same as anumāna, the results given by the two processes of reasoning should be the same. The information given by arthāpatti that Devadatta eats by night, cannot possibly be given by anumāna as the 'eating at night', not being contained in any of

16. S.W.K. p.234.

the premises, cannot appear in the conclusion. This element that cannot be had by means of anumāna is just that significant postulate, 'he eats at night' which dissolves the conflict arising between the statements: (i) Devadatta is fat, (ii) He fasts by day. This special contribution made by arthāpatti constitutes its claim to independence.

Those who reduce pāriśeṣa, sambhava and svabhāva-liṅga to anumāna forget that anumāna is restricted to syllogistic reasoning in which by means of a vyāpti and a middle ground, the conclusion is derived. If anumāna included also immediate inferences, then the pramāṇas in question, namely, pāriśeṣa, sambhava and svabhāva-liṅga, could readily be reckoned as instances of immediate inferences. But since anumāna applies only to syllogistic reasoning, and since such elaborate reasoning is not present in the pramāṇas to be considered, they cannot be reduced to anumāna.

Pāriśeṣa is based on elimination of those alternatives that are proved not to account for a certain fact, which process leaves the only alternative that can explain the fact concerned. When, for instance, it is known that of the three persons that could possibly be responsible for a theft committed, two are proved to be innocent, then the necessity of fact points out the third person as the thief. As in the case of arthāpatti, in pāriśeṣa also, an element of conflict enters between two facts, and this conflict is dissipated by a further postulate or alternative. Thus to use the above example again, the irreconcilable facts are that two of the persons concerned are not guilty, and yet a theft has occurred. The disparity between these facts vanishes when the only other person concerned is called to account for the theft. Pāriśeṣa, therefore, can be reduced to arthāpatti.

Sambhava and svabhāva-liṅga are similar to each other. Thus, as in saying 'I have six books' it is also implied that I have three books, so in saying that a mango tree has flowered, it is also implied that a tree has flowered. The latter is

given as an example of svabhāva-liṅga. The claim for independence in the case of these two pramāṇas is very feeble. The inference makes manifest an implied significance of either the subject or predicate term. The subject term, 'mango tree' has the significance that the object is a tree of a particular kind. Again, in the statement, 'I have six books,' the attribute, 'six' has the significance that it is a particular number, and that it ranks above the numbers less than itself. A proposition that merely makes manifest a certain significance of either subject or predicate term cannot claim to give inferential knowledge. The claim of independence for these pramāṇas cannot be conceded.

Aitihyam or tradition, when it is valid, is an instance of śabda pramāṇa.

We are now in a position to choose among the three lists of pramāṇas noted earlier. Of those that hold that the pramāṇas are three, and of those that maintain that they are six, and of those that put forth ten pramāṇas, it is the second group who, for reasons given above, gain our support. The accepted pramāṇas are : śabda, anumāna, pratyakṣa, abhāva, upamāna and arthāpatti.

The three pramāṇas that have been recognised by all these groups of thinkers may now be considered in detail. Of perception, it has been said that it is a pramāṇa accepted by all. Even the Lōkāyata who resigns all other pramāṇas retains this as a valid means of knowledge. The Siddhāntin divides perception into two main classes :

I. Valid perceptions ; II. Invalid perceptions.

I. *Valid perception consists of* : a. Nirvikalpaka perception. b. Savikalpaka perception.

a. *Nirvikalpaka perception.*

Nirvikalpaka perception is different from savikalpaka perception,[17] in that unlike the latter it does not involve the

17. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v.6.

work of the mind, but is an undefined awareness of objects. There is here no intelligent perception of the specific and generic attributes of the object which go to make it one of a class. In the 'Pauṣkara Āgama', nirvikalpaka is described as the cognition of the bare object, and savikalpaka as the cognition of the name, qualities and class of the object.

In perception, besides the sense organs which have been mentioned, several other means are involved. These accessories cannot perceive by themselves as they are non-intelligent; nor can the soul function by itself, as being covered with impurity it is dependent on the senses. The co-operation of both soul and karaṇas is required in perception. The intelligence goes out to perceive objects through the particular sense organ concerned, and these organs are helped by the five elements as e.g. light, which helps us to see forms of objects, and ether, which helps us to sense sounds.

The position of the Siddhāntin with reference to the sense-object controversy[18] is identical with that of the Naiyāyika. Further, as the difficulties which the Siddhāntin considers in seeking to establish his position are identical with those met by the Naiyāyika, it would seem that the Buddhist opponents of the Naiyāyika's sense-object-contact theory were also opponents of the Siddhāntin. The Nyāya view is that in the case of perception, the light of the eye reaches out to the object concerned, and in the case of hearing, smell etc., a medium like ākāśa establishes the necessary contact between the senses concerned and the object. The Buddhist logicians object to this view saying that[19] if the visual organ had to come into contact with the object of perception, it could not, for instance, pervade a large mountain, which in that case would be imperceptible. Further, the eye takes the same time to view a distant object as a near one, and this would not be the case if it were necessary for the sense organ to go out. Moreover, objects would not be perceptible through mica and other trans-

18. Ś.J.B. Mā. pp.175-178.
19. I.P. Vol. II, p.56.

parent substances if perception depended on sense-object-contact. The Naiyāyika's reply to these objections[20] is that the light of the eye pervades objects large or small. There is a difference in the time taken by the eye to see distant objects compared with the time required for seeing nearer ones. Mica, glass etc., being transparent, permit the passage of light through them. In the case of auditory perception, the sound waves are said to come into contact with the auditory organ. In the case of smell, small particles of the object are borne by the air to the nose.

The Siddhāntin maintains that the eye is as much an external sense organ as the skin, and as this cannot feel objects unless contact with them is established, so also the eye needs to come into contact with the objects to be perceived. If no such contact were necessary, objects behind the wall, with which the light of the eye cannot come into contact, ought to be perceptible. It might be said that since the eye can by reflection in the mirror see objects behind itself, the perception in this case cannot be due to contact with the objects. This objection serves only to confirm the Siddhāntin's theory. He points out that as the rays of the sun falling on a pot of water are reflected on the inner walls of a house, so the rays of the eye falling on the mirror are turned back on the objects behind the observer. It is the necessity for the light rays of the eye to come into contact with the object that explains the distinctness and faintness of near and remote objects respectively. As the light of the lamp gets less in intensity the further it goes, similarly, the light of the eye spends itself in proportion to the distance covered by it. The perception of an image within a crystal might be considered to overthrow this theory. In reply to this, the Siddhāntin points out that the light of the eye which is very subtle can travel through the crystal, which being finer than the wall presents no resistance to the entry of the light rays as the wall does. The next objection considered is that as the perception of a near object and a distant one

20. I.P. Vol. II, p.56.

require the same length of time, the theory must give way unless the absurd conclusion is to be accepted that for travelling small or great distances, the rays require the same length of time. By means of the analogy that the same length of time seems to be required to pierce a needle through one lotus petal as through a hundred petals arranged in a pile, the Siddhāntin points out that the passing of time is so subtle that it often escapes observation. This fact makes it difficult to notice the greater length of time required for observing a distant object than a nearer one. The next question raised is how the rays can pervade even a large object, such as a mountain. It is pointed out that as a drop of oil spreads itself out on water, and as the light of the lamp scatters itself in space, so the rays of the eye pervade even a large object.

The other four senses do not reach out to objects as the eye does, but attain the necessary contact through some connecting medium. Thus by means of the air, the heat of the fire in the neighbourhood and the smell of flowers are borne to the skin, and nose respectively. That this is so is proved by the fact that when the wind blows in the opposite direction, there are not the above experiences. These considerations lead the Siddhāntin to conclude that the eye by means of its light reaches out to objects ; the other organs do not reach out thus, but by means of some medium or other, attain the necessary contact with the object.

b. *Savikalpaka perception.*

Savikalpaka perception involves the work of the mind. The data cognised to be present in the stage of nirvikalpaka are now intelligently examined. There is an advance from the stage of mere undefined awareness of objects to discrimination of the same as certain specific objects.[21] Savikalpaka perception or perception by the mind is divided into :


21. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v.3.

i. Determinate perception of objects,
ii. Perception of pleasure and pain,
iii. Yogic perception.

In the last two of these perceptions it is only the organs of internal sense that are involved. Yogic perception is indeed a supreme experience. Here, the yogin exercising his will to its fullest extent, perseveres through various stages of detachment from the snares of this world, and concentrates his mind fully on the eternal realities and has visions of what is not revealed to ordinary minds.

The 'Pauṣkara Āgama' gives the following classification of pratyakṣa :

Figure 2.



We have here in the first division, perception dependent on external senses, and in the second, perception that is dependent on the internal senses, and this second type can again be divided into perceptions of the feelings of happiness, etc., and yogic perceptions. The third and highest is the perception that is derived through association with Śiva, and is therefore not dependent on the senses at all, external or internal.

Six kinds of sense-contact* are discriminated :

Figure 3.

sense contact

1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
samyoga	samyukta-samavāya	Samyukta-samaveta-samavāya.	Samavāya	Samaveta-samavāya	viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāva
perception of the pot by the eye.	perception of generality and properties therein.	Cognition of the generality of the properties.	perception of sound by ear.	cognition of the generality of sound.	Inherence as inherence of threads in cloth or *vice versa* and non-existence.

*The commentator says that since for the Siddhāntin the sense of hearing is a modification of ahaṅkāra, (not ether as for the Naiyāyika), 4 and 5 may be reduced to 2 and 3, so that there are only four kinds of sense-contact (P.B. p. 534).

II. *Invalid perception* consists of doubtful perception and erroneous perception.[22]

Doubtful perception is experienced when for example, on seeing a post in twilight, we wonder whether it is a post or a man.[23] The mental activity here consists in apprehending conflicting attributes of one substance. Doubt is engendered by similarity of form, like the uprightness which is common to men and posts. Doubt may also arise in the case of what is unique, e.g., sound-ness, in which case, doubts as to whether it is eternal or non-eternal are difficult to decide.[24] In both the cases given, there is defective causation of knowledge.

An example of mistaken perception is the mistaking of an observed rope for a snake.[25] The error is due to the cognised 'what' being at variance with the 'that' which does not possess that content.[26] Here also it will be noted that error arises due to similarity of form. The erroneous cognitions which arise owing to similarity of form, are by some considered as acceptable on the ground that in the case of similars, there is a presence of each in the other. The 'Pauṣkara Bhāṣya' points out that if the judgment, 'This is silver' made on observing a shell were to be accepted, then its contradictory 'This is not silver' could never follow, even though true. In the account of both doubt and error, the position of the Naiyāyika is closely followed.

Anumāna is the next pramāṇa to be considered. It is admitted to be a pramāṇa by all schools of Indian thinkers excepting the Cārvākas.[27] Describing it in general terms, the Siddhāntin says that anumāna is the process where the mind with the aid of the reasons given in the Siddhānta works is able to reflect on and corroborate the truths contained in these sacred works.[28] The definition given of anumāna[29]

22, 23 and 25. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v.3.
24 and 26. P.B. p.517.
27. S.W.K. p. 198.
28. Ś.S.P. p. 20.
29. P.B. p. 537.

is that it is inferential knowledge in the form of the presence in the minor of the middle as qualified by the indubitable concomitance of the major. Being inferential knowledge, anumāna, unlike pratyakṣa, can only follow on other knowledge. It has to result from the knowledge of the characteristic mark (liṅga) and the knowledge of those which bear the mark (the major and minor terms).

It is pointed out[30] that according to all Indian thinkers, inference proceeds from the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the middle and major terms (expressed by vyāpti) and from the knowledge of the minor term as characterised by the middle. In anumāna, the fact to be known is implicit in the premises; and by means of the connection between the middle and major terms, the nigamana or conclusion is made explicit. From this description of anumāna, it is clear that Indian thinkers recognise only mediate inferences for which vyāpti is essential. For this reason, it is not correct to say that 'anumāna' can be translated into 'inference'; for this latter term including as it does immediate inferences also, is a much wider term than anumāna,[31] which stands for mediate inferences only.

The indubitable concomitance of the middle with the major which is required for giving inferential knowledge is known as vyāpti. The possibility and validity of inferential knowledge depend on the possibility of arriving at, and the validity of, the vyāpti or major premise expressing invariable concomitance between the major and middle terms. It is therefore important for the Siddhāntin to establish the validity of vyāpti if his contention that anumāna is a valid pramāṇa is to be granted. The Siddhāntin notes[32] the various considerations on account of which vyāpti is regarded as impossible of attainment. It is held by the Cārvākas that there can be no vyāpti, as perception can give know-

30. S.W.K. p. 198.
31. S.W.K. pp. 197-199.
32. P.B. pp. 539-541.

ledge only of present instances, and not of those of the past or of the future. Even repeated perception of concomitance cannot guarantee valid vyāpti as this still does not exhaust all instances. The limitation of tarka (*reductio ad absurdum*) as a method of testing the validity of vyāpti is that tarka itself requires a universal relation, the means of arriving at which is not yet known. It seeks to build on that which it questions. Similarly, inference cannot yield vyāpti, as it is the validity of inference that is in question. Nor does testimony offer any better results as the sense of the words can be understood only as the result of inference based on the relation of word to sense in the usage of elders, and of inference itself validity has to be proved. The possibility of arriving at vyāpti seems undermined by these difficulties.

However, the Siddhāntin who seems to feel that unnecessary difficulties have been set up, proceeds to say[33] that there is vyāpti in so far as there is knowledge of co-presence, and also absence of knowledge of exceptions. Difficulty remains with regard to these exceptions, for there may be exceptions which are not known. This point is considered to be settled by tarka. The objection that tarka leads to infinite regress is not recognised as a difficulty by the Siddhāntin, who points out that tarka is to be used only in cases of doubt. Further, the Siddhāntin believing in the self-evident character of knowledge proceeds with tarka only until he arrives at knowledge which satisfies him, and does not go on with the argumentation *ad infinitum*. Even the absence of exceptions is considered to be sometimes self-evident. This need not be considered an extravagant claim, e.g. exceptional instances of fire being cool are inconceivable. The absurd position of those who seek to establish the invalidity of inference is shewn to consist in their having no valid vyāpti whereon to ground their inference. They ques-

33. P.B. p. 541.

tion what should be unquestionable if their own result is to be unquestioned.

Vyāpti is of two kinds,[34] namely: (1) Anvaya and (2) Vyatireka.

Anvaya expresses a relationship of co-presence; and takes the form, 'Where this is, that is.' Vyatireka expresses the relationship of co-absence, and takes the form, 'Where that is not, this is not.'

The Siddhāntin has four classifications of inference, each of which is made on a different basis.

I. Inferences are either positive or negative according as they are expressed in one form or the other.

Positive form.

Pratijñā	(proposition)	The mountain is fiery.
Hetu	(reason)	Because it has smoke.
Udāharaṇa	(illustration)	As in the case of the hearth which has smoke.
Upanaya	(application)	So does this mountain also have smoke pervaded by fire.
Nigamana	(conclusion)	Therefore, this mountain is fiery.

Negative Form.

Pratijñā	There is no smoke in this mountain.
Hetu	Because there is no fire.
Udhāraṇa	As in the case of a tank which has no fire.
Upanaya	So does this mountain also have no fire that pervades smoke.
Nigamana	Therefore, there is no smoke.

34. P.B. p. 542.

II. Inferences again are of three kinds according as they use positive, negative or both positive and negative illustrations[35]:

1. Kevalānvayi (positive),
2. Kevalavyatireki (negative),
3. Anvaya-vyatireki (positive and negative).

Positive instances may be exemplified by: The world has a creator because it is a created thing, e.g. a pot, which being a created thing, has the potter for its creator.

Negative instances may be exemplified by:

Every effect is originated only as already existent, because of its being an object of volitional effort. That which is not previously existent, like the horns of a hare, is not known to be an object of volitional effort.

Positive and negative instances may be exemplified by:

This place is fiery because it smokes; where there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen; where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a deep well.

III. Inference is of two kinds according as it gives sensible or super-sensible knowledge. Dṛṣṭam gives knowledge of what is within the reach of the senses; and sāmānyato dṛṣṭam gives knowledge of what is not perceptible by the senses.

IV. Inferences are three-membered or five-membered according as they are used for onself or for others.[36]

The question as to whether the three-membered or the five-membered syllogism is preferable is a point on which different schools of thinkers hold divided opinions. The Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists point out that the conclusion repeats the first member, and the fourth member repeats the

35. Ś.S.P. pp. 24-25.

36. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v. 4.

second. The Siddhāntins and Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, maintain that the five-membered syllogism cannot be abbreviated unless important thought processes are to be ignored. The Siddhāntin criticises[37] the Mīmāṃsaka's proposal to start three-membered syllogism with a universal proposition. What the hearer is interested in is the particular before him, and not knowing yet the connection between this and the universal proposition, he will condemn the person who commences the syllogism with a universal proposition, as being irrelevant. In order to enlist his interest to consider the universal proposition, he has to be led up to this step by being told that the hill has smoke because it has fire, and whatever has smoke has fire. Nor may it be said that we should stop with the udāharaṇa. Before the listener can be led up to the conclusion, he must see that the minor also has the major, since it is characterised by the middle, which also has the major. The conclusion then inevitably follows that the minor must also have the major since it is characterised by the middle which itself has the major. The conclusion is not a mere repetition, for it now carries assurance and necessity with it. It is the thesis proved, and therefore accepted by the opponent. The Siddhāntin's emphasis on the significance of the nigamana is intended to attack the Bauddhas who recognise only the udāharaṇa and the upanaya.

The Naiyāyika too, in supporting the five-membered syllogism, points out the significance of each of the five propositions. The Nyāya has other reasons also for favouring the more elaborate syllogism. As pointed out,[38] from Gautama downward, logic was with the Naiyāyika both a science and an art, discovery and proof. The five-membered syllogism being such a perfect blend of induction and deduction was reckoned a sure way of attaining truth. It is shewn[39] that

37. P.B. p. 538.
38. P.I.L. p. 291.
39. P.I.L. p. 290.

there is a further significance in the Naiyāyika's adhesion to the five-membered syllogism. It would appear that, in the five-membered syllogism, the Naiyāyikas enlist all the four pramāṇas recognised by them to urge the truth expressed in the conclusion. The statement of the thesis (pratijñā) may be taken to stand for valid verbal testimony (śabda); the reason (hetu) for the instrument of inference (anumāna); the example (udāharaṇa) for the instrument of perception (pratyakṣa); and the subsumptive correlation (upanaya) for analogy (upamāna). Being thus testified to by all the pramāṇas, the nigamana or conclusion comes to have much importance, and is described as 'the acme of logical demonstration.'

The propositions used in all these arguments, will be noticed to be of three kinds.[40] There is at first, 'pakṣa', which is a simple statement of probandum, e.g., 'There is fire on the mountain'. 'Sapakṣa' is the proposition used to express the positive instances of concomitance between the middle and major terms, e.g. 'There is always fire in the kitchen, when there is smoke.' 'Vipakṣa' expresses negative concomitance between the middle and major terms, e.g., 'Where there is no fire, there is no smoke'.

The hetu used in these arguments is of three kinds,[41] namely, identity, cause and effect, and lastly negation consisting in the non-existence of an effect due to non-existence of its cause. When from hearing the word, 'silver oak', we infer the existence of treeness, we have an example of identity. When we admit the effect smoke to indicate the cause, fire, we have an example of the second type. When from the absence of cold, we infer that there will be no dew, we have an example of the last type.

Śabda-pramāṇa, which is the next to be considered, is neglected by some as one that can gain acceptance only at the

40. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v. 9.

41. Ś.J.S. Chapter on Aḷavai, v. 10. This classification is possibly due to Buddhist influence. See B.L. Vol. II, p. 60.

hands of the credulous and the sentimental. The Buddhists, who refuse to recognise it, point out that as often there is reason to doubt what is received on the authority of others, and the truth of such verbal testimony has to be established by such considerations as the trustworthiness of the author, śabda-pramāṇa has to be reduced to anumāna ; and since its validity has thus to be tested by other pramāṇas, it cannot be recognised as an independent pramāṇa. But reflection proves that on this ground on which śabda-pramāṇa is rejected, the other pramāṇas of perception and inference should also be rejected. For just as sometimes the validity of śabda-pramāṇa has to be tested by another pramāṇa, so there are occasions when the validity of inference is tested by perception, as when waking in the morning, the streets are found to be wet, and the inference is made that it has rained, but subsequently, on seeing the roofs of the houses etc., quite dry, the inference is revised in the light of this perception so that the conclusion now drawn is that the street has been watered. If this be so, is inference to be given up ? If the validity of śabda-pramāṇa is sometimes tested by either inference or perception, these latter too are tested by śabda-pramāṇa. Perception indicates the sun to move from east to west, but the enlightened accept the information of the astronomers that it is the earth that moves around the sun. Śabda-pramāṇa is sometimes condemned on the ground that there is conflict of opinion among writers. This defect is to be found in inference and perception also, and is not something peculiar to śabda-pramāṇa. It is often the case that when verbal testimonies of two dependable people conflict, it is because of erroneous perception or wrong inference. Thus these several objections offer no difficulty to the recognition of śabda as pramāṇa.

As anumāna and pratyakṣa have to fulfil certain requirements before being accepted as valid, so also śabda has to meet certain requirements before it can be accepted as valid. The four requirements mentioned by the 'Pāuṣkara Bhāṣya' are :

1. Ākāṅkṣā (expectancy),
2. Yogyatā (competence),
3. Āsatti (juxtaposition) and
4. Tātparya (purport).

Ākāṅkṣā is the incompleteness of the sense of what is declared except in the light of something else that is to be declared. This requirement is based on the unity of a sentence conveying sense. The partial utterance of such a sentence leaves unsatisfied the expectancy that has been aroused, and the sense of what has been uttered requires the rest of the sentence to complete it. This expectancy is not experienced on hearing a string of words, such as, 'table, floor, light', which make no sense. The next requirement, 'yōgyatā' is the capacity to convey sense. This is attained when among the words that are to be predicated together, there is no incompatibility. The failure to meet this requirement leads to absurd statements such as, 'Moisten with fire'. Āsatti (juxtaposition) makes possible the unhindered understanding of the correlate of the combination. Should such a juxtaposition be lacking, e.g., in stating the first half of a sentence and allowing a long interval to intervene before the next half is uttered, then difficulty is experienced in understanding the sense intended to be conveyed. Tātparya (or purport) requires that the speaker should know the sense of what is spoken. It may be objected that in the case of the Vedas, which are eternal, and in the case of a parrot repeating a sentence, there may be valid testimony without the requirement of tātparya being satisfied. The first instance is no difficulty to the Siddhāntin for the reason that according to him, the Vedas, having been revealed by Śiva, cannot be said to lack an author. The second instance is also shown to be no exception to the rule since though the parrot lacks knowledge of the purport, he who taught the parrot, possessed the purport necessary for valid testimony.[41a] Testimony that conforms to these requirements, becomes a valid pramāṇa. Beyond accepting it because of its validity, it will

41-a. T.Ś.S. p. 17.

be seen that in one important respect, it is indispensable. Since the Scriptures deal with the supersensible, which cannot be compassed by any of the other pramāṇas, they must be given their rightful place as authoritative sources of knowledge.

Attention may now be turned to the Siddhāntin's criterion of truth. The significance of the Siddhānta position in this matter comes to light in its vigorous contention against the view that truth and error consist in correspondence and lack of correspondence respectively with reality outside, resemblance being understood by correspondence. This resemblance must be either partial or entire. Either position is exposed to the criticism of the Siddhāntin. If partial resemblance should constitute truth, that is to be found in error as well. If entire resemblance be sought to be attained in truth, that can never be had, for there can never be entire resemblance between a mental content and an object in the external world.[42]

Correspondence, which constitutes truth for the Naiyāyika, is considered to be verified by the 'fruitful activity test'. This position is the outcome of his postulate that being conditioned by the senses, one cannot know the world as it is, and truth and error have to be indicated by indirect means. Thus he cannot grant that truth is self-evident. That the soul in saṃsāra is conditioned by the senses is what the Siddhāntin emphasises in his śāstras. The soul whose intelligence is clouded by āṇava, is dependent for its knowledge of the world on the instruments of knowledge etc., provided by māyā. Māyā, being one of the malas, can at best give only a defective knowledge of the world. Considering that this postulate of the sense-conditioned nature of the soul is common to the two schools, one anticipates further points of contact between them. The possibility of such agreement is not unheeded by the Siddhāntin. On considering the Nyāya attempt to overreach the sense-conditioned nature of the soul by means of the 'fruitful activity test', the Siddhāntin finds that all such attempts must

42. P.B. p. 511.

necessarily be futile. If a present experience is condemned as sense-conditioned, and is sought to be tested by the fruitful activity test, is the knowledge given by this test apprehended through any means other than the sense-conditioned nature of the soul ? Does not this latter experience have just the same approach to the soul (i.e. the māyā-conditioned way) as the original cognition had ? The assumption, that whatever knowledge is attained through the material karaṇas is defective, refuses validity not only to present cognition, but also to the pramāṇas by which present cognition is sought to be tested. Knowledge attained through the karaṇas, whether immediate or remote, is defective. Hence, there is no point in trying to establish the validity of one experience by another which, being as much māyā-conditioned as the other, falls short of truth as much as the other. Giving up such a pointless procedure, he maintains that the approximate truth which the senses offer, is self-evident. The position of the self-evident nature of truth cannot with consistency be denied. It is the final goal even of those who imagine they have escaped from it. For to those who maintain that truth is not self-evident, even absence of validity is not self-evident, and has to be known through prior knowledge.[43]

In his adherence to the position of the self-evident nature of truth, does not the Siddhāntin rule out doubt and error ? These are admitted experiences in his system, and are shewn to be met with only sometimes, when owing to defective causation of knowledge, truth appears more distorted than under normal conditions. Truth has, for its manifestation, certain elements in addition to those present in error. Thus, in the erroneous cognition of a shell as silver, there is sense-contact with one surface of the shell. In the correct cognition of the shell as shell, there is in addition to the sense-contact present in error, contact with the dark outer surface of the shell. This added sense-contact keeps out the confusion that arises in erroneous cognition.

43. P.B. p. 514.

Invalidity for the Siddhāntin is not intrinsic. When, therefore, doubts and errors occur, even though they are not matters of constant experience, in the light of what are they to be judged in order that from those experiences one may be led to truth ? The elements of harmony and inclusiveness, of which there are slight indications in the Siddhānta system, lead one to conjecture that coherence might be the criterion. The greater number of tattvas in his system constitutes for him the superiority of his position compared with other schools which have discovered fewer tattvas. When Nandi Perumān perused all the Śaivāgamas, he was dazed by all the diverse accounts contained therein. He was happy, however, when the Siddhānta system was revealed to him because this helped him to find the harmony which satisfied his mind. Yet these evidences of the elements constituting coherence are too scanty to offer any conclusive result as to whether coherence is the goal of truth in the Siddhānta.

The question will be raised whether the Siddhāntin is satisfied with the approximate truth to which the soul is confined because of its association with impurities. No one feels as keenly discontented with the situation as the Siddhāntin. Verses 2-7 of the 'Vināveṇbā' express the despair of the human soul which, knowing the finite nature of its mind, realises that many things are beyond its grasp. All that the tattvas can give is the delusive knowledge of the world, and if being dissatisfied with what the tattvas yield, one dismisses them, the dark state of kevala promptly sets in. The poet (Umāpati) in despair seeks to know from his guru how he can ever come to have knowledge of God's grace and of God Himself. Thus the Siddhāntin thirsts for ultimate truth undistorted by impurities. But that cannot be had unless the soul is freed of its māyā-fetters. In Śiva-jñāna, he ultimately finds a means that, helping him to transcend his māyā-conditioned predicament, leads him to truth.

There are yet a few more difficulties lurking in the background, which must now be dealt with. Citśakti usually

meaning knowledge, is here said to be the instrument of knowledge. How can it be that cit-śakti could be both knowledge, and means of knowledge? The seeming inconsistency vanishes in the light of the fact that cit-śakti has the two aspects of being the self and the self which as knower turns towards the world outside.

A further difficulty is the derivation of a plurality of pramāṇas (śabda, anumāna etc.,) from the one pramāṇa of cit-śakti. The plurality is explained as due to the māyā-adjuncts with which the āṇava-pervaded soul is bound to work. But since this conditioned state of the soul is merely a passing state, when it is rid of the impurities, these derived pramāṇas are thereby dissolved. Surviving this change, there is the one pramāṇa of cit-śakti. Since cit-śakti is admittedly the one pramāṇa,[44] there are not many knowledges for the Siddhāntin, but only one knowledge.

44. Ś.S.P. p. 14.

For the information taken from the 'Pauṣkara Bhāṣya,' I have depended on the article, 'T.Ś.S.' and on some manuscript notes belonging to the author of that article.

CHAPTER III.

THE ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTIN'S CONCEPTION OF GOD.

Of the various proofs offered by the Śaiva Siddhāntin for the existence of God, the chief one is the cosmological. This is based on the reality of the world ; and since the truth of the argument depends on whether it is based on valid grounds, it becomes necessary to examine his proof of the reality of the world.

Though the Siddhāntin considers the senses as delusive in the sense that they misrepresent the value of the objects of the world to the soul, so that the seeming desirable objects are really undesirable for its welfare, yet he does not consider them delusive in the sense of representing as existing what really do not exist. So, normally, things perceived through the senses exist. Accordingly, the seen world of he, she and it exists.[1] But can it exist as the senses reveal it to us ? As perceived through them, objects seem to be outside us and to be tangible with solidity and extension. It is strange that the Siddhāntin fails to note any inconsistency between this realistic view and the idealistic tendency towards which he inclines when he says that it is the qualities that constitute the thinghood of objects.[2] Further, the Siddhāntin cannot consider the reality of the world to be established on the evidence of the senses.

He seeks to fortify his conclusion regarding the reality of the world by the further line of reasoning that what is unreal, such as the horns of a hare, never comes into existence in the past, present or future.[3] The world, however, has origin, and therefore it is real.[3] The reality of the world, in this argument is based on the empirical assumption that the world has

1. Ś.J.B. Cu. Notes on sūtra I. p. 12.
2. Ś.J.B. Mā. pp. 185-186.
3. Ś.J.B. Cu. Commentary to sūtra I, argt. 1. p. 17.

origin. In making this assumption, the Siddhāntin has to consider a point raised by his opponent, the Lōkāyata, who maintains that though we see particular objects come into existence and disappear, we do not see origin and dissolution taking place of the whole.[4] All that we can see is the world existing. We do not witness its origin and decay. Hence, these latter processes as applying to the world are mere fabrications of the mind. No doubt, as the Siddhāntin points out, there are seasons when things come into being as a class, and are destroyed likewise. However, to argue that as particular sets of things come to be and cease to be, the world as a whole similarly comes into existence and is destroyed,[5] is to commit the fallacy of composition. On the other hand, it cannot be said that as the whole world is not perceived to come into being, and die, therefore, there is no origin and decay of the world. The non-perception of anything is no proof of its non-existence. The utmost that the Lōkāyata can say on the matter is that the origin and decay of the world as a whole cannot be established through perception. The Siddhāntin's attempt to establish these cosmic processes through inference involves as already noticed the fallacy of composition. As they are not established through any other means either, the origin of the world remains a mere assumption ; and this is considered to guarantee the reality of the world. Thus neither of the two arguments used by the Siddhāntin to prove the reality of the world is convincing, so that this unproved assumption forms the basis of his cosmological argument.

This argument maintains that the different entities, classifiable as he, she and it, must have a creator who is omnipotent and omniscient, for they are diverse and finite, and are subject to the three processes of creation, preservation and destruction.[6] Attention is here drawn to their diversity, their finitude and their being subject to the three processes of creation,

4. Ś.J.S. I. v. 9.
5. Ś.J.B. I. argt. 1.
6. Ś.J.B. I ; Ś.J.S. I. v. 1 ; Ś.P. v. 16.

preservation and destruction, on account of which they need a supreme being to account for them. Of the three circumstances of diversity, finitude and change, it is the last that is emphasised more than the others. The world is of such a nature that it arises, continues for a time and perishes; and the same cycle of events is repeated again and again. It is not non-existent; for if it were, it would never come into being; and no creator would be needed. The existent need not come into being, and no creator would be needed.[7] The world does not come under this category either. It is, as it were, existent and non-existent, though not in the same sense, for this would be to attribute contradictory qualities of the same substance.[8] It is existent in the sense that māyā, being eternal, exists always, and non-existent in the sense that at the time of world-resolution, the world of forms ceases to be until the time of world origin when it springs into being again. The world being of this intermediate nature so that it passes through different conditions at different intervals, it needs a conserving cause that will sustain it through its varying phases.

The diversity and finitude observed in the world are considered as the other aspects of the universe which, besides its cosmic processes, necessitate a creator. The diversity and finitude seem to offer a double-edged proof for the existence of God. Firstly, they are considered to confirm the cosmic processes[9] which in their turn as already seen are regarded as necessitating the existence of God. Secondly, their diversity and their finitude seem explicable only in the light of an ultimate cause. Anything characterised by diversity, has parts; and having parts, it is destructible, e.g., a pot or an atom, each of which having parts is destructible. And anything having parts, must find its explanation in something ultimate, as the pot and the atom find their explanation at least so

7. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 5.
8. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 7.
9. Ś.J.B. Cu. Commentary to sūtra I. argument 1.

far as their material causation is concerned, in māyā.[10] Anything finite again, loses itself into that from which it arose, as the atom passes into māyā. The contingent requires something other than the contingent to explain it; for even if behind the contingent, there is something of like nature, there is no finality of explanation. Hence, turning away from this infinite regress, the Siddhāntin says that the various stages of resolution of the cosmos come to a stop at a certain point. The halting point is not prakṛti as the Pāñcarātrī claims, for, according to the Siddhāntin, mūla-prakṛti itself being an evolute, the process of resolution has to continue until all material things are converted into māyā,[11] which during the time of praḷaya abides in Śiva, as a seed is embedded in the earth.[12] Śiva, the solitary figure surviving the world-resolution, is the only possible creator of the universe. By way of forestalling infinite regress, the Siddhāntin maintains that as a pot can only be re-made from the clay into which it is disintegrated on breaking, so the world can only arise from the God of saṃhāra, into whom it was resolved at the period of saṃhāra.[13] There are certain important points of difference between God and the world to account for God being recognised as the ultimate author of the world-creation. Whereas the world of souls and of matter is dependent, God is independent, and whereas the universe is finite, God is infinite.[14] The argument that, as a car is made by several workers, the universe can be thought to have several authors, cannot be accepted, for though the car is wrought by several hands, the unity of design of the car calls for a master mind, who supervises the work to see that his employees execute his plan. Similarly, the unity underlying the universe can only be explained in the light of one supreme designer.[15] Moreover, the creation of this mar-

10. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 13.
11. Ś.J.B. sūtra I, argument 2, v. 1.
12. Ś.J.B. sūtra I, argument 2, v. 3.
13. Ś.J.B. sūtra I, argument 2, v. 1; also Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 18.
14. Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 26.
15. Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 27.

vellous universe requires such skill and wisdom that the maker of it can be nothing less than a being supreme, omniscient and independent, and consequently without a rival.[16] Thus avoiding the endless pursuit of a being that confers grace on one, and of the one that confers grace on that other and so on, the Siddhāntin comes to rest in an ultimate cause.[17] But in avoiding infinite regress, the Siddhāntin comes to maintain the concept of an uncaused cause, which as will be shown later, is not without inconsistencies.

In meeting the atheistic doctrine of the Sāṅkhya that the world arises out of the cosmic matter, develops and resolves itself into its primal stuff without outside help, and that God is superfluous to carry out these processes,[18] the Siddhāntin sets forth another of his proofs for the existence of God. Things arising from a material cause must have an instrumental cause. A pot that is made of clay, cannot come into being without a potter ; likewise, the world which is of a similar nature, in that it arises from māyā, has a creator.[18] The reason why the Siddhāntin cannot conceive of māyā developing itself into the universe is that though eternal, it is inert, and hence cannot evolve of itself. Therefore, he argues for the creation of the world by God on the analogy of the pot by the potter. To say that as particular things in the world have their respective authors, so the world as a whole should have its maker is to commit the fallacy of composition. Further, as the potter, though well-versed in the art of potmaking, does not know all about the pot, such as for instance, who will buy it, or for what purpose it will be used, and as he is not omnipotent either, and hence unable to control the pot in every way, so God though able to create the world, may neither know other facts regarding it, nor be able to control it in every way, and hence cannot be considered omniscient or omnipotent.

The Siddhāntin's next argument also is levelled against the Sāṅkhya system, which attributes the development of the

16. Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 28 ; also Ś.J.B. sūtra I, argt. 3. v. 1.
17. Ś.S.P. p. 40.
18. Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 17.


world to prakṛti, getting the stimulus needed to set it in motion from the proximity to puruṣa. According to the Siddhāntin, it is an intelligent being that is wanted for the creation of the world; and puruṣa is able to exercise its intelligence only when in conjunction with the sense organs etc.; and at the time when the world is about to come into existence, the soul is not equipped with these. Māyā by itself cannot evolve into the world as it is not intelligent. Hence, it is only God that can create the world.[19] This argument is exposed to all the difficulties which the concept of creation involves, and which will be examined later.

The Siddhāntin further says that in order that souls may be given a chance to rid themselves of mala, the world is brought into existence. For this purpose, it is necessary that souls should have bodies, to enable them to have the various experiences that fall to their lot. At the time of resolution, souls are bodiless; but at the time of evolution, they should be embodied. This linking of the soul with its appropriate body can be accomplished neither by the soul, which at that time is devoid of intelligence, nor by the body, which is inert. Yet it is a fact that souls come to have bodies they have merited; and if neither souls nor bodies are responsible for this, the only other alternative is that God brings about the union.

This argument that God must exist as it is only He that can bring together body and soul is not above criticism. For besides what will be noticed later, that the relation between body and soul is not clear, there is the added difficulty of God's relation to the body on the one hand, and His relation to the soul on the other. Here are three terms God, soul and body that have to be brought into inter-relation with each other. Investigation of the matter leads one to see that the bringing together of two or more terms is ultimately unintelligible. The relations are either attributes of the terms to be related or they are independent. If they are attributes of the terms, they either make a difference to the terms or not. According to the former alter-

19. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 17.

native, the terms to be related, namely God, soul and body undergo change by virtue of the relations linking them; and according to the latter alternative, there seems no point in the relations existing. If, however, instead of being attributes of the terms, the relations are independent, then it follows that besides the terms God, soul and body, we have these relations, C, D and E. The situation is somewhat as follows:



How can relation C unite God and soul? If it requires the aid of another relation C_1 to link itself to God and soul, then C_1 itself would require still another relation C_2 and so on *ad infinitum*. As will be noticed later, the Siddhāntin's contention that by means of cit-śakti God operates on souls and bodies only increases the difficulty by increasing the number of terms to be related.

God is required not only to give appropriate bodies to souls, but also to mete out to them the fruits of their karma. The Siddhāntin considers every shade of thought presented by his opponents with a view to make karma act without the control of God, thus rendering Him superfluous. The suggestion that karma can leave its traces in the mind of the doer, and thus be carried over into the next birth, is rejected as absurd. In that case, heaven, hell and earth experienced by souls could be ensured continuity in the minds of the souls concerned.[20] The Siddhāntin's point is that the souls are subject to limitations so that it is impossible for them to be considered the guardians of karma. The gift and giver all perish, and only God, the eternal knower, can control karma.[21] To say that

20. Ś.J.S. sūtra II. v. 20. 21. Ś.J.S. sūtra v. 21.

karma can do without the help of even souls and function by its own power, as an arrow travels of itself, is to lose sight of an agent who controls karma, even as in speaking of the arrow speeding by itself, one loses sight of the archer who shot the arrow.[22] Karma, being non-intelligent, cannot be the cause of the manifold joys and sorows which the soul experiences. Behind karma must stand a further cause, and surely an intelligent cause, which decides what is good and bad, observes the deeds of the souls, and finally sees to it that souls experience the fruit of their deeds. Only God can be the guardian and executor of the law of karma as He knows everything and possesses the powers in question.[23]

The denial of the existence of God, and the acceptance of some other entity as guardian and executor of karma leads to great difficulties,[24] as is shown in the refutation of the Buddhist, who claiming that Buddha practised virtue and vice before writing out the Piṭakas, is required to explain who set up norms of virtue and vice before Buddha. This of course leads to endless regress.[25]

God must exist as He alone has all the requirements needed for the working of karma. It is karma that forms the basis of God's existence in this argument. Examining karma, we find that neither for its existence nor for its nature, is it indebted to God. If, as will be shown in the chapter on matter, God is responsible neither for the existence of karma, nor for its laws, then the same objection may be raised to the Siddhāntin's God that the Siddhāntin himself raised in connection with Buddha, namely, that as Buddha, who is said to have practised virtue and vice would require some one to set up norms for him, so would Śiva, who works with karma require

22. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Jainism v. 9.
23. Schomerus, p. 46.
24. Schomerus, pp. 46-47.
25. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Sautrāntika. v. 8.

that some one should determine its nature, as karma, being eternal, does not depend on Him for its existence ; and if its existence does not depend on Him, neither can its nature depend on Him, as attributes cannot be independent of the substance. The being that is the executor of the law of karma cannot be God if He is not responsible for the being and nature of karma. As executor of the law of karma, He may have all the requirements for the working of karma, yet in not being responsible for the being and nature of karma, He cannot be the supreme God. The argument that God must exist as it is only He that has all the requirements needed for the working of karma, does not establish the existence of a supreme being, which is what we mean by God.

The creatorship of God does not amount to anything considerable in the Siddhānta system. Along with God who is eternal, there are two other entities also eternal, and these are souls and matter. These do not owe their existence to God. Consequently, His status is that of designer or architect with given material, and not that of an absolute creator responsible for the form and matter of the universe. Of course, to make the existence of souls and matter thus independent of God precludes such knotty problems as how the material world can arise from God, who is pure spirit, and how created souls can have eternal existence. Though these difficulties are avoided, there are others which cannot be satisfactorily met by the Siddhāntin. If matter exists prior to God's creative activity, is it impossible to posit the independent existence of objects ? May not the world as a whole be eternal ? If it be said that the existence of purpose which underlies the universe, necessitates intelligence to guide and shape the universe, metaphysical inquiry does not cease at this point. The further question arises : If God exists, who created Him ?

Reviewing in mind the arguments of the Siddhāntin for the existence of God, and the difficulties which they have to face, the fact that impresses itself on one's mind is that no argument can prove the existence of God. If we think of

Him as creator, we find that the concept of creatorship is open to many difficulties. If at first God alone existed and from Him the world took its rise, the difficulty arises as to how God, who is always conceived of as pure spirit, can produce from Him a material world. If to avoid this difficulty, it is said that along with God, matter too exists, and God operates on this, then arises the problem of how spirit can act on matter. The idea of any such relating element as cit-śakti merely complicates the situation.

If to avoid the difficulties involved in creatorship, it is said that God transforms Himself into the world, then it is either the whole of God that is thus transformed, or part of Him. If it is the whole of Him that becomes the world, then the world is God, and beyond it we need to seek no transcendent being. If it is part of Him, how can part of the eternal being be subject to processes of change ?

The idea of God as an uncaused cause is not acceptable, for if everything in the world is regarded as the effect of something else, why should the cause and effect series end with God ? What is there to prevent our asking who caused God ? The causal concept attempts to explain change by showing identity between what becomes and that which it becomes. This identity must be either partial or absolute. If it is only partial identity that obtains between cause and effect, this can be had among many things that are not causally related. If on the other hand, absolute identity exists, then if the cause is uncaused, the effect should likewise be uncaused. Thus the concept of an uncaused cause is full of contradictions.

That a certain effect follows from a certain cause has not the certainty that attaches to the mathematical deduction that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Any cause-effect sequence that has been observed is likely to be overthrown by any negative instance that may occur in the light of further experience. This is true also of all scientific laws of induction. Should the cause-effect relationship be established between God and the world, this will not have

absolute certainty either. To the Siddhāntin, however, this presents no difficulty; for to him, this knowledge which he obtains from experience about the relationship between God and the world is only a further confirmation of Scripture.

Some that are overwhelmed by the difficulties involved in proving the existence of God swing to the opposite extreme of explaining the universe without God, implying that He is superfluous or does not exist. But these theories cannot stand the test of criticism. Those who maintain that the four elements of fire, water, earth and air can act and interact and produce the universe, are met by the Siddhāntin's reply that every one of these elements is subject to the three processes of origin, development and decay; and that for the important processes of evolution, a controlling being over and above these fluctuations is required. It is difficult to conceive of inert matter developing into a cosmos, and undergoing the ordered changes in the universe. If this were possible, then we should see clay transforming itself into pots. It is not merely because such events do not happen that we argue that similar occurrences cannot take place on a cosmic scale, but because there is a contradiction involved in thinking of inert matter performing that which man, gifted with intelligence as he is, cannot do even with the co-operation of his fellow-men. Some have thought that to conceive of particles of matter that are in a continuous state of motion makes it easier for one to understand the cosmic processes going on by themselves without a Prime mover to give them the first impetus. Even this added element of motion injected into particles of matter, does not answer the purpose of bringing a cosmos into being. It may be contended that particles of matter moving with varying speeds have brought about the universe. It is obvious now that step by step the cosmic stuff is made to gain various elements that seem needed to explain the purpose underlying the world. This process of endowing original matter with various capacities may be overdone, so that qualities that can never belong to it may be predicated of it. This is exactly what happens when it is said that particles moving at differ-

ent rates of motion have been responsible for the universe evolving from matter. At this point, the question naturally arises as to how these particles come to have just those rates of motion that are needed for evolving the universe. It is a marvel that particles of matter that are not guided by any supreme being, and that do not communicate with each other, should assume just those varying speeds that will bring about a harmonious universe. It is obvious that the particles are given more than naturally belongs to them, so that they point out the need for an intelligence that alone can account for a cosmos.

Those who attribute the world to atoms and adṛṣṭa begin to realise that something more than atoms and adṛṣṭa is needed to explain the universe.[26] Atoms must be either active or inactive; if they are naturally active, then they should be eternally active, and this rules out any period of rest; and if inactive, how do they commence to move? Adṛṣṭa by itself is insufficient. Souls have no control over adṛṣṭa, for if they had, they would avert misery. The need of God is felt to evolve the world from atoms and adṛṣṭa.

The argument put forward by some that puruṣa can serve as the intelligent first cause to account for the evolution of the world is open to criticism. As Descartes maintains, the cause must have as much reality as the effect. That being so, it is impossible to conceive of man as the author of the universe, for the creation of it is an undertaking too vast for the small resources of man. If it lay in man's power to create the universe, would he not hesitate before he brought into being that which is the cause of so much misery to him? Or at least would he not pause to consider ways of moulding the world so as to derive better satisfaction from it? Or can it be said that even at the beginning of things, man knows for himself that happiness is not the end of life, nor is the world to be other than a 'vale of soul-making'? All such theorising is equivalent to building in the air, for if we are capable of per-

26. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 11.

forming such wonders, we ought to be conscious of such activities. On the other hand, what all rational beings are aware of is their being baffled on many an occasion in their attempt to solve the mysteries of life, and the patient faith with which they need to persevere to get anywhere near what they think is the truth of the universe. A potter knows all about the art of pot-making, and a good deal of the nature of his creation; but the supposed authors of the universe are mystified at every turn by almost every aspect of the universe, and know not how it came into being, how it is preserved or how it is destroyed.

Some have tried to explain the universe by the concept of evolution that from an indefinite, incoherent and homogenous mass, there is development of a definite, coherent and heterogeneous universe. This species of naturalism which resolves the world into matter, motion and force does not reckon with mind, and for this and other reasons, fails to be an adequate account of the world.

Darwin's account of evolution is a mere description of events in the biological world, and does not rise to explain the significance of the changes noticed. His theory rests on certain assumptions whose significance is not examined at all. Had Darwin carried out his investigations along this line, he would in all probability have realised that there was in this universe much more than he had allowed for in his theory. He attempts to explain the origin of species on the basis of natural selection among small variations. But this principle fails to account for many developments in organisms. "Well may Darwin have said that the eye made him shudder when he tried to account for it by natural selection. Why, its adaptations in one respect alone, minor though they be, are enough to stagger any number of selectionists".[27] Not only is the principle of natural selection insufficient to account for such

27. "A Critical Glance into Darwin." The Atlantic Monthly, August 1920, p. 239.

developments as those noted above, but it does not account for the upward trend in nearly all the changes that take place. The causes of the evolution of life are mysterious. Darwin has indeed stressed the fact of evolution; but he has not dealt with the causes of evolution. Darwin stopped short of discovering certain significant facts. Every stage of evolution is marked by the advent of new values, and there is progress in the whole process so that matter, life, intelligence, language, reason, science, social organisation, morals and art appear in succession. In his 'Emergent Evolution' Lloyd Morgan pictures the world as a pyramid with ascending levels; and at every one of these levels is a new emergent. From matter, we proceed to the level of life, and from life to that of mind. Besides noting these significant facts, the author pauses to consider what causes the 'emergents to emerge', for there is certainly an agency which, as it were, raises the world from one level to the next higher. And at this point, the author sees clearly the necessity that there is for affirming a supreme guiding power or God.[28] Any theory that stops short of penetrating thus far in its search for truth, is bound to fail of an adequate account of the world. The theories that have been considered, and which look upon God as superfluous, are one-sided; and they can be maintained only so long as certain significant facts are consistently ignored. But if any such incomplete views are to be avoided, then one is led to see with Lloyd Morgan the necessity for affirming a Supreme Being.

The existence of such a supreme controller, however, can never be demonstrated with metaphysical certainty. Philosophical inquiries, however diligently pursued do not take us beyond Kant's conclusion that the various arguments for God's existence, of whichever type they be, can never demonstrate the existence of God.

The same holds good of the Siddhāntin's arguments for the existence of God. However, his search is not without

28. E.E. pp. 206-209.

value; for it shows discontent with inadequate materialistic theories of the world, and leads one in the right direction of affirming the necessity of a supreme being, though the existence of such can never be proved with certainty.

It has been said that the monotheism of the Siddhāntin is an unexpected fact in view of the cricumstances that in India polytheism is the popular faith, and that the Vedas speak of several gods, and that among those accustomed to a trinity (of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva) one would expect god to be only *primus inter pares*.[29] Significant and praiseworthy as is the monotheism of the Siddhāntin, it is however, not a feature that should come as a surprise to any one acquainted with the gradual and sure development that came over Indian thought, leading it from the earlier and uncritical acceptance of polytheism based primarily on animism, to the later considered view of one God. As pointed out by the same writer in another place, there were various circumstances which led to a grouping of the gods, and later to monotheism among the various sects of Śaivites, Vaiṣṇavites and Śākta followers.[29a] If the Vedas are cited as authority for the polytheism of the earlier ages, they can also be cited as authority for the monotheism of a later day. Thus the 'Atharvaśikhopaniṣad' says: "Śiva alone is to be meditated upon, the rest being given up, as He is the one that grants final beatitude." The advance from polytheism to monotheism was an occurrence that was bound to happen sooner or later as the result of a natural development of thought. The gods that had to be propitiated were so numerous that it was an effort to remember them all; so by way of lessening the strain, they were classified into three groups of the gods of the earth, air and sky. The process of thus grouping them also led to their being worshipped in pairs, or in groups, and sometimes the reason for this method was that the gods fulfilled identical functions. Sometimes one god of a group was worshipped as supreme for the time being, and given the attributes of all the other gods. This process which

29. Schomerus, p. 48.

29-a. Schomerus, p. 12.

Max Müller describes as 'henotheism' soon paved the way for monotheism ; for this exaltation of one god over the others soon led to the natural question as to which of them was the creator of the others, and therefore supreme. This led to reflection regarding the attributes of godhead. Of such attributes, omnipotence was an important one, and this meant that god should be supreme. The universe also points towards a single author, for though it is diverse, and diverse phenomena take place in it, yet there is unity of law underlying it, and this must be the outcome of one supreme mind.[30] And as the polytheism of the earlier Vedas soon gave place to the later development of monotheism, similarly, those who believed in the trinity of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva, soon divided themselves into the two camps of those who regarded Viṣṇu as supreme, and those who regarded Śiva as the supreme being. As for the polytheism of the masses, it has through centuries been set down as due to their backwardness, and has been allowed to continue side by side with the monotheism of the enlightened.

With regard to the nature of God, the Siddhāntin finds that it is beyond the powers of the human understanding to comprehend it to any considerable extent. The finite and sinful nature of man, which prevents any clear understanding of God, leads him to voice his despair saying,

"O Thou, who fill'st the heaven, who fill'st the earth, art manifested light,

Transcending thought, Thou boundless One! Thy glory great, I, Man of evil deeds, know not the way to praise."[31]

His attempt to estimate the nature of God, impresses him with the fact that He is full of every perfection, that often qualities that are the opposite of each other are predicated of Him without it being made clear how they are to be found in the same being. The philosopher poet, Māṇikkavācaga, des-

30. I.P. Vol. pp. 89-91. 31. Tv. p. 3.

cribes Śiva as "the one and the not-one"[32] "more subtile than atom small! the king incomparably great!"[33] And turning to God, he further says, "Thou art the heat, and Thou the cold!"[34] "Thou who art without pleasure and pain, who yet hast both!"[35], "Who all things art, and their negation too."[35]

Although we see "He dwells afar where human thought goes not,"[36] still an attempt can be made to understand as much of His nature as it is humanly possible to know. Of the three entities of God, soul and the world, God is the highest. With reference to the other gods, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc., Śiva is so supreme that these other gods bow down before Him, for

> "He made the moon grow dim in Dakṣan's sacrifice;
> He, Indra's shoulder crushed; cut off Eccan's head."[37]

He is not only the highest among the gods as a king among men, there being only a difference of degree, but He is also the highest among them on the basis of a difference of kind,[38] though this superiority, as will be noticed later, does not amount to His being an absolute creator. The essential differences between Śiva and the other gods are two-fold, consisting in a difference in existence and in nature. The contention that though Śiva may be superior to other gods, He is by no means superior to Brahmā, the creator, and to Viṣṇu, the preserver, is met by the Siddhāntin's reply that at the dissolution of the world, even the gods Brahmā and Viṣṇu, who are responsible for the creation and preservation of the world, are disembodied, so that at the time of regeneration, only Śiva remains unaffected by the destruction and He is the only one that can create the world again. Thus Brahmā and Viṣṇu are, in a sense, His creatures, in that they receive from Him their bodies and also their respective offices

32. Tv. p. 1.
33. Tv. p. 21.
34. Tv. p. 4.
35. Tv. p. 6.
36. Tv. p. 20.
37. Tv. p. 124.
38. Schomerus, p. 48.

of creation and destruction. Śiva's supremacy then cannot be disputed; for,

"He is the ancient One, who creates, the creator of all;
He is the God, who preserves, the preserver of things created;
He is the God, who destroys the Destroyer."[39]
"He discerns—the aeon and its end!"[40]
"The God of gods, His sacred name!"[41]

The difference in nature between Śiva and these gods is that Śiva ever exists as the supreme being, and at no time is He shorn of His powers. Brahmā and Viṣṇu, however, though eternal, as souls are eternal, yet do not retain their statuses as creator and preserver without intermission. The levelling power of śaṃhāra, which reduces Brahmā and Viṣṇu to the level of souls, leaves Śiva as the supreme being on whom the next re-generation depends. Brahmā and Viṣṇu do not eternally exist as the creator and preserver respectively, while Śiva exists eternally as the supreme being.

Even in other respects, Brahmā and Viṣṇu are not on a par with Śiva. If Brahmā does the work of creation, and Viṣṇu that of preservation, it is that because of certain works of merit on their part Śiva was pleased to appoint them to the high status of being His assistants. Not out of their own full power but only upon command and under the control of Śiva do they perform their offices of creation and preservation of the world. Whether after this world-period, they will again be entrusted with the same work depends on their merit. Viṣṇu, Brahmā and all other gods are subject to creation, preservation and destruction. From this it is clear that the Siddhāntin places these gods not in the category of Pati, but in the class of souls. Śiva is the lord, Brahmā and Viṣṇu are His servants. Śiva is the one who gives freedom,

39. Tv. p. 19.
40. Tv. p. 21.
41. Tv. p. 15.

Brahmā and Viṣṇu are those who stand in need of this freedom as they are filled with māyā.[42]

Śiva is regarded as worthy of adoration not only because He is the supreme being in the universe, but also because He has in Him every perfection, and all these good qualities come into play in His relation to souls. Being full of benevolence, He is eager that all souls should attain release; and it is with His help that man can attain heavenly bliss. He hates all untruth and vice.

"Thou cam'st in grace that all things false might flee."

His devotees who seek what is good and true are helped by Him. The repentant sinner, who in all humility confesses his failings is acceptable to God, and not the proud and self-righteous man. To those that being eager to follow his footsteps, seek Him diligently, He is a "guardian," a "father," and a "great river of exceeding tenderness with ceaseless flow;"[43] but to the proud and haughty, He manifests His crushing power;

"He trundles Ayan's head like ball, He broke the teeth of Arukan!"[44]

Revelation of His nature, as far as man can understand it, is granted to His humble devotees; but He is difficult of access to those who have not the right spirit.

He attaches no importance either to caste or rituals. A story is told of how a Brahmin worshipped in orthodox fashion a stone image of Śiva that was in the forest. Later, a wild horseman passing by also paid his devotion to the image in his own barbarian style offering swine's flesh. When the Brahmin came to know of this, he felt that the

42. Schomerus, p. 49.
43. Tv. p. 6.
44. Tv. p. 137.

image had been polluted. But it was soon made known to him that the savage's wild form of worship, inasmuch as it was sincere, was as acceptable to God as the Brahmin's more refined worship.[45].

Because Śiva is thus considered the embodiment of all that is perfect, men who know what is worthwhile in life, seek Him. He is the unfailing goal of all those who thirst to reach Him. Their reward is unending bliss. Māṇikkavācaga, on attaining the much coveted goal of Śiva's feet exclaims, "My Light! Thou changest all to rapturous joy, My wealth of bliss! O Śiva Perumān!"[46]

God is said by the Siddhāntin to have the good qualities of complete independence, flawlessness, omniscience, freedom from mala, boundless benevolence, omnipotence and bliss. As has been pointed out, however, much importance is not attached to the above list.[47] Rather it is the terms 'sat' and 'cit' that are frequently used in describing the nature of God. These two terms may well be reckoned to contain all the perfections of God, for each is crammed with much significance. The term, 'sat' is used in more than one sense; and it is necessary to have in mind all the richness of its content when it is applied to God. The chief meaning of 'sat' is reality. In saying that God is 'sat', it is meant that He is real. No doubt, the souls as well as matter are existent and eternal, yet they are surpassed by God inasmuch as He is real in a sense in which they fail to be. They are subject to changing conditions so that they rise and collapse. The joys of this life, the happiness of Brahmā and Viṣṇu and the lives of countless millions themselves are likened to a magician's tricks, to dreams and to a mirage.[48] Though souls and matter exist eternally, they are subject to changing states; and if similia are required to illustrate that the world is asat, they are the figures formed on

45. P.P. p. 882.
46. Tv. p. 223.
47. Schomerus, p. 55.
48. Ś.J.S. sūtra VI, v. 3.

water, dreams and the mirage.[49] In being thus transient, they fail to be sat, and participate in the nature of asat.

The compound word, 'sadasat,' coined from the words, 'sat' and 'asat' is used to describe the dual nature of the soul which is considered to have a middle position between 'sat' on the one side, and 'asat' on the other. The 'sat' on the one side is constituted of Śiva and aruḷ, and the 'asat' on the other side is constituted of tirodhāyi and āṇava,[50] the former pair signifying purity, and the latter impurity. Aruḷ or jñāna, in being set in opposition to āṇava, brings out the contrast between enlightenment and ignorance, but this point is more markedly brought out by the terms, 'cit' and 'acit', which will be considered later. In considering the soul as associated with the senses, and as forgetting its kinship with God,[51] the ideas of spiritual purity and of sensual defilement are emphasised. Summarising the different meanings of 'sat' as derived from the use of the term, 'sadasat' in various contexts, we see that purity, virtue, enlightenment, and spiritual nature are what form part of the contents of 'sat' as over against impurity, vice, ignorance and material nature characteristic of 'asat.'

A further important point that is emphasised regarding 'sat' is that unlike the various things coming under the class of 'asat', 'sat' cannot become an object of knowledge. 'Asat' may be pointed out as 'that', but 'sat' can never be pointed out similarly. If God were to become an object of knowledge, He would become 'asat'.[52] The objection that if 'sat' is never an object of knowledge, Śiva can never be known and would descend to the level of the non-existent,[53] is met by the answer that He is the intelligence of the soul,[54] and being thus the soul of the soul, He is never projected forward as an object of knowledge, which circumstance would constitute a

49. Ś.J.B. sūtra VI. argt. 1.
50. Ś.P. v. 91.
51. Ś.J.B. sūtra VIII.
52. Ś.J.S. sūtra VI v. 1.
53. Ś.J.S. sūtra VI v. 4.
54. Ś.J.S. sūtra VI vv. 8 and 9.

limitation for Him.[55] As ' sat ' transcends ' asat ', the soul can gain knowledge of Śiva only through aruḷ, which also is ' sat '.[56] All things known by the soul's intelligence are ' asat ',[57] and Śiva, being ' sat ', cannot be grasped by the soul's intelligence.

In saying that God is ' sat ', one should think of Him as real, and by this it is meant that through eternity He exists unchangingly ; further, one is to think of Him as pure, of the nature of intelligence, and spiritual. The negative elements implied by the term are that ' sat ' never becomes an object of knowledge, and is never known by any medium other than ' śiva-śaktī.' The term, ' sat ' can be applied in its fullest sense only to Śiva. In this connection, our attention is drawn[58] to what is said in sūtra VI of the ' Śiva-jñāna-bōdham ' that the expression ' sat ' in relation to the soul, and in relation to matter, can be used only in a limited sense, and that to them, the predicate ' asat ' can also be attributed.

It is of interest to note one other meaning which the term ' sat ' is considered to have. Somewhat similarly to Descartes ' definition of substance, ' sat ' is defined as that which so exists that for its being and nature, it needs no other thing, while without it nothing other can be thought of as existent.[59] This amounts to making God absolute, and though the Siddhāntin believes he has done so, he does not succeed in making God absolute, although He is rendered comparatively supreme. God is not responsible for the being of souls in the sense in which a mirror, for instance, is responsible for the reflection cast by it, for here, both for the coming into being of the reflection and for its continuation, the mirror is responsible. Śiva, however, is not responsible for the genesis of souls, though without Him, they cannot function in any respect.

55. Ś.J.S. sūtra V. v. 1.
56. Ś.J.S. sūtra VI vv. 6 and 7.
57. Ś.J.B. sūtra VI. argt. 1.
58. Schomerus, p. 50.
59. Schomerus, p. 51.

The other term used to describe God is 'cit' which meaning 'intelligence' may also be applied to the soul. Yet God's intelligence is so different from that of the soul that just as compared with the soul, buddhi is 'acit', so compared with God, the soul is 'acit'.[60] The soul attains knowledge with the help of organs, but Śiva needs no instruments with which to know.[61] The intelligence of the soul is subject to many limitations so that it can attain knowledge only bit by bit, and it forgets what has been already taught;[62] in fact, the knowledge of the soul is so defective that the soul knows not either itself or God.[63] Śiva's intelligence, on the other hand, is not only free from these defects, but it is considered to have every excellence that constitutes omniscience. Unlike the way in which the soul attains enlightenment, Śiva does not gain knowledge bit by bit, but knows everything at the same time. This is possible because God by means of His śakti, is present in all souls,[64] and also in matter;[65] and hence, He is in a position to know everything. A further excellence worthy of note regarding Śiva's intelligence is that it is self-luminous,[66] and enlightens souls.[67] The term, 'cit', in its fullest sense, signifies an intelligence that is omniscient, and in this sense it fully applies to God.

It seems as if all that has been said of the omniscience of God is undermined by the Siddhāntin's further contention that 'sat' knows not 'asat'. The Siddhāntin tries to meet the difficulty by saying that Śiva cannot know 'asat' as an object, as paśu and pāśa are not foreign to Him, but form part of Him. As the sea contains within itself water and salt, so God (sea) contains within Himself the souls (sea-water) and matter

60. Ś.J.S. sūtra XI. v. 11.
61. Ś.J.S. sūtra V. v. 5.
62. Ś.J.S. sūtra V. v. 3.
63. Ś.J.B. sūtra V.
64. Ś.J.B. sūtra VI, argt. 2, v. 4.
65. F.D.G. chapter 1. v. 8.
66. Ś.J.S. sūtra XI v. 11.
67. Ś.J.S. sūtra V. v. 2; Ś.J.B. sūtra V. argt 2. v. 1.

(salt).[68] Here the Siddhāntin verges on Advaitism, for, on this analogy, the world and souls are only elements of the absolute ; and this position is inconsistent with the statements that there are three entities pati, paśu and pāśa each having its own individuality.

Further features that may be noted of the intelligence of God are that, being pure, it is free of both malas and the guṇas. The soul is in eternal union with āṇava ; but God is untainted even when He stands in union with the mala-burdened soul. Likewise, God is free from guṇas, though standing close to matter which is characterised by guṇas. The term, 'nirguṇa' does not mean that He is without attributes, but that He is without the sattva, rajas and tamas constituents of matter.[69]

It was pointed out how the presence of God in everything made possible His omniscience. Hara is omniscient in that by means of śakti, He pervades everything.[70] God's omniscience and omnipresence contribute towards His omnipotence. Śiva is supreme over all. As He exists everywhere and knows everything, so does He also do everything. He is the ultimate cause of every event in the universe, particular or universal. Yet these changes are not caused by Him directly, but by means of His śakti.

This is the energy or power of Śiva. It is of the form of cognition, conation and emotion. Though of the same essence as Śiva, it is yet different from Him. The relation between God and śakti is a very intimate one, but still it is not a relation of simple identity. The view that God is the efficient cause, and śakti the instrumental cause of the world creation keeps out the assumption of a simple identity between them. As the sun's rays though not existing without the sun, are still not identical with the sun, and as the king's will,

68. Ś.J.S. sūtra VII. v. 3.
69. E.H. p. 49 ; N.L.I.P. p. 8 ; Ś.J.B. sūtra IX argt 2, v. 1.
70. Ś.J.B. sūtra II, argt. 4.

though not existing without Him, still is not identical with him, so the śakti of Śiva, though not existing without Him, is still not identical with Him.[71] Hara and śakti are interdependent; except as grace, Śiva does not exist, and without Śiva grace does not exist.[72] Without His śakti, Śiva does not perform any of His functions. To make clear the fact that śakti is indispensable to God, an old Purāṇic legend tells of how when God put aside His śakti for a time, all creation began to lose its vitality; and Śiva out of sympathy for His creatures became reunited to His śakti. Yet because of this, it cannot be said that as without śakti God cannot work, therefore, He is powerless,[73] for this śakti is His own energy, and no foreign power with which He works. Śiva's śakti is called either cit-śakti or parā-śakti. This as shown below can be divided either according to the operations of Śiva, or according to His three faculties.

Figure 4.

Ś.J.S., I. 63.

Cit śakti or parā śakti
- Jñāna śakti (cognitive)
- Kriyā śakti (conative)
- Icchā śakti (emotive)

Ś.P. v. 2.

Parā śakti
- Sṛṣṭi śakti creation
- Sthiti śakti preservation
- Saṃhāra śakti destruction
- Tirobhāva śakti concealment
- Anugraha śakti grace

Icchā-śakti manifests itself as God's desire to lead souls to attain release from their state of bondage. By means of kriyā-śakti, God creates for souls the bodies that would enable them to experience the fruits of their karma, that thereby they may attain deliverance. With the aid of jñāna-śakti, He is able to judge the good and bad actions of the souls, to mete out grace accordingly.[74] Though śakti owing to various func-

71. Schomerus, p. 68.
72. Ś.J.S. sūtra V. v. 9.
73. Ś.P. v. 23.
74. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 63.

tions splits up as shown above, it is really one.[75] Since śakti is the means with which God performs all functions, all His offices are attributed to śakti.[76]

In order to fulfil His various duties to souls and the world, God takes on a body. His body, however, is different from that taken on by souls, which, being covered by āṇava-mala, find it necessary to take on bodies formed of māyā, which is helpful to gain knowledge of the world ;[77] but Śiva, being pure intelligence and unsullied by āṇava mala, has His body formed out of His own cit-śakti.[78] Though embodied, God does not suffer, as it is karma and not embodiment that is the cause of suffering.

The various offices which, by means of śakti, God performs are the creation, preservation and destruction of the world, and the concealment and redemption of the souls. It has been thoughtlessly said by some that God brings the world into existence, and after allowing a certain period of continuance, destroys it in order to amuse Himself.[79] On this view, God would be a cruel deity to derive pleasure at the cost of suffering to human beings ; His benevolent disposition would revolt at the idea of unkindness to any creature. The five functions are performed entirely for the benefit of souls. The world is brought into being in order that souls by striving may shed the impure mala which hampers the soul from knowing and doing all that it is capable of, and which binds the soul to this life. The work of preservation is continued, making it possible for souls to gain experience. The true nature of the world is concealed from the soul so that it desires the things of this world which are not its ultimate good ; unless the things of this world are made attractive, it will not seek them ; and it is only by experiencing them that it can realise their worthlessness and discard them. When the soul is convinced that the things of this world have no lasting value then the tirodhāna śakti is

75. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 61.
76. Ś.J.S. verse 3 of Invocation.
77. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 26.
78. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 41.
79. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 36.

converted into aruḷ śakti and enables the soul to turn towards God. After a period the souls require rest; and it is then that the world is destroyed in order that the souls may have relief from their weariness. Thus each one of the five functions performed by God is for the benefit of the souls.[80]

Although God thus carries out these different operations in connection with the universe, yet He is considered unaffected by His work.[81] If God operated on māyā directly, then He would be subject to alteration; but as noticed above, He works through His śakti. Just as the pot has the potter for its first cause, the staff and wheel for its instrumental cause, and clay for its material cause, so the world has Śiva for its first cause, śakti for its instrumental cause, and māyā for its material cause. It is because God operates by means of śakti that He remains unaltered. When the sun shines, the flowers in a pond may be in various stages of development, so that at one spot there is a bud just about to open, and at another place a flower that is in full bloom and at a third spot a flower that is fading away; and yet the sun that is responsible for these different processes, is unaffected by them. It is the same with God, who is not affected by the various duties He carries out. And just as time remains constant in spite of the changes that take place in the past, present and future, so God remains unaltered by His various offices.[82] Even the instruction of His devotees is carried on by Him without His being modified in any way. When the sun is in the east or west, it makes the crystal reflect the colour of the objects in the neighbourhood, and when the sun is over-head, the crystal reflects the light of the sun. In either case, the sun knows no variation. In the same way, it is Śiva-jñāna that enables the soul to attain knowledge of the world with the help of the sense organs etc., and also to attain knowledge of itself (soul) without the help of the sense organs. But Śiva-jñāna is itself unvaried in either case.[83] From the fact of God performing His various

80. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 37.
81. Ś.P. v. 17.
82. Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 24.
83. Ś.P. v. 69.

duties, it does not follow that He is subject to change, for He remains unmodified just as the sun remains constant although because of its power, the lotus blooms, the crystal shines and the water evaporates.[84]

Thus unaffected by the changes in the world as He is deemed to be, He is yet the cause of these changes. Though māyā and the soul are eternal like God, yet neither of them can do anything whatever without God operating on them. Māyā is inert and unintelligent, and cannot develop into the evolved universe without the aid of Śiva. Neither can soul attain body, gain experience, receive enlightenment or reach the goal without Śiva's aid.

The dependence of the universe on God is proved by the circumstance that matter being both inert and unintelligent cannot organise itself into a cosmos. Moreover, at the time of saṃhāra, God is the only person that can be responsible for the re-creation of the world.[85]

With man, God has a peculiar relation, for in him God is immanent, and at the same time He is transcendent. As both God and man are intelligent beings, there is temptation on the part of man to think that he is one with God. Though God is immanent in the soul, still He is over and above it. Because God is full of every perfection, and is difficult to be understood, He is hard to be attained, and because He abounds in grace, He stands without an equal.[86] The soul, being covered with āṇava mala, cannot compare with God. He is pure sat; the soul, however, which is 'sadasat', has leanings towards God, who is sat, and the world, which is asat. The soul can either approximate towards God becoming more and more of sat, or degenerate into asat by giving way to the allurements of this world. God is the unfailing refuge of souls, which are utterly dependent on Him.[87] He it is that preserves them and

84. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 33.
85. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 35.
86. F.D.G. chapter I, v. 3.
87. F.D.G. Chapter I, v. 4.

gives them rest.[87] God, the supreme being, therefore besides being immanent is transcendent also.

There is as much difference between God and man, as there is between the soul and body of man; and yet, just as man does not disown his body, but on the other hand, identifies himself with it, so God claims souls as His although in purity and power, He is far removed from souls.[88] Just as there is close union between the lute and its music, and a fruit and its taste,[89] so there is intimate connection between God and the soul, although the soul, being covered by mala, is far inferior to God.

The souls are God's servants, and He is anxious that they should attain His sacred feet. For this purpose, He gives all the help necessary to enable souls to rid themselves of mala, so that they can attain the coveted goal of release.

The outstanding features in the Siddhāntin's conception of God are the supremacy of God and His moral perfections. The Siddhāntin is of opinion that he has established the supremacy of God on the following grounds:

1. Of the three entities in the world, God is the highest. His power is therefore unlimited.
2. God is necessary for souls and the world.
3. God is responsible for all events in the world.

Before assenting to the Siddhāntin's view that God is supreme, the grounds on which he bases this view need to be scrutinised. With regard to the first assumption, it will be readily granted that God is superior to souls and matter, inasmuch as souls are ignorant and subject to suffering, and matter is unconscious, whereas God is not subject to these limitations. Yet His superiority is not absolute inasmuch as God is not responsible for the exist-

88. Ś.J.B. sūtra II, argt. 1. v. 1.
89. Ś.J.B. sūtra II, argt. 1, v. 3.

ence of souls and matter, assumed to be eternal. God is the author of the working of the world, not of the world itself. This circumstance, therefore, militates against the absolute nature of God.

The second assumption is based on a one-sided view. No doubt, God is necessary to the world. This alone, however, does not suffice to make God absolute. The further test for the absolute nature of God is whether He can do without the world. Judged by this criterion, the Siddhāntin's God fails to be independent and therefore absolute. If God is indispensable for the world and souls, these are equally indispensable to Him. God is not God without the world and souls ; for it is these that afford Him opportunity to give expression to His creatorship, preservation and other activities resulting from His divine attributes of omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence.

The third assumption that as all events are attributed to God His nature is rendered absolute, involves the Siddhāntin in various difficulties. At this point, the Siddhāntin resorts to the śākti with which God performs His various functions. The Siddhāntin deems the śakti concept to be rich with the promise of all good things. He thinks that it brings about a desired unity in the universe ; that it secures the changelessness of the nature of God in spite of His being the ultimate cause of events, and that it makes it possible for God to be both transcendent and immanent at the same time. The value of the śakti concept in the Siddhāntin's system lies in its fulfilling these three requirements for which it was introduced into the system. The Siddhāntin's desire for unity, which he hopes to secure by means of śakti, is accounted for. It is pointed out that as the Siddhāntin admits the eternal existence of several entities, he runs the risk of being condemned as missing the unity, and running counter to the requirements that all that is existent must form a unified whole, and that the task of philosophy is to conceive of such a unity. He seeks to escape this condemnation by placing God in relation to the other realities,

and by attributing to Him all events, so that in place of a pluralism of substances, he teaches a monism of events or changes.[90] This much coveted unity is sought to be realised by means of śakti. God comes into contact with other substances and makes them function. The discrete and manifold entities are subject to the control of God; and the diverse phenomena of the universe have their source in Him. Thus all beings and all changes are unified through Him. Śakti is also supposed to solve the difficult problem of how God, who is pure spirit, comes into contact with matter.

If as the Siddhāntin believes, śakti should unify the diverse plurality of the universe, what happens when, during the period of world-rest, śakti is withdrawn by Śiva into Himself? Diversity must necessarily set in again, and māyā and souls etc., exist side by side with the unifying element withdrawn.

If it is only through śakti that God comes into contact with other beings, and through it brings about all changes, then His contact with other beings must be superficial, and His control of the changes slight. As pointed out,[91] it cannot be maintained that God has upon the other substances a direct and unmediated influence in the true sense of the word. All events may be traced back to Śiva, not in the sense of a direct handling, but only in the sense of an incitation or stirring up which sets in motion the possibilities and potentialities.[91]

But even this superficial contact of Śiva with the world is ruled out as śakti is no unifying element. For if this has been required to link up God and the world, further elements are similarly required to link up śakti with God on the one side, and the world on the other; and to link these links with one another, others will be required, and so on without end. Śakti, therefore, instead of unifying the diversity introduces further discreteness, and defeats the purpose for which it was introduced.

90. Schomerus, p. 78.

91. Schomerus, p. 64.

The eternality of God is very much endangered when He is made the creator of the world of change. To obviate this risk, the Siddhāntin places Him above space and time, and the finite processes in time. In short, he makes God immutable; and since this immutable God is responsible for the changes in the world, the Siddhāntin interposes śakti between the unchanging God on the one hand, and the changing world on the other to serve as an intermediary without prejudice to changelessness on the one side and change on the other.

The problem of how the unchanging God can become the author of the changing world is explained by analogies. The criticisms offered of the analogies[92] are worthy of attention. The analogy of the crystal e.g. is considered to be inappropriate as the objects whose colours it shows are not present within itself, but standing outside it, are only loosely connected with it. Śiva, on the other hand, is thought to stand in such close connection with the other substances that by mixing they are one. The question is not whether Śiva is affected by things outside Him, but whether things in Him affect Him.[92] The analogy of the crystal is not relevant to the problem in hand, as it deals with conditions entirely different from those existing between Śiva and the other substances. The same criticism applies to the analogy of the sun and the lotuses.

Śakti also fails to fulfil the third purpose for which it is used. The Siddhāntin conceives of God as both transcendent and immanent at the same time. Śakti is introduced to make possible the immanence of God. But inasmuch as śakti during the time of world-repose, is withdrawn from the world and souls, Śiva at such times loses His immanence and becomes purely transcendent.

Even should śakti be in uninterrupted contact with the world, it still remains to be examined whether the unity of transcendence and immanence, which the Siddhāntin thinks is

92. Schomerus, p. 97.

realised in God, is an intelligible concept. In order not to create an impassable gulf between God and souls, the Siddhāntin asserts that God is immanent; and at the same time to maintain the supremacy of God, he makes Him transcendent. To explain this problem of how God, who is immanent in souls, can yet be transcendent, the body-soul analogy is used. The immanence is considered not to detract from the transcendence; for as the indwelling spirit is different from the body, so is God, who dwells in souls, also lifted high above them. In this analogy, the Siddhāntin says that when a man is called by the name attached to his physical organism, he responds to it; for the soul though superior to the body and different from it, yet identifies itself with the body. Similarly, God, who is holy and transcendent, yet claims the sinful souls as His and is immanent in them. The Siddhāntin, in using this analogy, presumes that the body-soul relationship is quite clear, and makes no effort to render intelligble a mysterious relationship. Experience leads us to think that when the self wills to do a thing, it actuates the body which carries out what is required. However, we cannot unquestioningly accept such a conclusion; for reflection on the matter unfolds various difficulties which make the relation unintelligible.

To Descartes, who admitted that experiences such as perception, feeling and volition seem to confirm interaction between body and soul, it was inconceivable how souls whose essence was pure thought could come into contact with the body, whose essence was extension. His successors taking up the problem, offered a mechanical explanation of the psychophysical processes. They offered the theory of psycho-physical parallellism, according to which every bodily change is accompanied by a modification of the soul, so that on either side, is a series of changes; but these series themselves have no relation each to the other. We cannot rest content with this view which merely observes the fact of invariable concomitance of the physical and psychical processes. We need to go further and discover the reason for such regular association. Further, as Bradley points out, this theory is, "opposed

to the main bulk of appearances "[93] of some causal connection between body and soul.

The failure of this theory is due to the fact that "Body and soul have been set up as independent realities. They have been taken to be things whose kinds are different, and which have existence each by itself, and each in its own right. And then of course, their connection becomes incomprehensible, and we strive in vain to see how one can influence the other."[93]

Epiphenomenalism, on the other hand, reduces the soul to a mere shadow. Consequently, this theory cannot explain the teleology which is found in the universe, and attributed to an Intelligence or soul.

Neither those theories that make body and soul independent realities, nor those that explain away one or the other of them making it unreal, offer a satisfactory account of the problem. The only plausible explanation of the relationship between body and soul has to overcome the dualism between the two by doing away with their independence and making them aspects of a third reality.

Bradley attempting to solve the problem finds that body and soul are appearances. If so, they must have their basis in a third reality of which they are appearances. Bradley maintains that it is in the Absolute that the phenomena of body and soul are somehow transmuted, so that it is possible for them as appearances of the Absolute to have interaction with each other. This interaction cannot be demonstrated; but it is in keeping with the bulk of experience that there is some causal relation.

The phenomena usually considered in this connection are those of the mental and physical series; the correlation between these two presents no problem to the Siddhāntin; for

93. A.R. p. 296.

mind being an evolute of prakṛti, and consequently a subtle form of matter, there is no difficulty in conceiving of their inter-action. But this still leaves unsolved the soul-body problem; for unlike Western philosophers, who identify mind with the soul, the Siddhāntin places soul over and above the internal senses that go to form the mind. To him, the soul is pure spirit, and over against this is the body with its material nature. If the two are independent realities with diverse natures, how do they come together? The Siddhāntin fails to see that there is a problem at all, and takes for granted that the body-soul relation is obvious. On this assumption, He applies the body-soul analogy, which in itself is not clear, to explain the even more difficult relationship between God and the soul. He hopes by this analogy to prove that God is immanent in souls, while at the same time He is transcendent. These two concepts of transcendence and immanence are contrary concepts that cannot both be true at once. By the immanence of God, we do not mean the mere co-existence of God with the soul, such as makes no difference whatever to the latter. And yet, if God were to come into contact with the soul, He could not at the same time be transcendent. The Siddhāntin's contention that the transcendence of God is consistent with His immanence in souls as it is His śakti and not He that dwells in souls will not gain acceptance, for as noted above, the śakti concept, instead of solving difficulties, intensifies them.

The supremacy of God, based on the three grounds shown above, is not borne out by any of them. God is not absolute because He is not responsible for the existence of souls and matter. He is not absolute because He is not independent of the world and souls. He is not absolute because He is the author of the changes in the world, and because He is immanent in the world of change. The second feature, which is held to characterise the Siddhāntin's concept of God, is His moral perfection. In order to give expression to His love and tenderness, which are a few of the traits that make up His goodness,

He requires the world and souls. For, considering that except as grace, Śiva does not exist, the world and souls that call forth the grace of God are indispensable to Him. This again is disturbing to the absolute nature of God. It is these and other contradictions noted above that point towards the more satisfying concept of the Absolute, which, however, the Siddhāntin is not willing to accept.

CHAPTER IV

MĀYĀ AND ITS EVOLUTES.

The postulation of a material substrate that underlies the universe is based on the following arguments. The universe, which is acit, cannot be accounted for by Śiva, who is cit,[1] for if it could be thus accounted for by Him, and if one were to judge the nature of the cause from the nature of the effect, then Śiva would be acit. In refuting the Māyāvādin, who attributes the world to God, it is pointed out by means of the analogy of the spider and the web that what is non-intelligent (the web) cannot be accounted for by the intelligent (the spider). The material universe accordingly, cannot have an intelligent entity as its substrate.

The need for a substrate of like nature is further made out for the following reasons. Every effect has a cause, and cannot be said to arise out of nothing. The world is an effect since it has component parts; and if an effect, it must have a cause. Any attempt to rule out a necessary cause as by saying that an unaccountable shower of sand arises of itself from nothing, is based on superficial knowledge of the matter in hand; thus, the shower of sand far from having no cause underlying it, is caused by very fine particles of earth pervading those heights.[2] There can be no effect without a cause. As the tree with its branches and leaves is contained in the seed in germ condition, so the evolved universe must have a substrate from which it arises,[3] and this substrate must be of a nature similar to itself, i.e. material. The material world, though asat or non-real in that it is subject to changing states,[4] is, however, not unreal like the horns of a hare.[5] And inas-

1. Ś.P. v. 23.
2. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 120.
3. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 14.
4. Ś.J.B. sūtra VI argt. 1, v.
5. Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 17.

much as it is real, though of a changing nature, it needs a substrate that will constitute its reality throughout the changing states. Further, if karma is to be wiped out, the soul must have experiences, and this is possible only if there are objects of knowledge ; and as the substrate of these, a material cause is wanted. These requirements lead to the postulation of a material substrate that is eternal and constitutes one of the three eternal entities of the universe. The Siddhāntin names it māyā, a word consisting of the two letters, mā (மா) signifying resolution, and yā (யா) denoting evolution.

Māyā is the material cause of the universe.[6] This primal matter is imperceptible,[7] because of its subtle condition. It is without parts[8] as it is the primordial stuff from which the universe arises, and that which is material and has parts cannot be primordial ; and being without parts, it is indestructible and eternal.[9] It is one, formless and all pervasive.[10] As it causes delusion in souls, it is reckoned as one of the three malas.[11] However, it is also the source of enlightenment to souls, although this knowledge is of a very defective nature. The products of māyā rise and perish, but the material stuff of which they are constituted remains the same. Māyā is non-intelligent and inert, for which reason, it cannot by itself account for the universe, but stands in need of an efficient cause.[12]

Māyā actuated by an efficient cause gives rise to the universe which, on the basis of its usefulness to souls may be subdivided into the four groups of tanu (bodies), karaṇa (organs), bhuvana (worlds), and bhōga (objects) required for the three classes of souls. The karaṇas mentioned here include also the antaḥkaraṇas or internal organs. Hence, māyā is the basis of the psychical as well as of physical. In

6. Ś.P. v. 23.
7. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 12.
8. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 13.
9. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 16.
10. Ś.J.S. sūtra II, v. 53.
11. Ś.J.S. sūtra II. v. 53.
12. Ś.P. v. 23.

view of this circumstance, it is pointed out that matter as understood by the Siddhāntin cannot be covered by the term, 'matter' as used by European philosophers, for in Western philosophy, 'matter' is used to signify the world of extension, as contrasted with the world of thought; for the Siddhāntin, however, it means whatever is non-intelligent in its own nature.[13]

The products that evolve from the material substrate are termed tattvas. The process of development of the world from its substrate, is in a few respects similar to that of evolution, and may for want of another term be referred to by that name. As noticed before, māyā being non-intelligent and inert cannot evolve of itself. How then does it unfold itself? As in products of industry, there are, besides the material cause, an instrumental cause and an efficient cause, so in the production of the world, māyā is the material cause, Śiva is the efficient cause, and His śakti is the instrumental cause.[14] Śakti plays the part of a go-between between spirit on the one side, and matter on the other, and between the immutable God on the one side, and the changing world on the other.

Among the differences between the Sāṅkhya and the Siddhānta accounts of the universe an important one is that the material substrate of the Siddhānta, namely, māyā, does not correspond to the material substrate of the Sāṅkhya, namely, prakṛti; for over and above the prakṛti of the Sāṅkhya, the Siddhānta discriminates śuddha māyā and aśuddha māyā. It almost seems as if instead of one material substrate, the Siddhāntin postulates three, namely śuddha, aśuddha and prakṛti māyā. This doubt is dispelled by his explanation that māyā in its primal state is śuddha māyā, while in its sūkṣma state, it is aśuddha māyā and in its sthūla state it is prakṛti māyā.[15]

13. Schomerus, p. 103.
14. Ś.J.S. sūtra I. v. 18.
15. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 136-137.

Śuddha and aśuddha māyā enlighten the soul in different ways; morever, whereas the one causes both pain and pleasure, the other causes pleasure alone. For these reasons, śuddha and aśuddha māyā are by some considered two independent elements different from each other. The Siddhāntin is averse to accepting this view on the following grounds:

1. If they were different, then being many and inert, they would be finite as well, and would consequently fail to be the cosmic stuff.

2. As there is only one instrumental cause, it is meet that there should be only one primordial material cause.

3. That śuddha and aśuddha māyā cause pleasure and pain respectively need present no difficulty as it is possible to have attributes of opposite nature present in one substrate as in the case of a kuṉṟumaṇi, one part of which is black while the rest is red, and as in the case of karma, which is both good and bad.[16] The Siddhāntin comes to the conclusion that there is one māyā from which arise two varieties—śuddha and aśuddha māyā.[17] That portion of the primal stuff which has mixed with mala and karma gives rise to aśuddha māyā; and that part of it which is pure gives rise to śuddha māyā.[18]

As the qualifying terms denote, the difference between the two kinds of māyā consists in the one being pure and the other impure. The impurities with which aśuddha māyā mixes are mala and karma.[19] This variety gives rise to pain and to pleasure. Śuddha māyā, however, not being tainted thus, gives rise to pleasure alone.[20] The one produces perfect knowledge; the other imperfect knowledge. The one produces śuddha prapañca and the other aśuddha prapañca.[20a]

Śuddha māyā, also called māmāyā, kuṭilai, kuṇḍali and bindu,[20a] being pure, is operated on by Śiva Himself,[21] through

16. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 136-137.
17. Ś.P. foot-note p. 41.
18. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 136-137.
19. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 137.
20, 20a. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 133.
21. Ś.P. foot-note 10 on p. 43.

His śakti, which when beginning to function sub-divides into icchā, jñāna and kriyā śaktis. Jñāna śakti acting on śuddha māyā produces nāda, and this when acted on by kriyā śakti, produces bindu. Jñāna and kriyā śaktis in equal proportion operate on bindu producing sādākhya tattva. When kriyā śakti exceeds jñāna śakti and the two conjointly act on sādākhya tattva, māheśvarī tattva arises. When jñāna śakti predominates over kriyā śakti and the two act on māheśvarī tattva śuddha vidyā arises.[23]

Figure 5
śuddha māyā and its evolutes, the śiva tattvas

	śuddha māyā
(jñāna śakti only)	nāda
(kriyā śakti only)	bindu
(both śaktis equal)	sādākhya
(more of kriyā śakti)	māheśvarī
(more of jñāna śakti)	śuddha vidyā

Thus according to this account, each evolute gives rise to the next one. In 'Śiva-jñāna-bhāṣya',[24] however, we are told that each of the śiva tattvas arises directly from śuddha māyā. The author points out that there is no inconsistency between his view and that contained in 'Śiva-prakāśam'. According to him, śuddha māyā modified as śiva tattva produces śakti tattva, śuddha māyā modified as śakti tattva produces sādākhya, śuddha māyā modified as sādākhya produces Īśvara etc., so that even the last evolute is directly linked up with the primal matter. He points out that in 'Śiva-prakāśam' too the meaning intended to be conveyed is the same, that the primal stuff itself modified as śiva tattva, śakti tattva etc., gives rise to the next evolute.

These five evolutes from śuddha māyā—nāda, bindu, sādākhya, māheśvarī and śuddha vidyā are known as śiva tattvas and prērakakāṇḍa.[25] Nāda or śiva tattva is characterised by

23. Ś.P. foot-note 4 on p. 42; also v. 21.
24. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 139-142.
25. Jk. Section 1. p. 5.

jñāna alone; bindu or śakti by action alone; sādākhya by jñāna and action in equal degree; māheśvarī has more of kriyā than jñāna; and vidyā has more of jñāna than kriyā.


Besides other things which exist in these various evolutes of śuddha māyā, there dwell also adhikāra-muktas and apara-muktas. Adhikāra-muktas are the souls which, possessed of the desire to exercise authority, have failed to attain mukti, and are meanwhile allowed to exercise authority over the sādākhya, māheśvarī and śuddha vidyā tattvas. Apara-muktas are those who following the path of jñāna have failed to reap the full fruits thereof.[26] In śiva tattva are intikai and other kalās (which are ten in number), the Śaivāgamas that are in the form of sūkṣmā vāk, the worshippers of Nāda mūrti wishing to dwell in nāda, and their bodies etc.[27] In śakti tattva nivṛtti and five other kalās, the Śaivāgamas in the form of paiśanti (paśyanti) vāk, those who worship Bindu mūrti and wish to dwell there, and the bodies, worlds etc., of those devotees.[27] In sādākhya are the five śaktis, the thirty-eight kalās, the Śaivāgamas in the form of madhyamā vāk, and Sadāśiva, Praṇava and other gods.[28] Māheśvarī has the Āgamas in the sūkṣma vaikharī form, Ananta and other Vidyeśvaras, Rudras, their bodies etc.[28] Śuddha-vidyā has the Āgamas in the sthūla vaikharī form, the mantras, Vāma and other śaktis, Rudra, Māl (Viṣṇu), Ayan (Brahmā) and Indra, their bodies etc.[29]

Some give a more detailed account of the śuddha tattvas,[30] pointing out that śuddha māyā, also called bindu, gives rise to the following: the four vāk; the fifty one letters of the Sanskrit alphabet; the eighty one padas, which are formulas for religious worship; the seventy millions of mahāmantras or great mystic formulas; all the śāstras; the tanu, karaṇa, bhuvana, bhoga for the vijñānā-'kalas and praḷayā-'kalas, the three states of beatification and the five kalās.

26. Ś.P. Foot-note 9 on p. 43.
27. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 139.
28. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 140.
29. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 141.
30. Jk. p. 1.

Figure 6

The evolutes of Śuddha Māyā.



The first five (the four vāk, fifty one letters, eighty one padas, mahāmantras and the śāstras) are intended for the use of the five divine elements (arising from śuddha māyā in order that they may benefit souls). The tanu, karaṇa, bhuvana, bhoga are the bodies, organs, worlds and objects of enjoyment. These are for the use of praḷāyā-'kalas and vijñānā-'kalas. For the formation of tanu etc., there arise from śuddha māyā the thirty tattvas ranging from kalā to pṛthivī. The three states of beatification are sālōka, which is living in the same world as God, sāmīpya or living near God, and sārūpya or taking on the form of God. These regions are for those who have passed through the caryā, kriyā and yoga states of religious life. Kalās are instruments, which in conjunction with particular modes of cit-śakti remove ignorance. Nivṛtti kalā helps souls out of their bondage to some extent; pratiṣṭhā kalā establishes the souls in their new status so that they do not slip back into their former sinful state; vidyā gives to them the knowledge that comes through experience; śānti quiets the souls' desires, aversions and volitions; śāntyatīta dispels the desires, etc., which in the previous state were subdued.[31]

Aśuddha māyā, also known as adho-māyā, and mohini,[32] is the material cause of the material universe.[33] It is eternal (though the products arising from it come into existence and perish); it is one (though its compounds are varied), and formless (though its evolutes may either have form or not have it).[34] From aśuddha māyā arise the tanu, karaṇa, bhuvana, bhoga for the sakalas. Though impure, it helps to remove from souls the impurity of āṇava. It should not seem strange that one impurity can remove another considering that dirty clothes are cleansed by cow-dung or sand.[35] Māyā and āṇava

31. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 142-143.
32. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 133.
33. Ś.P. v. 23.
34. Ś.P. v. 22; Ś.J.S. II, v. 53.
35. Ś.J.S. II, v. 52.

have opposite functions; for as this obscures souls making them ignorant, the other enlightens them.[36]

The pure tattvas considered above are the results of Śiva's co-operation with śuddha māyā by means of His śakti. As aśuddha māyā is impure, Śiva does not act on it, and it is the divinities evolved from śuddha māyā that carry on the rest of the evolution. God Sadāśiva by means of his śakti produces from aśuddha māyā, kāla, niyati and kalā; and from this last product, he produces vidyā and rāga.[37] Kāla tattva (time) is sub-divided into past, present and future, and brings to the soul the limitations of past time, the advantages of the present and the novelty of the future.[38] It makes the universe and organisms (which are subject to the ravages of time) undergo the changes of time.[39] Kāla and niyati work by limiting the time within which deeds are to be performed, and assigning the merits and demerits earned by the souls. It is necessary that the origin of kāla should precede that of kalā, etc., for the production of these cannot take place except in kāla. It may be replied that as kāla is itself a product, the same objection would apply, that for its production, time is required. This is so; and it is the kāla produced by śuddha māyā that fulfils the need. It cannot be objected that the kāla produced by śuddha māyā cannot be of use for the evolving of the products of aśuddha māyā on the score of difference between them; for though śuddha kāla and aśuddha kāla may be different from each other in some ways, yet they agree in being kāla; and hence, śuddha kāla can very well help in the production of the evolutes of aśuddha māyā.[40]

It may be thought that time is not essential for the evolution of products, as those of them that are brought into being

36. Ś.J.S. II, v. 84; Ś.P. v. 37. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 262.
37. Ś.P. v. 26.
38. Ś.P. v. 40; Uv. v. 20.
39. Ś.J.S. 11, v. 54.
40. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 144-145.

before the production of śuddha kāla come to be without the aid of time. Śiva is above time, and He Himself produces time in order that it may function. Therefore, for performing His offices, He does not need time. God Ananta and others, however, who like us are subject to time need it for their offices.[41]

In naming vidyā tattvas, kāla is sometimes mentioned first, and at other times, kalā is mentioned first. The former is the order of genesis, and the latter the order in which they function.[42]

Some contend that it is not possible for the gods dwelling in the śiva tattvas to have any experience as time is only a later evolute of aśuddha māyā. This view, however, does not hold good, for the gods dwelling in the śiva tattvas are not dependent on the time yet to be produced by aśuddha māyā, for śuddha māyā itself, as we have noticed, evolves śuddha kāla.

Niyati (or law) regulates the dispensation to souls of the fruit of their deeds, as kings of vast dominions mete out justice to their subjects.[43] Kalā removes from the soul to some extent, the obscuring āṇava and actuates the kriyā śakti of the soul, thus helping it to undergo experience.[44] Vidyā (cognition) helps towards enlightenment. Rāga (desire) intensifies the soul's icchā śakti, and helps the soul to experience the fruits of its karma.[45] These five tattvas are different from others in that unlike them (which in the various avasthās associate with the soul and depart) they remain with the soul always in this life, and are called 'pañcakañcuka.'[46] When, in conjunction with these tattvas, the soul attains the stage of experiencing the world, it is called, 'puruṣa tattva'. Because in union with them it experiences the world, it is called so; but really the soul cannot be reckoned as one of the tattvas as it

41. S.J.B. Mā: p. 145.
42. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 145.
43. Ś.J.S. II, v. 55; Ś.P. v. 40.
44. Ś.J.S. II, v. 56; Ś.P. v. 39.
45. Ś.J.S. II, v. 56; Ś.P. v. 40.
46. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 158.


is an intelligent being.[47] The tattvas condition the soul, so that we see and experience it as a certain limited being, limited with regard to space and time, subject to fate, and with its powers of knowledge, will and activity greatly curtailed. The soul stands thus on account of its connection with māyā.[48] Hence, it is named after the tattvas. The last tattva of this group is prakṛti māyā or mūla prakṛti, which arises from kalā. These seven tattvas form the group of vidyā tattvas.

By the activity of God Rudra, prakṛti and the guṇas arise from kalā. Prakṛti and guṇas, being still undeveloped, are said to be in the avyakta state ; and while in this condition, they give rise to citta (attention) and buddhi (intellect). This last gives rise to ahaṅkāra (individuality) which splits into its three varieties of taicata (taijasa, characterised by sāttvika guṇa), vaikari (domintated by rājasa guṇa) and bhūtādi (pervaded by tāmasa guṇa). From taicata ahaṅkāra arise manas (the understanding) and the five jñāna indriyas. Vaikari produces the five karma indriyās, and bhūtādi the five tanmātras with their respective elements.[49] The tanmātras are the cause of the elements.[50] Each of these elements has one more guṇa than the preceding one ; thus ākāśa has sound ; air has touch as well ; fire makes a further addition of colour ; water has yet the further guṇa of taste ; and earth has all the five qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.[51]

47. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 159.
48. Schomerus, pp. 137-138.
49. Jk. p. 7.
50. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 185.
51. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 184.

Figure 7.

The Evolution of the Tattvas.



Prakṛti has the three guṇas of sattva, rajas and tamas, each of which is capable of combining with the other two[52] so that we get nine varieties of guṇas.[53] Sattva is characterised by brightness and buoyancy ; rajas by change and vigour ; and tamas by heaviness. The sattva guṇa manifests itself as pleasure, rajas as pain and tamas as desire.

Citta, manas, ahaṅkāra and buddhi constitute the antaḥkaraṇas. Citta apprehends things, say for instance, a shell ; manas analyses and doubts as to whether the object could be a shell or a piece of silver ; ahaṅkāra, the source of pride and self-assertion, which leads the soul to think there is none to compare with it, has no certain cognition of the object perceived, but resolves to obtain such knowledge saying, 'I shall make sure' ; buddhi decides that it is a shell, and presents its judgment to the soul.[54]

The five jñāna indriyās of ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose experience respectively sound, touch, form, taste and smell, which are the qualities of the five elements.[55] The Lōkāyatas and others say that the ear, eye, etc., are themselves the indriyās. Considering that a deaf man cannot hear although possessing ears, it is clear that the jñāna indriyās must be other than the physical organs.[56] The contention of the Advaitins that the jñāna indriyās are caused by the elements is not sound ; for if the eye for example were produced by fire, the eye would cognise that element alone and not any other. The eye, however, cognises not merely fire but other elements too.[57]

The karma indriyās viz., mouth, feet, hands, anus and genital organs, perform the functions of speech, walking,

52. Ś.P. v. 41.
53. Ś.P. v. 41.
54. Ś.J.B. IV, argt. 1. v. 2 ; Ś.P. v. 43 ; Ś.J.S. II, vv. 58-60.
55. Uv. vv. 12-14 ; Ś.P. v. 44 ; Ś.J.S. II, v. 61.
56. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 175.
57. Tp. p. 56 ; Ts. p. 84.

giving and taking, excretion, and enjoyment respectively.[58] Besides the five main functions, there are others, such as frowning, and these are carried out by the five karma indriyās which though prominently active in a special part of the body, are yet spread over the whole of it as the skin pervades every part of it.[59]

The five elements help the soul to have experiences of the sense objects; ākāśa helps the ear in its awareness of sound; fire helps the eye to perceive form; air aids the skin to experience touch; water helps the tongue to taste things; earth enables the nose to experience smell.[60] The elements have other functions as well. Ākāśa provides the extensive space which things occupy and move about in; air which being light moves about freely, gathers up everything; fire heats all things, welding them together; water cools things and makes them soft; earth being solid, supports all.[61] The earth is four-sided in shape and golden in colour; the god who actuates it is Brahmā, the creator. Water is of the form of a crescent, and white in colour; it is directed by Viṣṇu, the Preserver. Fire, which is triangular-shaped is red in colour; it is ruled by Rudra, the Destroyer. Air, which is six-sided is black in colour; its presiding deity is Maheśvara who gives rest. Ākāśa, which is circular in shape, is smoky-coloured; and it is actuated by Sadāśiva, who shows grace.[62]

The tattvas, which were re-viewed total to thirty-six thus: the five śiva tattvas (nāda, bindu, sādākhya, māheśvarī, śuddha vidyā); the seven vidyā tattvas (kāla, niyati, vidyā, rāga, kalā, puruṣa and māyā); the four antaḥkaraṇas (manas, buddhi, ahaṅkāra and citta); the five karma indriyās (mouth, hands, anus, feet, genital organs); the five jñāna indriyās (eye,

58. Uv. vv. 15-16.
59. Ts. p. 78.
60. Uv. vv. 13-14.
61. Ś.P. v. 45; Ś.J.S. II, v. 66.
62. Uv. vv. 5-8; Ś.J.S. II, vv. 67-68.

ear, nose, tongue and skin); the five elements (earth, water, air, ākāśa and fire); and the five subtle elements (sound, taste, touch, smell and form).[63]


Some divide māyā into three kinds, namely, śuddha māyā, aśuddha māyā and prakṛti māyā.[64] The tattvas divided on this basis are the five śuddha tattvas (nāda, bindu, sādākhya, māheśvarī and vidyā) produced by śuddha māyā; seven śuddhāśuddha tattvas (kāla, niyati, kalā which are ruled by śakti tattva, vidyā ruled by śuddha vidyā, rāga ruled by Īśvara, puruṣa ruled by Sadāśiva and māyā ruled by śiva tattva);[65] and twentyfour aśuddha tattvas (5 tanmātras, 5 elements, 5 karma inrdiyās, 5 jñāna indriyās, 4 antaḥkaraṇas) produced by prakṛti māyā.

We have considered the evolution of the tattvas. Their resolution follows the opposite order so that the last evolved is the first to be resolved. The twenty four tattvas that arise from prakṛti are destroyed by god Rudra; the six vidyā tattvas above prakṛti by god Ananta; the śuddha tattvas of vidyā, māheśvarī and sādākhya by Layaśiva, and bindu and nādā by Śiva Himself.[66]

63. Ś.J.S. II, v. 69.
64. Ś.J.S. Commentary to v. 50 of sūtra I.
65. Ś.J.S. Commentary to v. 57 of sūtra II.
66. Ś.J.S. II, v. 72; Ś.P. Foot-note 9 on p. 46.

Figure 8.

Resolution of the Tattvas.



The evolution of the tattvas takes place at the creation of the world; their resolution at the destruction of the world. The interval between the two events constitutes the preservation of the world. The world is continuously subject to these cosmic processes. There is no creation which can be regarded as the first. In saying that the cosmic processes are beginningless, the Siddhāntin turns away from some important and difficult ultimate problems that though suppressed for the time, keep recurring at intervals so long as one is given to wondering over ultimate mysteries.

The tattvas of the Siddhānta numbering thirty-six exceed those of the Sāṅkhya which number twenty-four. The tattvas which the Siddhāntin has in excess of the Sāṅkhya are the śuddha tattvas and five of the aśuddha tattvas, derived from śuddha and aśuddha māyā respectively. This leads to the question whether there is any justification for the more elaborate scheme of the Siddhāntin. He postulates śuddha and aśuddha māyā neither of which finds a place in the Sāṅkhya system. It is from the prakṛti māyā onwards that the two schemes coincide. The Siddāntin's justification for these extra tattvas may now be considered.

As the world is not an appearance, it must have a substrate to account for its existence. Māyā is this first cause.[67] Śuddha māyā serves various purposes and is indispensable. It is part of Śiva's nature to absorb, enjoy and control. There must be something other than Himself, which He can absorb, enjoy and control. Śuddha māyā meets this need. It is further required to produce the bodies, organs, worlds and objects of enjoyment for Ananta and other adhikāra-muktas who, being purer than sakalas, cannot have their bodies etc. supplied by aśuddha māyā. It is śuddha māyā that produces sound without which there can be no knowledge.[68] It is some of the śiva tattvas that are wanted to actuate the aśuddha tattvas. The

67. Ts. p. 70.

68. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 134.

existence of śuddha māyā comes thus to be regarded as indispensable.

• Aśuddha māyā which is the cause of the material world is held to be equally important. The Sāṅkhyas contend that the three guṇas when in equilibrium constitute prakṛti. This, according to the Siddhāntin, cannot be, as the guṇas being inert and many and consequently subject to origin and decay are themselves in need of a substrate from which to arise.[69] Further, the guṇas while in the state of equilibrium can only constitute a guṇa tattva and not the prakṛti tattva.[70] The further contention that prakṛti while in the avyakta state constitutes the primal matter because here it is one and hence not subject to origin and decay, is not any the more acceptable; for though prakṛti, being more subtle than buddhi, ahaṅkāra etc., which take their rise from it, is prior to them, yet being gross compared with kalā and other tattvas, can only proceed from them and be one of their evolutes. Prakṛti really occupies a middle position so that though it is the cause of the evolutes below it, it is at the same time the effect of the subtler tattvas above it. Prakṛti, therefore, cannot be the primal cause of the universe.[71]

It may be said that the world arises from nothing as a shower of sand comes from the sky without a cause, and as conjurors take on various forms that are not produced by anything else. These facts, however, do not overthrow the principle of satkāryavāda. As noted above, the shower of sand is not without its cause in the form of fine particles of earth pervading those heights. Conjurors again, take their forms from whatever is the cause of such forms. The facts cited above do not undermine the existence of māyā.[72]

Paramāṇus cannot take the place of māyā as they have parts and there is no authority for assuming the existence of a subtler variety without parts. Should such exist, being inert

69. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 122.
70. Ś.J.B. Mā : pp. 160-161.
71. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 122.
72. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 121.

and many they would be merely products that arise and perish.[73]

Such sayings, as, "He that has known Brahman, knows everything," would mislead one into thinking that Brahman is itself the explanation of the universe, as apart from it there is nothing. This is to forget that cit cannot produce the universe which is acit. It may be replied that as the spider produces the web in which its (the spider's) nature is not seen, so there is no difficulty in conceiving the inert world as a product of the intelligent god. This, however, does not overthrow the Siddhāntin's position that cit cannot produce acit. The web should be traced not to the spider as an intelligent being, but to its bodily secretions. The effect need not have the same qualities as the cause, but it certainly should not have attributes that are opposed to those of the cause. As cit is opposed to acit, this cannot come from that.[74]

Māyā further serves the purpose of being the bearer of karma. It may be argued that as cause and effect or the deed and its fruit cannot be in separate places, māyā cannot be the bearer of karma and that therefore the agent must be the support for his karma. This reasoning overlooks some important facts. Often it is true that the deed and the resulting fruit do not reside in the same place. The son often profits by some good thing done by the father. It is therefore possible to think of māyā as the bearer of karma which, being inert and subject to origin and decay, cannot reside in cit and must abide in acit. Māyā, therefore, serves as the bearer of karma.[75]

The bound souls are robbed of knowledge and agency; and in order that the souls may come to have these again, the vidyā tattvas appear.[76] The denial of time by some of the Buddhists is not in keeping with our experience of the world. Whatever is an indispensable condition for the production of

73. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 121.
74. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 123.
75. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 119-120.
76. Tp. p. 27.

an effect is one of the causes of the event. Every one of those causes must be present for the production of the effect, for even should one of them be absent, the effect would not result. Clay and the potter's wheel alone cannot produce the pot ; nor yet will the inclusion of action have the desired result. Time is further required to make the cause operate and to produce the effect.[77] Time cannot be dispensed with because certain types of vegetation require appropriate seasons of the year in which to sprout, and certain other seasons in which to wither. If time did not exist, these would cease to be the moment they came into being, and the bliss of heaven would be experienced even while offering sacrifices for the purpose.[78]

Souls desire to have the fruit of the good deeds of others, and to discard the fruit of their own bad deeds. To prevent this, niyati is needed, for it sees that each one experiences the fruit of his own actions. Because of such circumstances as the father profiting by his son's actions or *vice versa,* niyati cannot be denied. If the fruit of one's actions profit another, it is that because of kinship etc., the performer intends that the fruit of his actions shoud benefit the other person concerned. Hence, these facts do not undermine the existence of niyati.[79] Even karma cannot replace niyati and induce a man to experience the fruits of his actions. If it were to do so, it would require a body or some instrument with which to work, and could not work of itself. Neither can cit-śakti perform this office for the similar reason that it acts always through instruments and not by itself alone. The indispensable instrument for assigning experiences and confining souls to them is niyati.[80]

The soul, which because of obscuration by mala has become a non-entity, has its mala removed to some extent, and its kriyā śakti actuated by kalā so that it can have experiences. Though buddhi is required to function in order that

77. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 146.
78. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 147.
79. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 150.
80. *Ibid.*

the soul may have experiences, it cannot take the place of kalā ; for this is needed to remove āṇava partially so that the soul can then be actuated by buddhi tattva. The removal of āṇava cannot be performed by buddhi as it is inert. Though kalā is also inert, it is actuated by one of the śiva tattvas. The question may be asked as to whether without kalā intervening the śiva tattvas can act directly on buddhi. This is not possible as the śiva tattvas cannot become instruments in the hands of the finite jīva.[81]

Vidyā tattva actuates the jñāna śakti of the soul so that it comes to have the intelligence required to profit by the functioning of manas.[82] It has been noticed that kalā removes mala to some extent making it possible for the soul to gain knowledge. As śakti is one, kalā cannot actuate kriyā śakti without at the same time illuminating jñāna śakti. If so, where is the need for vidyā tattva ?[83] As a man whose blindness has been rectified cannot straightway see things but finds himself lost for some time amidst all the strange impressions experienced by him, so the soul, whose mala has been dispelled to some extent by kalā, cannot at once function with buddhi etc., but needs further help from vidyā. Further, as each tattva has its respective office, kalā cannot add to its other functions that of vidyā also.[84] It may be thought that as buddhi and other antaḥkaraṇas help the soul to gain knowledge, vidyā tattva is superfluous. For the accomplishment of one purpose, more than one instrument is often needed. A rider travelling to some place needs besides his horse a pathway and a light. Similarly, the soul needs, besides the antaḥkaraṇas, vidyā tattva as well for its experiencing of this world, and of all these, vidyā tattva is the most important for this purpose.[85] Vidyā is further required to cognise the judgments presented by buddhi. The soul cannot use buddhi

81. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 152.
82. Ś.J.B. Mā : pp. 152-153.
83. Tp. p. 47.
84. Ś.J.B. Mā : pp. 152-153.
85. Tp. p. 47.

itself to cognise the conclusion presented by buddhi. Even though buddhi is bright like the sun, yet being the object of knowledge, it cannot be the means of knowing the same. For this purpose, vidyā is required.

The need for the next tattva is based on the fact that without desire, man will not seek the experience of objects.[86] Rāga actuates the icchā śakti of souls[87] and creates in them a general desire for things.[88] Karma cannot be the cause of desire, for after yielding the fruits of pleasure and pain, it comes to an end.[89] Māyā cannot do it either as it cannot do so directly and stands in need of instruments.[90] The rāga of buddhi cannot actuate the icchā śakti of souls, for it is when icchā śakti acts on buddhi that the rāga of buddhi arises, so that this cannot be the cause of its cause. Moreover, the rāga of buddhi has its own special function so that it cannot perform that of rāga as well. Whereas the latter creates in the soul a general desire for experiences, the rāga of buddhi urges the soul to desire specific experiences.

Buddhi is an evolute of guṇas which are at first in the unmanifested state described as 'avyakta'. Later, when manifest, and when all the guṇas are in equal proportion, it is called guṇa tattva, and when the equilibrium is lost they become differentiated into buddhi, etc.[91] Buddhi arising from guṇa tattva, has the sāttvika guṇa predominating and the other two guṇas in lesser degree. It is the organ which manifests specifically the jñāna śakti, which has been manifested in a general way by vidyā; it discriminates specific objects through name, class, etc. It is the intellect, which taking on the form of the respective objects that it has ascertained, presents itself to the soul as an object of enjoyment. Since the process of determining the nature of objects perceived is

86. Ś.S.P. pp. 67-68.
87. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 155.
88. Tp. p. 49.
89. Ts. p. 88.
90. *Ibid.*
91. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 162.

not carried out by any other tattva, buddhi is necessary.[92] It also has assigned to it the further function of being the bearer of karma or the merits and demerits of the soul's actions.[93] This seems to be inconsistent with what has been mentioned earlier that māyā is the bearer of karma. It is, however, only by a figure of speech that māyā is said to be the bearer of karma; and it is buddhi that is the actual bearer of karma.[94] Though karma dwells in buddhi, it should not be thought that with the resolution of buddhi at saṁhāra, karma is also dissolved. In praḷaya, the śakti of karma as well as those of other tattvas exist; but unlike them, karma śakti is the only one which has the power of regenerating the universe.[95]

Ahaṅkāra, having rajas as its predominating guṇa, is admirably fitted to fulfil the function assigned to it of determining to decide the nature of an object in the field of perception. The further process of determining the object perceived is accomplished by buddhi. Some consider the two processes as the same, and therefore maintain that one tattva is all that is required for the purpose. There is, however, an important distinction between the two stages. In the first, there is more a sense of the self as making bold to determine the object; and in the next, there is purely the determination of the object; in the former again rajas is the predominating guṇa, and in the latter, sattva is supreme. As the two processes are thus essentially different, one karaṇa will not suffice for their fulfilment.[96].

Along similar lines of reasoning as noted above, the tattva of citta is sought to be ruled out, and manas is considered to suffice for the process of saṅkalpa and vikalpa. In the first of these processes, an object is perceived, and with

92. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 162.
93. *Ibid.*
94. Ś.S.P. p. 62.
95. Ś.S.P. p. 64.
96. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 170.

past experience to bear on it, is thought to be some particular object. In vikalpa, there is doubt as to whether the object is what it was thought to be or something else. Those that consider that the tattvas cannot be reduced point out that saṅkalpa is due to impressions of past experience, and vikalpa due to indeterminate perception, and that owing to this basic difference, manas alone cannot perform the two functions. Those whose view is that one tattva is all that is needed, explain the difference of the two processes of perception and doubt, which take place in saṅkalpa and vikalpa respectively, as due to a lapse of time. According to them, these processes can be performed by manas, and citta as a separate tattva is not necessary. The manas, which doubts, is also considered to be the one which perceives, for which latter process, it is modified in the form of citta.[97] The elimination of citta, however, is not allowed to make a difference in the number of tattvas produced by aśuddha māyā. The twenty-fourth tattva is had by regarding guṇa tattva as separate from prakṛti, or by regarding prakṛti itself as one of the tattvas.[98]

The two sets of jñāna and karma indriyās are required, for though jñāna and karma śaktis are the same in nature, yet they differ in that they have different functions to fulfil and hence need these different organs. Jñāna śakti again is one, yet as it needs to know the five different sense objects, it needs the five different organs of eye, ear, nose etc. Similarly, kriyā śakti having to fulfil five different functions needs the five different organs of hands, mouth, feet, etc.

The Siddhāntin's reasons for postulating his various tattvas have been noted. These grounds may now be examined to see whether they are valid. In claiming that the material world should have a material substrate, the reason put forth to justify the claim is that the effect should be accounted for by a cause of like nature, and in accordance with this requirement, the universe which is material, cannot

97. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 171. 98. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 172.

be explained by a cause which is intelligent. In conformity with this line of reasoning, one is urged to ask the Siddhāntin whether he is justified in explaining the changing world of forms by māyā, which is considered to be eternal. His own contention that the cause and effect cannot have attributes that are opposed to each other condemns his concept of māyā containing within itself change and changelessness, as it is considered to be eternal in itself, and yet the basis of the changing world of forms.

The need for postulating śuddha māyā is felt in order to bridge the gulf between God, who is pure spirit, and the world of gross matter. The Siddhāntin is anxious to preserve the purity of God, and with this intent, he interposes śiva-śakti, and the evolutes of śuddha māyā between God on the one side and the world on the other. In śuddha māyā are the divinities which act on aśuddha māyā, so that God operates on this indirectly through His devotees deputed to do the work. Though the Siddhāntin deserves credit for discerning the problem of the relation between spirit and matter, yet it cannot be said that his attempt to overcome the dualism by propounding śiva śakti and śuddha māyā is successful. In order to bring together the two entities of spirit and matter, he has set forth two more entities (śiva śakti and śuddha māyā) and far from solving the difficulty, he has made it worse; for now instead of the two with which he started, he has on his hands the four which must somehow be connected if his system is to be intelligible.

A second reason for the assumption of śuddha māyā is that as it is Śiva's nature to absorb, enjoy and control, He must have something other than Himself which He can thus enjoy, absorb and control. Śuddha māyā, which is matter as pure as it can possibly be, is considered to serve the need. Although śuddha māyā is pure matter, yet inasmuch as it is matter, śakti here too acts as intermediary. The introduction of śuddha māyā for the above-mentioned purpose very seriously detracts from the absolute nature of God. If God

is absolute, He should be self-sufficient. Here, however, the Śiddhāntin, in definitely stating that it is Śiva's nature to absorb, enjoy and control, and that He requires some such thing as śuddha māyā to meet this need, undermines the supremacy of God, who through want of a material toy abandons the status of excellence.

A third ground that leads the Siddhāntin to postulate śuddha māya is that whereas the Sāṅkhya believes in one order of human beings,[99] the Siddhāntin distinguishes three classes of them, namely, the sakalas, praḷayā-'kalas and vijñānā-'kalas. The Siddhāntin is led to make this difference as he distinguishes three stages of development among souls according as they have three, two or one of the elements of bondage which are karma, māyā and āṇava. The Sāṅkhya system, however, does not admit āṇava at all, and attributes the ignorance of souls to their association with prakṛti. Nor does it recognise the various stages of development noted above. The Siddhāntin deems that Ananta and other adhikāra-muktas and praḷayā-'kalas and vijñānā-'kalas, who are more advanced in spiritual life than the sakalas, should have their environment provided by śuddha māyā which, being pure, provides pleasure alone and not pleasure and pain as aśuddha māyā does.[100]

It is in order to leave śuddha māyā untainted for these souls that karma is allowed to take up its abode in aśuddha māyā ; for karma is one of the elements that bring pain. The postulation of aśuddha māyā is thus partly due to the Siddhāntin's distinction of three orders of souls.

Three of the vidyā tattvas are considered to be necessary in order to actuate the ichhā, kriyā and jñāna śakti of souls. The stimulation of these powers as conceived by him is indeed a very elaborate process. Thus for instance :

99. S.K. v. 53.
100. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 134.

1. the ichhā śakti of the soul is acted on by rāga; ichhā śakti on being thus incited, acts on buddhi, inducing it to produce the rāga of buddhi, which tattva acts on the soul creating in it specific desires;

2. the kriyā śakti of the soul is acted on by kalā, which destroys to some extent the grip which āṇava has over the soul; kalā in its turn is acted on by one of the śiva tattvas;

3. the jñāna śakti of the souls is acted on by vidyā, which also weakens the power of āṇava over the soul.

These various processes whereby the soul is enabled to exercise its powers do seem unnecessarily elaborate, even should the soul be so overwhelmed with āṇava as to become helpless and require more than one process of assistance. More especially does this seem so in view of the fact that the Siddhāntin assumes śakti to be one, so that none of its differentiations can be acted upon without its influencing the others. Thus as he himself says, kalā cannot actuate kriyā śakti without at the same time illuminating jñāna śakti.[101]

It is obvious that the reason for the Siddhāntin constructing a chain of links (e.g., from Śiva———to———śiva śakti ———to niyati———to———karma or, in other words, before karma is meted out to souls the elements involved are Śiva—śiva śakti—niyati—karma) is to make God responsible for the changes in the world and yet at the same time to keep Him above the change and impurity of the world. Śakti alone is not considered a sufficient intermediary between God, on the one side, and the world on the other. Śiva śakti itself having to be as jealously guarded against every chance of being tainted, it is never allowed to act except through instruments.[102]

101. Tp. p. 47.
102. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 150.

The elaboration of these processes sometimes leads to difficulties. Thus rāga is conceived to act on the icchā śakti of souls creating in them a general desire for things. The icchā śakti acts on buddhi, which then evolves the rāga of buddhi, and this again acts on the icchā śakti of souls producing specific desires. The difficulty consists in this, that buddhi, which being considered inert is thought incapable of removing āṇava,[103] is yet here considered capable of acting upon the icchā śakti of souls producing in them specific desires.

The defence offered by the Siddhāntin for the acceptance of any tattva is not above criticism. To the suggestion that vidyā can be discarded as its work of actuating jñāna śakti can be taken over by kalā, the Siddhāntin answers that since kalā has its own special function of actuating kriyā śakti, it cannot add to itself any other function and can therefore not actuate jñāna śakti. This line of reasoning is based on the assumption that each tattva can fulfil only one function. However, this principle is not consistently applied in every case. Thus māyā has the varied functions of serving as a cosmic stuff, bearer of karma, a means of deluding souls and a means of enlightenment to them.

An important feature of these processes whereby the soul's powers are made active is that both the removal of āṇava and the actuating of these powers being accomplished by these various tattvas, there is no scope left for the exercise of any initiative on the part of the soul. Acted on by so many tattvas, one has to think of it as a poor teased entity.

Māyā has so far been considered in its capacity as material cause of the universe. Its function as bearer of karma has also been noted. Besides these offices, it has also a further function. Inasmuch as it provides the body, organs, worlds and objects of enjoyment for souls, it enables them to gain experience, and knowledge of the world. Regarding this

103. Ś.J.B Mā: pp. 152-153.

knowledge, however, which the soul gains through māyā, it should be noticed that after all māyā can give the soul knowledge only of things that have arisen from it ; and even this knowledge is imperfect as māyā does not reveal the inner nature of things. Consequently, although māyā is a light and a staff, it causes confusion ; and because in spite of its usefulness it remains a mala and an evil, it must be cast aside.[104]

There are two other malas which together with māyā hinder the soul. These three are often considered one on the basis of their common nature of non-intelligence.[105] Their differentiation as three elements is based on their varied operations. All three are considered as pāśa or fetter because they hinder the souls from enjoying their advaita relation with God, and as mala or impurity because they do not permit the true nature of the soul to see daylight.[106]

Māyā exists beginninglessly in connection with the soul in the same way as āṇava and karma.[107] It is considered a fetter for the soul because when the soul is extricated from its state of sleep at the termination of world-rest, the soul enters a body formed of māyā, as it would a prison house, and finds itself encompassed by a host of objects that seductively invite the soul to become one with them. The tattvas out of which the body is formed support the allurements of the outer things. Māyā thus causes the soul to be disturbed through excitement of desire or aversion, joy or sorrow, compels the soul to come under the law of karma, and delivers it to transmigration. Thus it is plain that māyā is that fetter which afflicts the soul in the most direct way and is found and known by the observant soul earlier than karma and āṇava.[108]

Āṇava is yet another fetter for the soul, as the ignorance that the souls experience is due to āṇava. Some admit the

104. Schomerus p. 219.
105. Schomerus p. 101.
106. Schomerus p. 102.
107. Ś.P. v. 25.
108. Schomerus p. 153.

existence of karma and māyā, but deny the existence of āṇava. If āṇava is thus dispensed with, it is impossible to explain how even in conjunction with the tattvas, the soul attains knowledge only of the external world, and not of itself or God, and when the tattvas depart from the soul (as in the kevala avasthā) still it is not possible for the soul to know itself. This ignorance is āṇava.[109] To the Siddhāntin, ignorance is not negative like the absence of knowledge. It is something positive, and it is one of the malas.[110] Neither is it a mere attribute of the soul ; for if it were, when divine grace which can destroy it appears, then the attribute āṇava, and its substrate, the soul, would be destroyed at once.[111] Āṇava is in beginningless union with the soul. Should it be presumed that at a certain time the primal mala linked itself to the soul, the baffling inquiry would arise as to the cause which thus made it suddenly conjoin itself to the soul. If at any time, it may thus make a prey of the soul, then there is nothing to prevent it from polluting purified souls ; and in that case, there can be no mukti.[112] It may appear at first that if āṇava is eternal, and is always associated with the soul, mukti is impossible. On the other hand, it is true both that mukti is possible and that āṇava is eternal, and there is here no incompatibility, for in mukti, the āṇava that continues its endless existence has its power destroyed, and as darkness is covered by light, so is āṇava rendered impotent in mukti by the grace of Śiva.[113]

Āṇava, which is innate in the souls, is the cause of their delusion, and of their manifold births filled with misery. Not knowing the worthlessness of the pleasures of the world, souls seek to experience them ; and these experiences bear fruit in good and bad karma, to exhaust which, souls undergo numberless births. Āṇava, which is the cause of so much

109. Ś.P. v. 35. 110. Ś.P. v. 32.
111. F.D.G. chapter II, v. 7 (or lines 13 and 14).
112. F.D.G. chapter III, v. 8 (or lines 15 and 16).
113. Ś.P. v. 88.

evil and suffering, is worse than darkness; for this though concealing objects, reveals itself; whereas that both causes delusion and is hard to detect.[114]

Karma is not proved to be non-existent by all the arguments of the Lōkāyata. The objection raised by him against the existence of karma is that the wealth[115] and pleasures enjoyed by man are due to his own industry, and not to any such thing as karma. The Siddhāntin points out that this assumption does not explain such facts as that sometimes even the most indolent roll in luxury.[116] By karma is meant the acts of the soul in its embodied state.[117] These acts may be either good or bad; and consequently karma is of two kinds—good and bad. Good karma consists of the good done to all sentient creatures, and bad karma consists of the harm done to them.[118] The two kinds of karma, good and bad are created by the words, thoughts and deeds of the souls.[119] The two karmas constitute the merit and demerit of souls, yielding the two fruits of pleasure and pain.[120] These fruits are of three different kinds. Pleasure may arise from high birth, long life or happiness;[121] and on the other hand, pain may be due to low birth, short life or misery. These pleasures and pains may be divided into ādhibhautika, or the comforts and discomforts caused by the elements of nature, ādhyātmika, or the gains and losses caused by intelligent beings, and ādhidaivika or the rewards and retributions meted out by chance[122].

The experiences of the soul in any life are due to its past karma. There is never an experience of the soul which is not the result of its past karma.[123] A further terrible fact is that the experiences which one must undergo as the result of past karma cannot be escaped; neither can good and bad

114. F.D.G. v. 3.
115. Ś.J.S. II. v. 7.
116. „ II. v. 8.
117. „ II. v. 10.
118. „ II. v. 13.
119. Ś.P. vv. 28 and 31.
120. „ v. 28.
121. „ v. 29.
122. „ v. 29 and Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 46.
123. Ś.P. v. 29.

karma cancel each other.[124] The heavy burden of the soul is made heavier by the circumstance that even the desires and aversions which the soul has for its past experiences contribute to the total karma that the soul has to wipe out; and even the conceit of 'I' as acting and experiencing, will go to accumulate the karma that has to be consumed.[125] Even in wiping out the accumulated karma, further karma is formed, so that karma becomes endless. This is the natural consequence of its being impossible to act without giving rise to other acts.[126] As the fruits of the soil give us food for present use, and seed for future use, so our acts besides constituting our present experiences, also constitute the basis for future ones.[127]

The karma that thus seems augmented at every step may according to a different basis be divided into the three kinds: Sañcita, Āgāmi and Prārabdha.

The malas considered above are inter-related. They are all in beginningless union with the soul, as the husk, the bran and the shoot exist together in paddy.[128] Āṇava is considered the mūla mala as it is owing to ignorance that desire arises, and this leads to embodiment and this to acts. It is more the logical ground of the other two malas than a temporal cause; for the Siddhāntin's assumption that they are beginningless rules out any such enquiry as to which of them came into being before the others. Karma is said to be the cause of the body with which the soul unites;[129] yet on closer enquiry, it is found that the attempt to ascertain whether karma or māyā attached itself to the soul first is as futile as the attempt to determine whether the palmyra or the seed came first.[130] Of these three malas which are all in beginningless association with the soul,[131] māyā and karma are

124. Ś.P. v. 31.
125. „ v. 30.
126. Ś.J.S. II. v. 11.
127. „ II. v. 12.
128. Ś.P. v. 25.
129. Ś.P. v. 28.
130. Ś.P. v. 35.
131. Ś.P. v. 25.

said to appear and disappear, whereas āṇava unfailingly continues.[132] One should not be misled into thinking that māyā and karma have a beginning. What is meant is that while āṇava uninterruptedly exercises its function of concealment, without being hindered from doing so even during the time of world-destruction, karma differs even as māyā in that although ever standing in association with souls, it enters into activity not during the time of the general world-repose i.e. between the common world destruction and the new creation, but only during the time of the world preservation, when all commission of deeds and consumption of the fruits of the deeds take place.[133]

The Siddhāntin who at all times maintains that God is supreme and that His power is absolute, is careful to emphasise that the three malas of āṇava, māyā and karma are subject to Him. Of these, māyā and karma are, as it were, His tools with which He works to realise His cherished aim of releasing souls from their bondage. Though āṇava cannot be reckoned a tool in the hands of Śiva, it is yet subject to His power. Of the various features pointed out as indicating the power of Śiva over āṇava, the ones most noteworthy are as follows :

1. Śiva is in no way affected by āṇava, though He and āṇava co-exist in the soul.[134] He is unchanging and His intelligence can be neither diminished nor augmented by anything. He remains as unaffected by āṇava as the sun remains unaffected by the umbrella which we open. The umbrella does not hide the sun, but only us who open the umbrella. Similarly, āṇava does not hide Śiva, but only the knowing capacity of the soul.[135]

2. Though āṇava in no way affects Śiva, yet Śiva affects āṇava. He is the lord of it, and has such great power over it that He can free souls from it.

132. Ś.P. v. 36.
133. Schomerus p. 115.
134. F.D.G. Chapter II. v. 4.
135. Schomerus p. 112.

3. Āṇava cannot function without Him.

4. One may think that as the cosmic processes take place on account of mala, what induces Śiva to function is āṇava. However, we need not see in this a dependence of Śiva on āṇava, or His being influenced by it; for there is still room to think that Śiva thus functions out of His free will. The postulation of a period of world-rest during which Śiva does not work upon āṇava mala gives room for the assumption that the working of Śiva upon it is affected by nothing other than His own will. He does not have to set it in motion; He does so out of His free will in the interests of souls.[136]

Similarly with regard to karma also, God is supreme. In fact from maintaining that karma is most amenable to God's will, the Siddhāntin takes a step in advance in venturing to say that it is God's will itself. The Veda is God's word,[137] and in the Vedas, Śiva lays down what are regarded as virtuous acts.[138] As a king rewards those who honour and obey His laws, and punishes those who do otherwise, so Śiva expresses pleasure or displeasure by rewarding or punishing souls respectively.[139] The suffering and enjoyment meted out to souls by God are the two kinds of physic administered by the Supreme Physician for the removal of mala.[140] The meting out of punishment need not be contrary to the nature of God, for as mentioned earlier it is in order to remove mala. Śiva makes souls eat karma in order that they may get freedom.[141] As parents punish their disobedient children, so God punishes the wicked.[142] As all His acts flow out of love,[143] so the punishment of the wicked is in order that they may mend their ways. Thus karma being an expression of Śiva's will, it cannot possibly stand in His way. Māyā too acknowledges the power of Śiva, since being non-intelligent and inert, it cannot function in any respect without the aid of God.

136. Schomerus p. 113.
137. Ś.J.S. II. v. 30.
138. Ś.J.S. II. v. 23.
139. Ś.J.S. II. v. 31.
140. Ś.J.S. II. v. 33.
141. Ś.J.S. II. v. 34.
142. Ś.J.S. II. v. 16.
143. Ś.J.S. II. v. 51.

Yet with all this solicitous care on the part of the Siddhāntin to maintain the absolute nature of God, there are certain points which must be satisfactorily met by him ere one can admit that his venture has been successful. Āṇava was noted to be no tool in the hands of Śiva. However, it is subject to the power of Śiva, as through His agency, it loses its concealing effect on the soul. On receiving its impetus to function, it brings into being the evil qualities of pride, confusion, etc., which hitherto were non-manifest. It is pointed out[144] that Śiva has no power to alter these evil qualities displayed by āṇava. He cannot so work upon āṇava or so influence it that it can bring forth better things. Just as the sun by its influence cannot decide to have the seed produce any particular kind of plant desired by it, so Śiva cannot insist on āṇava that is worked by Him to produce any good qualities desired by Him. Further, since the evil qualities produced by āṇava are opposed to the nature of Śiva, āṇava is reckoned a serious menace to the absolute nature of Śiva.[144]

One expects to meet with no such difficulty where karma is concerned, as that, being the law of Śiva Himself, ought to be no obstacle to His absolute power. However, one meets with no such gratification as all that is said about the law of karma being the law of Śiva is renounced at a stroke in assuming that karma is a mala or matter that exists independently of God. This justifies the observation[145] that karma allows Śiva to appear not as an absolute monarch but only as a constitutional king bound by a law not set up by him, but already in existence.

Even māyā which being non-intelligent and inert is dependent on God for its functioning does not serve to contribute to the absolute nature of God. No doubt Śiva is supreme in that it is at His free will that He can either evolve

144. Schomerus p. 114. 145. Schomerus p. 129.

the universe or not evolve it. Yet as pointed out,[146] the Absolute requires to function not only with regard to the 'that' but also with reference to the 'how'. An absolute God must have power not only to will the not-making, as well as the power to will the making, but He must also have the capacity to make as He will. The result must entirely depend on Him and on nothing else. The first possibility i.e. to will to make or not to make, cannot be denied to the Siddhāntin's God; the second possibility, however, to create as He will, He does not have. The Absolute God stands pure up to a certain point i.e. until the moment when He wills to function. As soon as He begins to carry out His will, His Absolute nature experiences a limitation which lies in the innate tendency of māyā, the stuff given Him for His action.[147]

It has been noted how the qualities of āṇava are considered to interfere with the absolute nature of God. The law of karma again, in manifesting its attributes, renders God not an absolute monarch, but a constitutional king. Lastly, the non-intelligent and inert māyā too in evolving its innate tendency is a check to the absolute power of Śiva. Since the qualities of āṇava, karma and māyā are a limitation to the absolute nature of God, one may proceed a step further maintaining that the very existence of these is a limitation of the absolute power of God. For attributes are what constitute the thinghood of anything, so that the existence of any entity cannot be had apart from its attributes. God in working with elements which, of course, can never be had without certain attributes, has His power limited by them, for He is bound to work in conformity with their nature. If this limitation of the absolute nature of God is sought to be avoided, then with wiping out the attributes of the given materials, their very existence goes, and the God hitherto limited by these, expands into the Absolute in which the elements that hitherto opposed God find their place. The concept of

146. Schomerus pp. 163-164. 147. *Ibid.*

God is thus a difficult one. He is either a limited entity, and in that case, He has personality over against which is the world, or if unlimited, His personality vanishes, the world becomes an appearance and God the Absolute.

There are yet other difficulties which also point towards the Absolute as that which reconciles all differences. The Siddhāntin's vain attempt to force within the concept of māyā the elements of change and changelessness has been noted. No doubt, the aspects of transition and permanence are found in experience, yet to force them within the one substance of māyā is like a forced attempt to reconcile opposites. There is no such opposition between the two elements in the Absolute. The changing world of forms is an appearance of the eternal Absolute. A certain article cannot be both shell and silver; but a shell may appear as silver. Similarly, māyā cannot contain within itself the change and changelessness of the universe, but the eternal absolute can appear to change.

The problem of how karma when regarded as mala or matter can fail to limit the power of God, can find solution only in the Absolute. Matter in the Siddhāntin's system is an integral element which, standing over against God, is a limitation to His power to the extent that He has to work in keeping with its nature. In the Absolute, there is no such opposition as the individuality of matter is there transmuted, so that becoming an element of the Absolute, it becomes also a harmonious element.

The problem of how āṇava can attach itself to the soul that is pure spirit finds solution in the Absolute. Matter and spirit in the Absolute do not stand in opposition to each other creating a gulf that cannot be spanned. Losing their independence, they become elements in a common substrate, the Absolute.

CHAPTER V

PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL

The subject of the existence of the soul is an important point of contention between the Siddhāntin and a considerable number of his rivals. The Siddhāntin cannot stop with postulating the existence of the soul, and maintaining that it is the second of his three eternal realities; for, over against his view of the soul as an eternal spiritual entity is that of his opponents that there is no entity such as the soul, and that what is regarded as such is only the body, or some part or parts of the psycho-physical organism. In meeting these various objections to the existence of the soul, the Siddhāntin offers his several proofs for its existence.

The first of these arguments states that there is in us something which says, "I am not the body; I am not any of the sense organs." There is something which remains after every part of the body is eliminated as not being itself; and that which thus intelligently differentiates itself from the body and its organs is the soul. This argument establishes that "an intelligent soul exists, as its intelligence is exercised when it says, 'This is not the soul; that is not the soul.'"[1] We cannot here fail to be reminded of the similar way in which Descartes proceeds to establish the existence of the soul. He too, adopting the method of elimination, realises that, after ruling out his body and sense organs, there is something which constitutes his self. The very fact of doubt implies the existence of a doubter. This first argument of the Siddhāntin refutes the Śūnyavādin, who says that the soul is non-existent. If the Śūnyavādin persists in saying that even the intelligence which refuses to be identified with any part of the body is non-existent, then his statement is equivalent to his asserting that his mother is childless.

1. Ś.J.B. III. argt. 1.

The second argument[2] refutes the Deha-ātma-vādin sect of the Lōkāyatas, who say that the soul is no other than the body. The body cannot be the soul. As the phrase, 'my body' is used in a separate possessive sense, there is a soul different from the body. As a man clearly realises that his city and his wife are not himself but different from him, so with careful consideration one can see that the soul is other than the body. The soul is that which with a possessive sense speaks of the body as its body.

The body certainly cannot be regarded as the soul, for as was made clear in the last argument, there is in us some residue even after elimination of every part of the body, and it is this which, standing over against the body, speaks with a possessive sense of the body as belonging to it. The soul is the residue which exercises this ownership. The body then cannot be the soul. "I am not this collection of members which is called the human body," says Descartes; and Bradley gives expression to the same fact saying, "Few of us would venture to maintain that the self is the body."

The Indriyātmavādin says that since it is admitted by all that the five senses perceive the five different sensations, these organs constitute the soul. This is refuted by the third argument which says that each sense organ has its own particular function only, so that the eye, for example, cannot perceive sound, just as the ear cannot sense the colour of any object. But there is some one who experiences all the five different sensations,[3] a feat impossible for any or all of the sense organs. This is the soul, which for gaining knowledge of the world, has the sense organs as the avenues of sense-knowledge. The sense organs merely function, but are not capable of knowing, "We function thus." They have objective consciousness, but not subjective consciousness. That which has the subjective consciousness is the soul. The

2. Ś.J.B. III. argt. 2.
3. Ś.J.B. III. argt. 3 & Ś.J.S. III. v, 3.

sense organs cannot be the soul because they are deficient in two respects. Not one of them can rise to performing any function but its own, nor is any of them capable of self-consciousness. But there is in us something which has neither of the deficiencies, while on the other hand, it is able to perceive all the five different sensations, and is also characterised by self-consciousness. This is the soul. There is the further difficulty that if the sense organs are said to constitute the soul, the cognition that takes place in dreams when the senses are not functioning cannot be accounted for.[4]

The Sūkṣmadehātmavādin considers the subtle body to be the soul. In refuting this position, the Siddhāntin states that in sleep, when the senses lose their action, the soul enters another body, the subtle body, and has dreams, and when waking comes back to the gross body. The soul is therefore different from the subtle body. The subtle body and the soul cannot remember the dream experiences in the same way. The dream body is of only one nature, dreamy, and what it sees in dreams is quite vivid to it. If it be this body that remembers the dreams, it should remember them not as dim recollections, but as actual vivid experiences, just as experienced in the dream condition. In actual experience, it is found that on waking there is an entity which remembers these dream experiences and says, "I dreamt thus and thus." This entity not only remembers the dream experiences, but being of two-fold nature is capable of perceiving things in the waking state and the dream state. When it says, "I dreamt so", it differentiates these experiences from waking experiences, for the former compared with the latter are now very faint.[5] Thus to sum up what has been explained, the subtle body should be able to have vivid recollections of dream experiences, but in actual experience, there is a self able to contrast the dream experiences with the waking experiences, and the

4. Ś.J.S. III. v. 3.

5. Ś.J.B. sūtra III. argt. 4 & also Commentator's notes on the same from Ś.J.B. Cu.

former compared with the latter are dim. The subtle body theorist maintains that the subtle body is the soul. Against this, the Siddhāntin maintains that the recollection of dream experiences belongs not to the subtle body but to another being, the soul.

This argument is open to the following criticism. One of the assumptions underlying the argument is that the gross and subtle bodies are wholly distinct from each other. The fact, however, would seem to be that the gross body of the waking state is distinguished only by having more tattvas working than the subtle body of the sleeping state. Because of the difference in the number of tattvas functioning in the two states, the body when having fewer tattvas is described as the subtle body, and when having the complete number of tattvas, is known as the gross body. The evolutes that constitute the subtle body are: buddhi, ahaṅkāra, manas, the five tanmātras; and the gross body has these together with five jñāna indriyās, five karma indriyās, and five bhūtas. Though the former may function without the assistance of the latter, these cannot exercise any of their activities without the help of the former. Thus in the dream state, manas, buddhi etc., are at work; and in the waking state, these together with the external organs etc., are active. Hence, the assumption that the subtle body is radically distinct from the gross body cannot be accepted. If so, how can it be so easily proved that it is the one rather than the other which recollects these dream experiences? With regard to the further assumption underlying this argument that if in the waking state, the recollection of dream experiences belonged to the subtle body, it would have vivid memories, we have to reply that this does not follow; for what can otherwise be vivid, may be distorted by the grosser tattvas co-existing with that body in the waking condition. A plausible argument put forward by others on some such lines as these is that in dreams, there comes into being a dream body which is entirely different from the gross body. In the waking state, there is in us something which owns the dreams as well; and this is the soul.

There are some additional points of criticism which the Siddhāntin might have added to his attack of the subtle-body theorist. One of these points is that the body from which the soul distinguishes itself saying, "I am not the body" is its entire body, which may be differentiated into the subtle and gross bodies. The soul marks itself off not only from the additional tattvas of the gross body, but also from the group considered to make up the subtle body. The argument in which the soul is differentiated from the antaḥkaraṇas is also directed against the subtle-body theorist, for it is mainly the internal organs of knowledge that constitute the subtle body. The antaḥkaraṇas have no subjective consciousness. Similarly, the dream body may dream, but cannot realise that it is dreaming. Hence, the entity, which having such subjective consciousness can say "I dreamt", is the soul. Further, in dreamless sleep, even the dream body does not function, and yet on arising from such sleep, there is an entity which says, "I had dreamless sleep." Surely, the dream body cannot claim to know of experiences (dreamless sleep) that took place during its non-functioning state!

In the Sanskrit Commentary,[5a] the third and fourth arguments (contained in sūtra III of Ś.J.B.) are treated as one for the purpose of proving the existence of the soul as distinct from the sense organs, on the ground of the existence of consciousness in dreams when the sense organs are at rest. The Tamil author in splitting up the argument into two has neither advanced the argument nor made matters clearer.

Another sect of the Lōkāyatas, the Prāṇātmavādins, say that unlike the sūkṣma śarīra, which is present only in the dream condition, prāṇa-vāyu is present always; and hence, this is the soul. This is refuted by the fifth argument which points out that this body is given to us in order that we may have cognition of the world and the experiences of pleasure

5-a. See Śivāgrayogin's Commentary on Ś.J.B.—grantha edition. p. 266.

and pain. If the vital air be the soul, then as it functions as well in sleep as it does in the waking state, it should have cognition of the world as well as the experiences of pleasure and pain in sleep as in the waking condition. But these are in abeyance in sleep, when the soul is resting, and resume their activities when the soul awakes. So these functions exist, not for the benefit of the vital air, but for something other than this, and that is the soul.[6] And it is the soul which seems to have the capacity to exercise these functions or to stop them. Another fact which rules out the suggestion that prāṇavāyu is the soul is that it is non-intelligent.[7]

The next argument maintains that the changing psychical states cannot be the soul. There must be some underlying identity which is present through all the flow of psychical phenomena and which recognises its identity in spite of occasional lapses of consciousness as in sleep.

With regard to this argument Meykaṇḍa Deva has not strictly kept to the Sanskrit original. He has interpreted the argument to indicate that the soul is different from God. As he points out, our minds are subject to various limitations. We can only learn in part, and bit by bit, and our consciousness is always in such an incessant flow that we have hardly grasped one thing when thought moves on to another, and this present thought already seems to be giving way to another thought that will come anon only to speed away as soon. And we are subject to forgetfulness, and we can never have comprehensive knowledge. One other distinction is that " the human intelligence requires to be taught, improved and developed ; it is imperfect and needs the support of a perfect intelligence. " Our minds characterised by these and other limitations cannot compare with God's mind that is omniscient. The soul, therefore, cannot be identified with God.[8]

6. Ś.J.B. III. argt. 5 & Ś.J.S. III. v, 4.
7. Ś.P. v. 53.
8. Ś.J.B. III. argt. 6.

As thus interpreted, this is no argument for the existence of the soul. It is more a description of the nature of the soul. The next argument, as in the original, contending for the existence of the soul on the ground of personal identity is very common. Personal identity is of course an essential feature of the soul which is mostly conceived as a permanent entity that cannot be identified with the flowing psychical states, each one of which is different from the rest. But whether such identity is intelligible will be examined later.

The next argument in opposition to the Tattvasamūha-ātmavādin, contends that the aggregate of the tattvas cannot be the soul, for the tattvas are constituted of the perishable māyā. The soul is somehing other than the tattvas.[9] This argument, like the previous one, is directed against the Buddhists, who sought to dissolve the soul into an aggregate of skandhas or a series of cognitions.

The last argument is directed against the Antaḥkaraṇa-ātma-vādin, whose plea for maintaining that the antaḥkaraṇas constitute the soul is that all other organs have their respective names, but the terms citta and jīva are used interchangeably, and so the antaḥkaraṇas are the soul.[10] That these constitute the soul is not acceptable for the reason that the internal senses are dependent for their material on the external senses;[11] and as the antaḥkaraṇas are different from this material, so is the soul different from the antaḥkaraṇas.[12] Moreover, as the antaḥkaraṇas are only intelligent when viewed in relation to the subordinate tattvas, but are non-intelligent when viewed in relation to the soul, the antaḥkaraṇas cannot be the soul.[13] As in the case of the external senses, the internal ones also have only objective consciousness, but no subjective consciousness; and hence, though manas doubts, it does not know that it doubts.[14] The soul which is conscious of all its activities, is other than the antaḥkaraṇas.

9. Ś.J.B. III. argt. 7.
10. Ś.J.B. Cu. pp. 5-7.
11. Ś.P. v. 53.
12. Ś.J.B. IV. argt. 1. v. 1.
13. Ś.J.B. Cu. 85-86.
14. Ś.J.B. Cu: pp. 85-86.

From a general survey of these arguments, it is clear that they are based mainly on elimination and the sense of personal identity. The soul is not the body, or the sense organs, or the internal organs, or the vital air or the subtle body. It is that which intelligently differentiates itself from all these, and speaks of the body as its body, and appropriates dreams as its experiences. It is that which through all the changing psychical states and through occasional lapses of consciousness maintains its identity. The net result of these arguments is that the soul exists, that it is different from the body, sense organs etc, and that it has a continuous existence.

Can the conclusions regarding the soul withstand critical examination ? Descartes, after rigorously yielding up all that was doubtful, found that there was one indubitable fact, and that it was his self ; and the existence of his self was manifest from the fact that he doubted his existence. If he doubted, there must be a doubter. The similar Siddhānta contention that, after eliminating every part of the body, there is still a residue, and that this is the soul would appear so far to be valid.

All the knowledge about the soul gained till now is mainly negative. It is not the body, or the sense organs, etc. The question which now arises is 'What then is the soul ?' In what way can we conceive of it, and in what way can it be said to exist ? Can the self be the psychical contents that are to be found at any moment of one's existence ? Introspection reveals that at any moment of one's existence, there is a mass of psychical content, such as for example, one's thoughts at the time, one's feelings, one's awareness of the environment, and in short, all the felt experiences. Can these be said to constitute the soul ? It is at once obvious that these fluctuating psychical states cannot constitute the self as they are in an incessant flow and the self must be permanent. Moreover, during the kevala avasthā, when the soul owing to disembodiment is without any mental apparatus, there is no psychical experience of even the most elemen-

tary kind. If psychical experiences constitute the self, then it follows that during the kevala avasthā, it is annihilated.

The view is held that perhaps what can be reckoned as one's average psychical experiences constitutes the self.[15] As one's psychical contents from moment to moment are too changing to constitute the self, perhaps, the average obtained from taking what is common to these states constitutes the self. This suggestion is subject to the criticism made above that during the kevala avasthā, there is a complete cessation of psychical experiences. Moreover, on the Siddhānta view that the soul is subject to repeated transmigration, during which the soul's career may range through various kinds of births, from that of the egg-born to that of the placenta-born, it is extremely difficult to reckon up any average from the infinite range of psychical experiences.

It will be objected that it is absurd to identify the self with either the momentary or the average psychical experiences of the self. The self is the individual experiencer of these experiences. Therefore, over and above all this concrete filling is the self. But what does this self amount to, when, in kevala avasthā, it is divested of nearly everything that is supposed not to constitute the self ? It can only be said to exist, and it seems to have very little else that can be attributed to it. Even the icchā, kriyā and jñāna śaktis which are considered to be its essential qualities do not come into play, and the soul is reduced to a negligible element that is hardly worth claiming as the soul. In order that it may become a puruṣa tattva, in which condition it is a normal self able to act, desire and know, it has to be endowed with the necessary tattvas. The soul, of whatever nature it may be, seems to count for nothing when deprived of the concrete setting of psychical experiences, environment, etc. Macbeth was a brave warrior and quite self-composed at all times, but the moment his hands were stained with blood, he had visions

15. A.R. p. 78.

of a dagger, and of the ghosts of his victims, and Lady Macbeth had to find excuses for his strange behaviour in the presence of the guests. We are in eager search of an essential self, but it remains well-nigh impossible to meet with success. We find that the psychical experiences are too inconstant to be the self, and yet it is these happy or unhappy experiences that appear to constitute the self, so that if we remove these, we remove the self as well; or even if any residue is left, it merely amounts to a non-entity not worth recognising. We here find ourselves up against the dilemma which Bradley expresses thus: "If you take an essence which can change, it is not an essence; while if you stand on anything more narrow, the self has disappeared[16]....... Evidently, any self which we can find is some concrete form of unity of psychical existence, and whoever wishes to produce it as something apart or beyond, clearly does not rest his case on observation."[17]

Closer investigation leads to an even more desperate situation where we can draw no hard and fast line of distinction between the self and the not-self. At any moment of our existence, there seem to be present the self and the not-self. But from this, no hasty conclusion can be drawn that the self and the not-self are absolutely different one from the other. The self passes into the not-self and *vice versa*, a circumstance by no means encouraging to those in eager pursuit of an essential self closed by a wall from all the changing psychical phenomena which with certainty are placed in the category of not-self. The sound that was so disturbing to a person gets to be less of a nuisance as the person gets used to it, and though continuing with the same tonal intensity, it finally passes out of the focus of his attention, gliding unobserved from the not-self to the self. The self in the same way can pass over to the not-self. Thus the feeling of pain which forms part of our inmost self is felt as an un-

16. A.R. p. 80. 17. A.R. p. 90.

pleasant experience that should be eradicated. Of course it may be that not all of the self can thus pass into the not-self, and not all of the not-self can pass into the self. Granting this, it still remains that when we abstract from the self all that does not seem essential to it, we seem to be left with what is best described in Bradley's terms as, "a wretched fraction" and "poor atom" and "bare remnant" that is not worth having.[18]

The question, what is the self, is rendered difficult of solution by the Siddhānta theory that the soul is 'sadasat' or a hybrid of sat and asat. As the eye is neither darkness nor light, so is the soul neither asat nor sat.[19] Its nature is such that it can assimilate either sat or asat, and being wedged in between sat on the one side, and asat on the other,[20] it becomes either sat or asat according as it inclines towards the one or the other. Its nature is not constant; for, from being asat in the kevala avasthā due to being overwhelmed by āṇava, it becomes sadasat in the sakala avasthā when it is equally distracted between sat and asat, and in the śuddha avasthā, it becomes sat with no mixture of asat, for as long as there is any taint of impurity, no union with Śiva is possible. What then is the soul? Is it asat, sadasat or sat? It seems to be all these in succession.

It is contended that beyond the varying and transient states, the essential nature of the soul remains constant. The soul is an object for other substances only in its outer form, and not in its inmost nature. With regard to its inmost nature, the soul is immutable; it is and ever remains a thing different from both sat and asat. In its outward appearance, the soul is like a crystal, mutable; it depends on the entities that influence its powers. When it stands wholly under the influence of asat, which is the case during the kevala avasthā, it appears as asat; if it stands under the

18. A.R. p. 90-94.
19. Ś.P. v. 57.
20. Ś.P. v. 91.

influence of sat, which is the case during the śuddha avasthā, then it appears as sat; when it comes under the influence of both, which happens during the sakala avasthā, then it appears as sadasat, although its inmost nature during all these three states is sadasat.[21]

This view that the essential part of the soul remains constant, and that only its outer form is subject to change, causes one to think that the career of the soul merely consists in its changing its outer garb, which in the kevala avasthā is of asat, in the sakala avasthā of sadasat, and in the śuddha avasthā of sat. This leads to the absurd conclusion that in the śuddha avasthā, Śiva is content with a change of form on the part of the soul. Its essential nature may be sadasat, but its outer garb should be pure sat. If so, is the state of the soul in release in any way different from that of a "whited sepulchre, which indeed appears beautiful outward, but is within full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness?"[22] The essential nature of the soul which the Siddhāntin considers to remain constant is its trait of dependence on Śiva. If so, this inner sadasat condition of the soul in mukti does not imply impurity but only lack of omnipotence. Even this position does not extricate the Siddhāntin from the criticism already noted that the wearisome process of cleansing of the soul is intended for nothing further than merely the altering of the outer garb of the soul which not being of the essence of the soul, is not important. Should the Siddhāntin consider that in spite of the criticisms incurred, he has at least discovered the soul to be a dependent entity present through all the transient states of kevala etc., then the question arises as to whether it enters these states or not. Either alternative is fraught with difficulties. If the soul participates in these states, then it participates also in the transient nature of the states, and anything that abandons itself to change, surren-

21. Schomerus pp. 204-205.
22. St. Mathew's gospel, chapter 23. v. 27.

ders its being. Should the soul transcend these changes, then what is it that ultimately becomes purified by these changes and unites with Śiva ? We have not yet been able to discover what this entity is that is conceived to retain individuality throughout its various stages of kevala, sakala and śuddha. It is not intelligible to conceive of it as either in the change processes or out of them.

We meet with similar difficulty when we approach the problem of personal identity and this needs careful consideration. We do not think of man as made up of a number of momentary selves, but as one individual that remains the same through all the varying experiences of his life-time. 'A' who is born now will be the same individual ten years hence or even in his old age. What we mean by this is that through the varying stages of life, we have one individual. When recollecting experiences of years ago, a man says, "I did this." On close examination, do we find that such personal identity is real ? If so, in what does it consist ?

The Siddhāntin's answers to this question are conditioned by the various issues of the theory of transmigration of souls. Personal identity for him does not consist in having the same body ; for a soul during its transmigration, may take on any number of bodies whose types may range from those of the egg-born to those of beings much higher in the scale of life, as for instance, gods and men. Memory cannot constitute personal identity because in migrating from one body to another, the soul has no recollection of its experiences in any particular embodiment. It is the Lord that has to keep count of the merits and demerits of the soul. Moreover, even in one life time, memory is seen to be full of defects. The individual who had his ring returned to him, completely forgetting this, asks his friend that it should be returned.[23] Moreover, there are such states as swoons when there is no recollection of any event. Owing to these difficulties, memory cannot constitute personal identity. Continuity of psychi-

23. Snk. Refutation of Aikyavādi.

cal experiences cannot serve the purpose, for in dreamless sleep and in the kevala avasthā, this continuity is snapped. Moreover, besides continuity, there is need of qualitative sameness, and this is not had in the stream of psychical experiences each of which is different from the other. Further, the psychical experiences of any being will be conditioned by its body, organs, objects of experience and environment. According to the theory of transmigration, an individual soul during its career may be endowed with tanu, karaṇa, bhuvana, and bhoga appropriate to the various births it undergoes. Any hope of attaining uniformity of psychical experiences under these conditions meets with little encouragement. The suggestion that the interests of a person go to build up his personal identity is subject to the same criticism as stated above that considering that a soul undergoes various births, its interests cannot remain constant. The view that the soul is a monad that preserves its identity by standing aloof from the changing psychical states, leads to the absurd conclusion pointed out above in another connection. The soul is either related to its avasthās or not. If it is subject to the avasthās, then its integrity is dissipated ; if it is over and above the avasthās, then there is no sense in speaking of the soul undergoing the avasthās. If it merely accompanies them, then almost anything outside the avasthās may be said to accompany them, and one would be as little justified in saying that the soul undergoes the avasthās as in saying that any of the other accompaniments undergoes the avasthās. The view of the soul as an entity having icchā, kriyā and jñāna śaktis does not rise to meeting the requirements of personal identity. These śaktis are dependent on tanu, karaṇa, bhuvana, bhoga and several other tattvas for functioning. When these are absent, the śaktis cease to function and fail to serve as the basis of personal identity. Further, if these śaktis constitute the essence of the soul, inasmuch as they are subject to fluctuations, the essence of the soul enters into the stream of change, and we are left with nothing on which to pin personal identity.

The soul in its relation to the various entities with which it comes into contact in the various states, loses its self-subsisting character. In the kevala avasthā, we have :

soul and āṇava,

in the sakala,

aruḷ and Śiva, soul, tirodhāna and āṇava,

in the śuddha avasthā,

soul and Śiva.

In each state, the soul is placed in a different setting. If these various elements make a difference to the soul, then it loses its identity. If they make no difference to the soul, then there is no point in the soul being placed in the different environments.

No satisfactory view of the sense in which the soul exists, and of personal identity has been arrived at. And yet, " that selves exist and are identical in some sense is indubitable."[24] Every view of the self and of its identity has been seen to be full of contradictions. If one is not content with what is inconsistent and therefore unreal, one may perhaps arrive at the truth by altogether changing one's view, so that each empirical self instead of being looked on as independent and self-subsisting, should be considered as a part or aspect of the whole in which it finds place. The certainty as to the thinker may be based not on a limited empirical self, but on an Infinite Consciousness of which thinker, thought and thinking are appearances. The error thus far has been in attempting to conceive of the self as an independent being out of relation to the Infinite Consciousness of which it is an aspect. Hence, the various conceptions of the self have resulted in contradictions. For the Siddhāntin, it is not difficult to take up the position suggested of an Infinite Consciousness, as for him the soul is not atomic, but infinite and all-pervasive. If on the other hand, the soul is found confined within limits, it is because of āṇava mala, and all human effort is to be directed to ridding the soul of this impurity which acts as a drag on the soul preventing it from being all-pervasive.

24. A.R. p. 104.

CHAPTER VI

THE MALA-FETTERED SOUL

As rice is covered by husk, as copper is encrusted with verdigris, and as sea-water is permeated by salt, so is the soul in intimate beginningless union with āṇava mala. This acts as a fetter for the soul, thwarting every one of its powers. To gauge fully the pernicious effect of āṇava on the soul, we may consider the soul in the kevala avasthā when it is dissociated from everything else, and stands with āṇava alone. The soul is so impoverished by this connection that beyond saying that it exists, nothing else of a positive character can be attributed to it. Its existence is not even a conscious one. And with regard to its three essential qualities of knowing, willing and desiring,there seems no trace of any of these at this stage.

Śiva, having compassion on the souls, resolves to redeem them from their bondage. Since this fallen condition of the soul is brought about by āṇava, if the soul is to be reclaimed from this state, attention must be directed to ridding the soul of āṇava. Āṇava, being eternal, cannot be destroyed, but its power can be crushed so that its presence with the soul should count for nothing. The one means of effecting this desirable result is through the soul's attainment of śiva-jñāna, which will not only undermine the power of āṇava, but will open the way to the happy state of release for the soul. Śiva-jñāna is enlightenment of the highest kind. Having as its basis a knowledge of the three eternal realities of Pati, paśu and pāśa, it necessarily involves an appreciation of the relative values of the three eternal realities. This wisdom enables the soul to set its mind on Śiva who, being pure sat, is of supreme worth. This enlightenment, however, can come to souls only as the fruit of long and bitter experience ; and necessarily so, as the state of the soul's unconsciousness in the kevala avasthā, and the state of its happy enlightenment in the śuddha avasthā are as far removed from each other as earth and sky ; and if

the two states constitute the first and last rungs of the ladder of the soul's progress, and the distance between them be great, the number of the intervening steps would be proportionate to the distance between the starting point and goal.

In order to make a beginning at acquiring the knowledge for its uplift and release, the soul is made to emerge from its state of unconsciousness, inactivity and ignorance in the kevala avasthā, and to enter the state of consciousness, activity and knowledge of the sakala avasthā; and when the soul through experience and knowledge gained in the sakala avasthā perceives its bound state and is eager to be released, then it enters the śuddha avasthā, where its purification is accomplished through attaining true knowledge; and this stage leads up to the coveted goal of release where the soul, being cleansed of its impurity, attains its highest development.

These three states of kevala, sakala and śuddha are the three gross states of an individual's career; and corresponding to these three stages are the five functions of Śiva. His office of destruction brings about the kevala avasthā; His creative activity brings about the sakala avasthā during which Śiva exercises His offices of preservation and concealment; and in the śuddha avasthā, Śiva exercises His grace.[1] The three states of kevala, sakala and śuddha are characterised by the dominance of āṇava, māyā and śiva śakti respectively.[2]

Kevala, which is brought about by world destruction, is intended to give rest to souls. In this avasthā, the soul is devoid of any characteristic mark, being without a body; of intelligence, being without kalā and other vidyā tattvas; and of guṇas, being without rāga and other tattvas. Being without activity, it is no agent, and has no experience of the world. It is eternal and pervasive. It is united with mala.[3] This avasthā which is reached by the soul when the world is destroyed, endures until the time of regeneration. The soul is

1. Schomerus p. 214.
2. Jk. p. 8.
3. Ś.J.S. IV. v. 38; Ś.P. v. 33.

thereupon united to its body, and enters the sakala avasthā where it attains all the tattvas of bhōga kāṇḍa (vidyā tattvas) and of bhogya-kāṇḍa (aśuddha tattvas) which enable it to think, talk and to perform all other activities. As a lamp functions only when its accessories of wick, oil, etc., are present, so the intelligence of the soul will work only when these tattvas are present.[4]

It is now obvious that in these two states of kevala, and sakala, the soul exists under entirely different conditions. In the kevala, the soul is isolated from all influences except that of āṇava, and is inactive ; in the sakala, it becomes active so that associating with everything, it is influenced by them.[5] The kevala state is one of non-differentiated being for the soul ; for divested of embodiment and consequently freed of every space limitation,[6] it can neither be located nor perceived. In the sakala avasthā, the soul owing to its connection with matter, becomes a conditioned being[7] or a puruṣa tattva, and as such, it becomes a differentiated being. Further, karma and māyā, which were inactive during kevala, now exercise their role.[8] In fact, close connection with the products of māyā and surrender to karma are the chief characteristics of the sakala avasthā, and as these are not found in the other two states, these constitute the special features of this state. The assimilation on the part of the soul that is spoken of as a further characteristic of sakala avasthā[9] should not be considered as peculiar to this state. For unless in the kevala avasthā also, the soul were amenable to influence, āṇava could not overwhelm the soul with ignorance ; nor could the soul in śuddha avasthā be redeemed unless it allowed itself to be influenced by aruḷ and Śiva. During kevala, the soul so lends itself to the influence of the indwelling āṇava that it takes on the appearance of āṇava although its nature is that of intelligence, and lies as a non-intelligent entity bearing in itself the charac-

4. Ś.P. v. 37.
5. Schomerus p. 215.
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*
8. Schomerus pp. 216-217.
9. Schomerus p. 216.

teristics of matter.[10] It is this almost complete transformation of the intelligent soul to non-intelligent matter that constitutes the tragedy of kevala avasthā. Further, the soul is ignorant of its deplorable state. As ignorance is the sole cause of this wretchedness, kevala comes to be dreaded because it is the state in which ignorance abounds. The inactivity of this period is less to be deplored, as knowledge and not activity is the highest good of the soul. If the activity of the sakala avasthā is valued, it is because of its resulting fruit of knowledge.[11] It cannot be said, on the other hand, that sakala is in every way to be preferred to kevala, for in sakala, the soul, being conscious, feels all its experiences, and Śiva out of compassion for the tortured soul, makes the sakala an intermittent period broken in by the kevala avasthā, a period of unconsciousness and of rest for souls.[12] It is important to note that the oft-recurring kevala avasthā does not wipe out the progress made by the soul, so that its past experience counts for nothing; it comes as an interval of rest, while not obliterating anything, so that the soul can renew its career from the point where it was last cut off.[13]

The sakala avasthā follows the kevala avasthā and is brought into being by the termination of the world-rest and the creation of the world. This period, though entailing much suffering, is of great significance in that it is a period of preparation of the soul for fitness for release. As the valuable metal of gold has to be subjected to many a refining process ere being rid of all dross it can become pure, so the soul, which is a spiritual being, has to undergo many a painful process of cleaning ere, overcoming the evil influence of āṇava, it can re-assert its pure essence. These various processes of preparation may be broadly divided into the two classes :

1. embodiments,
2. the four mārgas of caryā, kriyā, yoga and jñāna.

Though in both kinds of preparation, the soul as will be notic-

10. Schomerus p. 211.
11. Schomerus p. 212.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 212-213.

ed later, hardly has scope to exercise its initiative, so that it is more or less a passive entity, yet in the latter group of caryā etc., there is more of conscious effort on the part of the soul in realising a better state, than in the process of embodiments where the karmic evolution, by taking its own course, eventually accomplishes the inevitable result of the soul becoming disillusioned with regard to the seeming charms of the world. The process of transmigration, by means of which the result is achieved, is a long and wearisome one. No doubt, the manifold births that are experienced are as diverse as they can be, consisting of the egg-born, the sweat-born, the soil-born, and the placenta-born, which with their sub-species number to the vast total of eighty-four lakhs.[14] Yet the features common to these varied experiences, which reduce them to the level of trying monotony, are the experiences of pain, that are difficult to be borne, and of pleasure, that are speedily supplanted by pain of longing for pleasure, which if it should come again, comes only to disappear again, leaving pain in its wake as before. This, however, is the price that the soul has to pay for its redemption. The way to release is beset with suffering, and paved with vexation of spirit. However, it is these painful experiences that urge the soul to seek for Śiva, who is in Himself the abiding ānanda.

The bodies which the soul must take on to undergo purification are formed out of the tattvas whose origin and evolution have already been examined. These bodies as noted before may be distinguished into the sthūla śarīras in which all the tattvas are at work, and the sūkṣma śarīras in which the gross tattvas mentioned below do not function. The sthūla śarīra, which is composed of five jñāna indriyās, five karma indriyās, and five bhūtas, is discarded by the soul at death. The soul may then either forthwith enter another gross body, or it may, according to its karma, make a stay in either hell or heaven.[15] The analogies of the snake dropping its skin, the bird leaving its shell, and

14. Ś.P. v. 47. 15. Ś.J.S. II. v. 37.

the yogin leaving his body and entering another,[16] and the iron drawing towards a magnet[17] attempt to describe the passing of the soul from one gross body to another. These gross bodies as noticed are of various types ranging from those taken by the egg-born to those of the placenta-born.[18] If the soul at death is doomed not to pass into another gross body, but to enter either hell or heaven, then it discards the gross body and retains the subtle body[19] that is composed of the eight tattvas (pury-aṣṭaka): buddhi, ahaṅkāra, manas, five tanmātras. In heaven and hell souls merely re-live their past in a more intensified form, so that their earthly joys or sorrows mean to them either intense happiness or intense sorrow.[20]

It was noted that in kevala, the soul was not conditioned by space-limitation; in the sakala, however, a deep-rooted change comes over the soul in this respect, so that the question arises as to whether it has form or whether it is formless. The Siddhāntin considers the views held by other schools about the condition of the soul in its embodied state. He points out the defects of the theories advanced, but has little to offer by way of positive knowledge. Should the soul be conceived as having form, then the soul should be seen entering the womb; it would be apparent in the body, and would be destructible,[21] as all things perceived, being asat, are destroyed. If it should have an invisible form, this would be constituted of one or other of the subtle tattvas, all of which are perishable.[22] The theory that the soul is rūpārūpa necessitates that the soul should be visible at least sometimes;[23] further, this theory is infected by the inconsistency of attributing two contradic-

16. Ś.J.S. II. v. 38.
17. Ś.J.B. II. argt. 2. v. 2.
18. Ś.J.S. II. v. 89; Ś.P. v. 47.
19 Ś.J.S. II. v. 36; Ś.J.B. II. argt. 3, v, 1,
20. Ś.J.S. Translation by Nallaswami, foot-note to v. 36 of sūtra II p. 174.
21. Ś.J.S. IV. v. 9.
22. *Ibid.*, IV. v. 10.
23. *Ibid.*, v. 12.

tory natures to the same substance.[24] The theory that it is formless and inactive like ākāśa[25] is condemned in the light of the fact of the soul being bound in a body while actuating it.[26] The view that the soul is an atom brings with it the risk of the soul escaping from the body through its various openings.[27] Should it occupy only part of the body, then it would have all the defects of a soul with form ; moreover, its sway would not extend over the whole body even if it should throw its radiance like a lamp so as to fill the whole body, for the lamp can better light the things nearest it.[28] The suggestion that it is spread over the whole body entails the consequence that the soul will not be subject to the avasthās. Further, should any part of the body be severed, the part of the soul dwelling in the dismembered part should suffer the same separation.[29] If it be all-pervasive, then it should perceive all things at once, and there would be no necessity for it to enter heaven or hell.[30] The only positive information ventured by the Siddhāntin in this connection with regard to the soul is that it is formless and all-pervasive, and that these attributes are applied to the soul in a sense different from that in which they may be attributed to material things. The formlessness and pervasiveness are to be understood in the sense of the soul becoming one with whatever substance it is associated for the time being.[31] The significance of this answer offered by the Siddhāntin will be examined later.

The soul in the sakala avasthā, is, as it were, situated in between Śiva and aruḷ on the one side, and tirodhāyi and āṇava on the other.[32] Under these conditions, the soul can either cut itself loose from the grip of mala, and attaining the feet of Śiva realise its true self-hood ; or it can choose the evil path of wallowing in the mire of the senses. Due to ignorance, it

24. Ś.J.S. IV. v. 11.
25. *Ibid.*, v. 44.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Ibid.*, v. 15.
28. *Ibid.*, v. 16.
29. *Ibid.*, v. 17.
30. *Ibid.*, v. 18.
31. *Ibid.*, v. 20.
32. Ś.P. v. 91.

is the latter alternative that the soul adopts. It is ignorant of the fact that the senses are only a means to the end of helping it to realise the futility of the world. The soul is ignorant also of the fact that it is God who confers on it these sense experiences, and attributes to itself all the credit. Thus, ignorant of Śiva, and ignorant of its kinship with Him, lured away by the fleeting pleasures of the senses, it sinks in them, and undergoes manifold births and deaths.

The theory that the soul undergoes manifold births and deaths seems to be discredited by the fact that the soul has no recollection of its experience of its past births. This objection, however, presents no difficulty to the Siddhāntin who points out that the soul, which no doubt is an intelligent being, is subject to various limitations, one of which is that it forgets many of its experiences. If the experiences of childhood are not denied on the ground of their fading away from memory in later life, there is as little justification to overthrow the theory of past births on the score of absence of recollection of those experiences in another birth. This difficulty then cannot be admitted to be serious. There are also other facts which lead the Siddhāntin to accept the theory of transmigration. There is cruel inequality seen to exist among human beings so that whereas one person has all that one could covet in life, another has a lot that is far from enviable. This state of affairs, however, cannot be attributed to God, who would thereby descend to the level of a powerful but unjust and capricious being whose deeds cannot be accounted for by any rational principle. Since every thought, word and action of the soul must have its effect, souls cannot shirk the responsibility for the consequences of their thoughts, words and deeds. These consequences take the form of good and bad fruits that accrue to souls yielding to them pleasure and pain respectively; and this scheme is in keeping with the conception of God as a perfect being, from whose moral attributes justice cannot be excluded. At the heart of the world then, there is justice. Daśaratha, whose heart is wrung by his having to exile his dear son, traces back in time the source

of his grief to his reckless shooting of an arrow which caused the sad death of an only son. So all happy and unhappy experiences of any particular life can be traced to earlier good and bad deeds whether of this or of a former life. There is no experience of the soul which cannot be accounted for by karma.

In working out the law of karma, the soul need not take on every form of embodiment; for it may be that due to the accumulation of good karma, the soul instead of taking on the next higher birth, can go up much higher in the scale of existence. The reverse process is also possible, that owing to bad karma, the soul sinks considerably lower in the next birth.[33] Illustrating these principles of transmigration are the facts that Ahalyā was turned into a stone, and a rat was born as a king.[34]

The highest birth is the human birth ; and the difficulty of attaining it is stressed by comparing the man who has attained it after migrating through the lower stages of birth, to one who has swum the ocean with his own hands.[35] And among human births again, there is a long series ranging from the lowest level, which is that of the savages, to the highest, which is that of the Śaiva Siddhāntin,[36] who has laid hold of the truth that the being of supreme worth is Śiva, and unreserved devotion to Him is the way to release.

The soul persists in taking pleasure in the experiences of the world because of its ignorance of the true nature of things. It is due to its association with āṇava that it is misled into seeking the things that are alien to its nature as a spiritual being. The work of deluding the soul is for a certain period of time aided by tirodhāyi. This is really śiva-śakti,[37] which hides from souls the true nature of the objects of the world, so that by experiencing them, maturation of

33. Schomerus p. 223.
34. Ś.J.S. II. v. 44.
35. Ś.J.S. II. v. 89.
36. *Ibid.*, II, v. 90-91.
37. Ś.P. edited by Tiruviḷaṅgam, foot-note 8 on p. 39.

mala may be obtained. Its function, though apparently characterised by a negtive aspect, has positive effects eventually; for the soul that is deluded into thinking that the objects of the world are pleasure-yielding, finally concludes for itself that, the pleasures derived from them being evanescent, they are not worth while. Further, tirodhāyi enlightens the soul by means of the śuddha tattvas, kalā and other tattvas.[38] Thus without tirodhāyi, the souls will not seek experiences which, resulting in knowledge, bring about maturation of mala. Because it works with mala in concealing from the soul the true nature of the world, it is classified as one of the malas.[39] But it is really not considered a mala; on the contrary, after bringing about the ripening of mala, it is considered to change into aruḷ śakti, which taking on the form of a guru, dispels mala.

And of the presence of this divine grace, the soul is ignorant as of the presence of āṇava in itself. This indwelling grace is its only help for getting rid of mala. As the sickness to which one is subject can be known only to the members of one's home,[40] so the ills to which one is subject can be known only to the Lord. And of His near presence, the soul is ignorant, as a lonely traveller is ignorant of an approaching companion.[41] The soul forgetting the grace of God, and sinking in the ocean of the senses, is like fish, which living in the milky sea, and not heeding the milk around them, search rather for mean creatures to satisfy their hunger.[42]

At this stage, the soul's powers of knowing, desiring and acting are all crude. Owing to ignorance caused by āṇava, the soul desires the contemptible things of the world, and in attempting to attain the objects, performs actions unworthy of itself, and thus subjects itself to the sway of karma, and implicates itself in the endless process of transmigration. In thus giving way to the senses, and going through endless

38. Ś.P. foot-note 8 on p. 39.
39. Ś.P. v. 20.
40. F.D.G. chapter V. v. 2.
41. F.D.G. chap. IV. v. 5.
42. *Ibid.*, v. 4.

births, the soul runs much risk of losing itself; for not only do the senses delude the soul so that it is ignorant of itself,[43] but reveal to it only the universe.[44] Moreover, the soul, being like the crystal which reflects objects in the neighbourhood,[45] is likely to identify itself with the world to such an extent that its spiritual nature becomes obscure. Though this condition of the soul is a lamentable one, yet there is no need to despair of the soul bettering its condition. It is possible for the soul to get rid of the asat that taints its nature, as it is naturally intelligent, and can profit by Śiva's instruction. Learning the true nature of the world, and finding no lasting satisfaction in the things of the world, it weans itself away from them. It is now able to see that as the colours reflected in a crystal are different from the crystal, so the false senses are different from itself.[46] And when once the soul is disillusioned about the senses, it must eventually reach the feet of Śiva, as when the rope of the swing breaks, the man who had been swinging must necessarily reach the ground.[47]

With regard to the soul being intelligent, there need be no doubt, for the body is unintelligent, the sense organs cognise only in succession, the antaḥkaraṇas are dependent on the external senses for their material, and the vital air is inert; and this process of elimination leaves us only the soul as responsible for cognising.[48] The argument that Śiva stands within the soul, and for its sake cognises things is as absurd as maintaining that one's hunger can be satisfied by some one else eating.[49] In thus treating with disdain the argument which would rob the soul of initiative, the Siddhāntin gives proof of his desire to give free will to souls. However, he is not free to go very far in this direction as his two basic assumptions of a soul entirely helpless owing to its being overpowered by āṇava and of God as responsible for all

43. Ś.J.B. VIII. argt. 3.
44. Ś.P. v. 35.
45. Ś.P. v. 59.
46. Ś.J.B. VIII. argt. 3. v. 1.
47. Ś.J.B. Cu. Notes on sūtra VIII, argt. 4. p. 163.
48. Ś.P. v. 53.
49. Ś.P. v. 65.

events in the universe can at best yield a soul whose initiative is so much encroached upon that what can still claim to be unaffected hardly amounts to anything worth considering.

As an intelligent being, the soul proves itself to be different from matter, which is non-intelligent. On the other hand, it cannot possibly rank with Śiva, as He is the great intelligence, whereas the soul is only a small intelligence. Whereas Śiva is omniscient, the knowledge of the soul is limited ; whereas He knows all things at the same time, the soul can learn only bit by bit ; and it also forgets what it learns ; and whereas Śiva knows things directly, the soul can only learn through instruments. The nature of the intelligence of the soul places it in between the two extremes of Śiva, on the one hand, and matter on the other. The soul is not a perfect intelligence like God ; if perfect, it should be able to learn without instruments. It is not non-intelligent like matter, for in that case, the soul would acquire intelligence neither from the organs of cognition, nor from Śiva ; the organs of cognition are themselves inert, and cannot help to know if the soul should also be non-intelligent ; and Śiva will not give knowledge to the non-intelligent.[50]

Though the soul is naturally intelligent, yet it cannot dispense with the instruments of cognition, etc. Uniting with one of the sense organs that associates with the object concerned, one of the gross elements, the four internal organs, and kalā and other tattvas, the soul experiences an object.[51] The eye cannot be said to perceive by means of its own light, for if that were the case, it ought to perceive objects in the dark ; nor does it on the other hand, have no light of its own. What actually happens is that the light of the eye mixes with the light of the lamp in perceiving an object.[52]

The tattvas have several functions in helping the soul to attain knowledge. The jñāna indriyās obtain sensations

50. Ś.P. v. 54.
51. *Ibid.*, v. 63.
52. Ś.P. v. 58.

from sense objects. Antaḥkaraṇas are as useful to the soul as ministers to a king; and as these acquaint the king with the situation in the country, so the antaḥkaraṇas induce consciousness in the soul which, because of its union with āṇava, is unconscious.[53] In conjunction with citta, the soul becomes aware of the sensations; with manas, it doubts; with ahaṅkāra, it resolves to determine the object; and with buddhi, it decides rightly. These antaḥkaraṇas being produced from prakṛti are inert. If so, the problem arises as to how being thus inert, they are capable of action. The solution proposed that the organs are controlled by the five mystic letters,[54] again leads to the same difficulty as these also are inert. The Siddhāntin says that back of these letters are deities to actuate them.[55]

The soul which is dependent on the tattvas for its welfare, finds them useful only up to a point. All that the soul can know through their aid is asat,[56] which is fleeting[57] as the figures formed on the water, as dreams and as a mirage.[58] The tattvas themselves, being asat, can never enable the soul to know sat.[59] If it is hoped that by meditation Śiva, who is sat, can be perceived, even so our hope is doomed to failure, as meditation can only be accomplished with manas, which again is a material tattva.[60] Meditation without instruments is unthinkable, as this would result in the kevala avasthā. It is only the aruḷ śakti of the Lord that can enable the soul to know Śiva. Hence the soul that has reaped the benefits conferred by the tattvas must advance further, and, reaching unto grace, seek Śiva.

The tattvas which can give knowledge only of asat, do not merely cease to be useful after the soul has attained a

53. Ś.J.B. IV.
54. Ś.J.B. IV. argt. 1. v. 3; Ś.J.S. IV. v. 3.
55. Ś.J.B. IV. argt. 1. v. 4; Ś.J.S. IV. v. 4.
56. Ś.P. v. 55.
57. Ś.P. v. 86.
58. Ś.J.B. VI. argt. 1. v. 1.
59. Ś.J.B. VI. argt. 2. v. 2.
60. Ś.J.B. VI. argt. 2. v. 3.

certain stage, but they are a distinct hindrance, and should be subdued if the soul is to make further progress. It is when the soul loses itself in grace in such a way that the tattvas are ineffective that the soul reaches a higher state of perfection.[61]

Not merely should the tattvas cease to function, but even the intelligence of the soul should be superseded by divine grace. The human intelligence is subject to many limitations. No sooner has the intelligence grasped one subject than it passes on to another, and hence the intelligence comes to be and ceases to be; and moreover, it is marred by conjunction with mala. Owing to this defect, it can never know anything other than asat. If it is to rise to knowing sat, it must withdraw itself into the background like the lamp light in the light of the day,[62] and it will be supplemented by divine grace which will give the soul new powers of knowledge. As the crystal reflects objects in the neighbourhood, so the soul leaning on śiva-jñāna, gets true wisdom,[63] and is enabled to get rid of asat. And this śiva-śakti leads to Śiva Himself; for as intense brightness cannot exist without its source,[64] so śiva-jñāna cannot be accounted for without Śiva. And as the brightness of the sun dispels the clouds and reveals the bright orb, so grace dispels mala and reveals Śiva.[65]

The soul led by its desire for the things of the spirit, practises caryā, kriyā and yoga, and in undergoing these stages, it prepares itself to meet its Lord, who patiently waits for the soul to make itself ready to receive Him. If pearls are not to be cast before swine, neither can the Lord make Himself manifest to the soul before it can appreciate Him. As the sun can open only those lotuses that are mature enough to open, so can the Lord make Himself known only to those who hunger to have Him.

61. Ś.P. vv. 68-78.
62. *Ibid.*, v. 82.
63. *Ibid.*, v. 59.
64. *Ibid.*, v. 74.
65. *Ibid.*, v. 75.

As ghee is present in the milk without its presence being obvious,[66] so is the Lord ever present in the soul though revealing Himself to it only when it seeks to have Him. And now that the soul definitely turns towards Him, taking on the form of a guru, He teaches the soul that, forgetting its high descent, it has deteriorated by its association with the five senses. The soul then ridding itself of everything foreign to its nature, attains the feet of Śiva.[67] The process of cleansing the soul and of preparing it for release takes place in the śuddha avasthā which will be considered in another chapter.

Besides the subtle states of kevala, sakala and śuddha avasthā, which cover the whole career of an individual, there are the gross states, which the soul passes through at different times. Kevala, sakala and śuddha are here referred to as the subtle states, and the Siddhāntin gives to them the common name of "Kāraṇa Avasthā". Those states that are spoken of as the gross states are described by the Siddhāntin as the "Kārya avasthā". With regard to the relationship between these two sets of avasthās, not much guidance is had from the Siddhānta source books, and we are left to conjecture the relationship. A close study of the avasthās leads one to venture to say that the kāraṇa and the kārya avasthās are the non-manifest and manifest or subtle and gross states respectively.

Each set of kārya avasthā has the five states ranging from the jāgra avasthā to atīta, or *vice versa*. The soul going through these states of jāgra to atīta and back again to the original state is explained by the analogy of a king who, returning to his palace leaves at its various entrances his ministers and servants and finally enters his chamber alone for rest; and when later, he goes out again, he has their company.[68]

66. Ś.J.B. Cu. p. 155.
67. Ś.J.B. VIII.
68. Ś.J.S. IV. v. 32.

While there is agreement among the Siddhāntins as to the number and nature of the kāraṇa avasthās, there is no such unanimity of opinion among them regarding the number and nature of the kārya avasthās. Some distinguish three sets, and others add as many more. According to Jñāna-prakāśa, there are five sets of kārya avasthās, viz. :

1. Kīḻāl avasthās.
2. Mēlāl avasthās
3. Madhyāl avasthās.
4. Preraka avasthās.
5. Niṉmala avasthās.

According to Tiruviḷaṅgam there are four :

1. Kīḻāl avasthās.
2. Madhyāl avasthās.
3. Niṉmala avasthās.
4. Yoga avasthās.

According to Jñānāmṛtakkaṭṭaḷai, there are three :

1. Kārya kevala avasthās.
2. Sakala kevala avasthās.
3. Niṉmala kevala avasthās.

Śivāgrayogin says there are three :

1. Apratibhā avasthās.
2. Niṉmala avasthās.
3. Yoga avasthās.

According to the " Avattai-darśanam " there are five :

1. Preraka avasthās.
2. Madhyāl avasthās.
3. Kīḻāl avasthās.
4. Mēlāl avasthās.
5. Niṉmala avasthās.

All are agreed that the kāraṇa avasthās are three in number, and that they are the states of

1. Kevala, 2. Sakala, 3. Śuddha.

With regard to the kārya avasthā, Jñānaprakāśa's account may here be considered, as his classification, being comprehensive, covers nearly all cases, and indicates the inter-relation of the various avasthās.

1. *Kārya Kiḻāl Avasthās.*

In these avasthās, in passing from jāgra to atīta, one gradually gets dissociated from the tattvas, and consequently loses consciousness of this world. These states are experienced when the soul passes from kāraṇa sakala to kāraṇa kevala. The kiḻāl avasthās have five sub-divisions :

i. *Jāgra.*

In jāgra, all the thirty-five tattvas are present, and the soul is in the forehead.

ii. *Svapna.*

In svapna, the ten indriyas do not function, so that there are twenty-five tattvas, and the soul moves down to the throat.

iii. *Suṣupti.*

In suṣupti, only prāṇa and citta function for puruṣa, and the soul moves still further down to the heart.

iv. *Turīya.*

In this state, citta disappears leaving prāṇa and puruṣa, and the soul descends to the navel.

v. *Atīta.*

In atīta, puruṣa dwells alone, and the soul goes to the furthest extreme of mūlādhāra.

II. *Kārya Mēlāl Avasthās.*

In these avasthās, the soul goes back from kāraṇa kevala to kāraṇa sakala. It returns in the reverse order from mūlādhāra to the forehead, and in doing so, recovers the tattvas and consequently experiences a growing awareness of the world until in mēlāl jāgra, being in full possession of the

tattvas, and dwelling in the forehead, the soul has complete consciousness of its environment.

III. *The Madhyāl Avasthās.*

In these avasthās, the soul neither ascends nor descends, but, being in the forehead where it can be cognisant of the world, it goes through the various stages of atīta, etc., when on occasions impressions concerning some fact gradually come up from the sub-conscious to the full conscious regions.

IV. *Preraka Avasthās.*

These correspond to kārya śuddha. Jñānaprakāśa and the "Avattai-darśanam"[69] agree in saying that the tattvas present are: Five śiva tattvas, seven vidyā tattvas, four antaḥkaraṇas, and one tanmātra, making eighteen tattvas; but neither of them states the position of the soul for the five avasthās. In these avasthās, one perceives the object in jāgra, and gradually draws near and becomes one with it, until in atīta one is lost in it.

V. *Niṉmala Avasthās.*

These correspond to kāraṇa śuddha. Here the soul travels from the heart to brahmarandhra, and in doing so, comes to know its true nature and its kinship with God.

The avasthās distinguished by Jñānaprakāśa are confirmed by the "Avattai-darśanam". Some writers differ from Jñānaprakāśa. However, all of them are agreed upon the three main kārya avasthās:

1. Kīḻāl avasthās corresponding to kāraṇa kevala,
2. Madhyāl „ „ „ sakala avasthā,
3. Niṉmala „ „ „ śuddha „

A comparative study of the avasthās expounded by different writers leads one to the following conclusions:

69. Manuscript by unknown author, in the Government Oriental Library, Madras.

Kīl̲āl avasthās. The soul in travelling from the forehead to mūlādhāra goes through these five states beginning with jāgra. There is a growing non-awareness of the world. In fact, even in the state of kīl̲āl jāgra, the individual though seeming to see cannot see, and seeming to hear cannot hear. This unconsciousness is explained by the absence of the śiva tattvas, and more especially the vidyā tattvas from all the five states.

Mēlāl avasthās. These are the very opposite of the kīl̲āl avasthās, for as these (kīl̲āl) correspond to the soul travelling from kārya sakala to kārya kevala, those (mēlāl) correspond to the soul passing from kārya kevala to kārya sakala. The soul, instead of losing contact with the tattvas as in the kīl̲āl, gains them by degrees, so that instead of the consciousness dying out, there is a quickening of it. The śiva tattvas appear one by one until in jāgra, five of them are present along with the other tattvas.

Madhyāl avasthās. In these avasthās, the soul is in the forehead always, so that there is an awareness of this world, and complete consciousness, though the recollection of some particular thing experienced in the past comes about only gradually as the individual passes from atīta to jāgra.

Nin̲mala avasthās. In these states, the soul moving from the heart to brahmarandhra goes from jāgra to atīta. There is a gradual shedding of mala and purification resulting in a growing approach to God.

Preraka avasthās are unique in some respects. In other states, if either tanmātras or sense organs are present, all the tanmātras or all the sense organs are present; here, only one of each exists in any state. The difference between the five states is due to a different sense organ in each state,[70] and perhaps a tanmātra. All the five states have the five śiva

70. Avattai-darśanam. p. 1.

tattvas. By means of these states, the individual draws nigh to God.

The differences of the avasthās are explained by the different tattvas present, or the different positions of the soul or both circumstances. The kārya avasthās fall under three main divisions, namely, those in which the soul losing contact with the tattvas becomes ignorant; those in which the soul aided by the tattvas, takes cognisance of the world; and those in which the soul makes a definite approach to God, and becomes one with Him; and these kārya avasthās correspond to the kāraṇa avasthās of kevala, sakala and śuddha respectively.

In the previous chapter, it was noted how the Siddhāntin spares no pains to differentiate the soul from the body and from the various parts of the psycho-physical organism. Further, in describing the nature of the soul, he uses the term 'cit', and in doing so contrasts its nature with that of the body, etc., which are described as 'acit'. Yet in spite of all this discrimination, he finds no difficulty in conceiving of inter-action between the soul, which is cit, and what is opposed in nature, viz., psycho-physical organism, which is acit. This over-sight is even more surprising in view of the fact that it is the problem of how God, who is pure spirit, can act on the universe, which is material, which induces him to invent the intermediaries of cit-śakti and śuddha māyā and its evolutes. As he neglects to consider the soul-body problem, so does he pass over the problem of the mala-fettered soul. He objects to conceiving of the relationship between soul and āṇava as that of substance and attribute. To him, there is no substrate at the back of the attributes so that it might be possible to destroy these while leaving the other intact. On the contrary, the attributes are the substance, so that if those are affected, this too is affected. Accordingly, if in release, āṇava is overcome by Śiva's grace, the soul would also be overcome. His own view of the relationship is that āṇava is in beginningless union with the soul, as the husk, for instance, is in beginningless union with rice. This analogy, however, does not meet the

problem of how āṇava which, being one of the malas is acit, can be in union with the soul that is cit. If they are both independent entities of opposite nature, as they are made out to be, how do they exist together in intimate union ? What is it that creates the bond of union between these integral entities of contrary nature ? Further, since āṇava is admitted to influence the soul rendering it ignorant, how is the integrity of the soul preserved so as to justify the description of it as an eternal entity ?

Similar difficulties recur when one considers how the Siddhāntin's view that the soul is an eternal entity can hold good in the light of the experiences which the mala-fettered soul undergoes in the sakala avasthā. Corresponding to the problem of how God can be immutable in spite of His acting on the world of change, is the problem of how the soul can be eternal in spite of the various avasthās experienced by it, and in spite of careering through endless transmigration. The moment it participates in these changing states, does not its eternal character vanish into thin air ? And after it has been through all the changes in store for it in the various avasthās and in transmigration, can it be said to be the same entity that it was when it started on its career ? If it is considered to be the same, have the diverse states, through which it has been, made no difference to it ? If they make no difference to it, why does it laboriously undergo these manifold states ? If they make a difference to it, does not the eternal soul suffer change ?

The material things, which appear and disappear, are for this reason condemned by the Siddhāntin as unreal or asat.[71] Does the soul, however, manifest a continued existence ? As a king withdraws himself from the view of his subjects, and enters his innermost chamber,[72] does not the soul in entering atīta subside, and in recovering itself and attaining jāgra again, does it not re-assert itself once more ? If in defence of

71. Ś.J.B. VI. argt. 1. 72. Ś.J.S. IV. v. 32.

the assertion that the soul is eternal it be maintained that though the soul intermittently subsides into unconsciousness and regains consciousness, yet it is never annihilated, then it should be made clear in what way the soul can be said to exist. The products of māyā resolve themselves into their primal stuff at praḷaya, and exist as such. In what manner does the soul exist? Deprived of its body, it cannot act; devoid of guṇas, it does not desire; and without the psychical apparatus of the antaḥkaraṇas, it cannot perform any intellectual work. Perhaps it may be contended that the soul in the kevala is an entity having its essential powers of knowing, desiring and acting in a dormant condition. This can be granted only if it be proved that the soul is an entity that knows, desires and acts.

If the soul is not responsible for its ignorance, as it is due to āṇava that it is ignorant, neither is the soul altogether responsible for its knowledge. God so works that tirodhāyi should change its functioning so that from being a concealing agent, it should become a revealing agent. God stands behind the vidyā tattvas and the śiva tattvas so that by actuating these, the soul should be illuminated. As the eye does not see by its own light, but needs the light of the lamp with which to perceive objects,[73] so does the soul not know by its own efforts, but needs the help of Śiva. As men are prone to forget that it is the sun that at dawn reveals to them the objects hid from them by darkness, so the soul forgets that it is Śiva that reveals to it the knowledge screened off from it by āṇava.[74] This presumption on the part of the soul is one of the dark blots from which it must be cleansed. No doubt, the soul is allowed a share in attaining knowledge as it is said that should Śiva know instead of the soul, it would be as absurd as one eating in order that the hunger of another may be appeased.[75] But the share that is allowed the soul is so

73. Ś.P. v. 58.
74. Ś.P. v. 66.
75. Ś.P. v. 65.

very little that the soul is more an instrument in the hands of God than a self-subsisting being.

With regard to its power for action, the soul is entirely dependent on God. If it be contended that the soul is an active being, then its activity should be self-caused change, for a " transition that begins with and comes out of the thing itself is the process where we feel that it is active."[76] The soul, however, in being redeemed from the kevala avasthā, has its activities initiated by God as it is He that through His śakti acts on the tattvas that enliven the kriyā śakti of the soul. The soul far from being an active being, has the characteristics of a passive thing. God acts through His śakti, and the soul acquires activity. In so doing, the soul fails to fulfil the condition of activity, which is that it should be self-caused change. There is yet a further aspect of the soul's activity which makes of the soul a passive thing. Its change is occasioned, and this occasion which makes the soul act, comes not from itself, but from God. God wills that the soul should act, and He makes it become active. Thus in the light of critical examination, the supposed activity of the soul sheds its false pretences, and is discovered to be passivity instead.

The icchā śakti of the soul again is seen to dissipate the self-subsistence of the soul as much as the other śaktis. Here also, God through His śakti acts on the tattvas that quicken the icchā śakti. And if when icchā śakti is set to work, the soul desires the evil things of the world, it is led into doing so because of the concealing effect of tirodhāyi.

The soul that was defined as an entity that knows, desires and acts, is seen to give up what ghost-like being it had with relinquishing its false claims to know, act and desire. The Siddhāntin readily admits that the body, which the soul takes on during its transmigration, is an appearance like everything else that is material and therefore asat. But with what justi-

76. A.R. p. 64.

fication does he withhold the same verdict with regard to the soul? That the soul and the body inter-act is admitted by the Siddhāntin. And in thus inter-acting, do not both lose their individuality? Should it be maintained that the independence of body and soul remain intact, then their inter-action should be given up; for body and soul being matter and spirit, and therefore of diverse nature, they cannot possibly come into contact with each other while retaining their individualities. If they interact, they do so on sacrificing their independence and becoming aspects of a substrate in which they lose themselves. In blinding himself to the fact that the soul is an appearance, he evades the definite issues presented by his opponents that the soul in its embodied state either has form or is formless, and straying from the point, says that the soul is all-pervasive in the sense that it has the capacity to assimilate the nature of the being with which it associates.

CHAPTER VII

THE FREEING OF THE MALA-FETTERED SOUL

The condition of the soul in the sakala avasthā has been considered. Equipped with tattvas, the soul exercises its three śaktis of icchā, kriyā and jñāna, but in such a way that it comes under the bondage of karma, and is consequently goaded to endless births and deaths entailing much suffering. The cause of this miserable state is its association with āṇava, which obscures the capacities of the soul. It is deluded into regarding as desirable the fleeting pleasures of the world and in thus surrendering to the senses, it sinks to a degraded state similar to that reached by a king's son, who in his early years, being captured by the gipsies, is brought up in their rude environment, and has none of the up-bringing of a child who has had a good home. When, however, the soul has glutted itself with the enjoyments of this world, it feels disgusted with them, and is no longer inclined to seek them. The experiences of pleasure afforded by the objects of the world are too evanescent to give abiding satisfaction to souls, and the sufferings are too acute to be borne. As an intelligent being, having the indirect guidance of Śiva's grace, it finally realises the worthlessness of asat; and, feeling thoroughly discontented with its life hitherto, very definitely turns its back on the fleeting and looks to the eternal.

Its yearning after the things of the spirit leads it to practise caryā, kriyā and yoga, which are preparatory stages to be gone through before the soul is ready to meet its Lord. In caryā, the soul, as the servant of God, devotes itself to cleansing and lighting God's temples, adorning images with various garlands, praising God and attending to the needs of God's devotees. For these external services rendered to God, the soul is rewarded with sālōka or dwelling in the region of God.[1] In the stage of kriyā, the soul from being a servant of

1. Ś.J.S. VIII, v. 19.

God, becomes a son, and as such renders more intimate services than before, such as invoking God's presence, and serving Him with love and praise, and other acts of service that are still of an external type, such as collecting flowers, incense, light, etc., required for the worship of God, and cleaning the images, treasures, etc. The reward accruing to those who have been through this stage is sāmīpya or dwelling near God.[2] In the next stage of yoga, the soul is a friend of God, and as such draws nearer to God than it did in the previous stages. Withdrawing its senses from attending to the sense objects, it concentrates on the contemplation of Śiva. Those who practise yoga are rewarded with sārūpya, which is to have the same form as Śiva.[3]

Regarding the significance of the above as preparatory stages for entrance to the highest stage of jñāna mārga, in which release is effected, it has been said[4] that in the caryā, and kriyā stages, the soul considers not the sense world, but Śiva as the highest good, since through the commandments to render acts of service to God, the attention is directed from the world to Śiva ; in the yoga stage, the soul comes to realise that the knowledge attained through the outer and inner sense organs is not true knowledge, and that for the attainment of true knowledge a higher medium than the senses is necessary.

Thus these are merely preparatory stages preliminary to reaching the final stage. The souls endowed with the rewards of sālōka, sāmīpya and sārūpya will not retain them for ever ; for when in these various states they have had the enjoyment earned by their good deeds, then they must come back to earth. Practices, such as pilgrimage to distant lands, and dwelling in forests and caves, do not bear permanent fruit.[5] If the chain of births is to be snapped, jñāna mārga is the only way ; for as ignorance has been the cause of delusion and misery, so it is only knowledge that can bring about enlighten-

2. Ś.J.S. v. 20.
3. *Ibid.*, v. 21.
4. Schomerus p. 277.
5. Ś.J.S. X. v. 5.

ment and happiness. Even meditation cannot take the place of jñāna, for meditation is possible only with the help of manas and the other karaṇas, and these tattvas, as noted already, do not take one beyond the material world. Any hope to attain Śiva by meditation without the aid of karaṇas is doomed to failure, as, when the karaṇas are dispensed with, the dark state of kevala sets in at once.[6] Though meditation and other preparatory states may be dispensed with, jñāna mārga is the one path that cannot be ruled out if Śiva is to be attained. The Vedas, the Āgamas and Purāṇas proclaim that by jñāna alone mukti is attainable.[7]

The fulfilment of these religious rites and a dedicated life lead the soul to reduce its karma so that what yet remains of it can be wiped out in one life time. The soul now experiences the state of 'iruviṉaioppu'. This term literally translated means 'equality of the two deeds', and is thus interpreted by some. Accordingly, iruviṉaioppu is described as the equal maturation of good and bad deeds so that the best of good deeds, such as sacrifices, and the worst of bad ones, such as murders, are ready to cancel each other, like the two Asuras, Sunda and Upasunda, who for love of one woman, Tilōttama, slew each other.[8] Others effecting a further refinement say that the equality in question exists between the merits and demerits which the soul has earned for the future.[9] The Siddhāntin in working towards his position overthrows both these views as being superficial. The Śaiva-vāda, which among others holds that iruviṉaioppu means equality of two deeds, incurs the criticism of the Siddhāntin that the good and bad karma cannot be weighed in a balance to have the equality tested.[10] Further, what is the point in attempting to equalise the good and bad deeds ? If it be with the view to have the good and evil cancel each other, it is indeed a futile attempt for neither can the good deeds cancel the bad,

6. Ś.P. v. 86.
7. Ś.J.S. VIII. v. 27.
8. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 362.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Snk. Refutation of Śaivavāda.

nor this that.[11] These same criticisms prove equally disastrous to the second position that the equality denoted by the term applies to the merits and demerits of souls. For as the good and bad deeds cannot be weighed in a balance, so merits and demerits cannot be weighed in a balance, a process of evaluation which can work only in the case of tangible objects. Nor is there any other process of determining the equality or inequality of the good and bad. Further, the law of karma does not permit the good and bad to cancel each other.

In attempting to see the significance which the term has for the Siddhāntin, it is necessary to note that according to him, it is not only the actions that matter, but also the desires and aversions which the soul has for its pleasant and unpleasant experiences; in fact it is the desires and aversions that help to bring about karma.[12] This points to the necessity of the soul being cleansed of its desires and aversions. The soul in the course of its births and deaths realises that it is not only the painful experiences that it should shun, but even the pleasant ones, for the pleasures brought by these are so short-lived that when exhausted, their absence causes pain. The final result of these experiences is that the soul ceases to entertain desires and aversions, and experiences a state of calm in which it can look on with quiet indifference on the attractive and non-attractive things of the world so that whether it is a piece of gold or a piece of potsherd that comes up before its view, it causes no unrest to the soul.[13] It is this more fundamental state of being equally unmoved by either desires or aversions for the experiences of the world that is meant by iruviṉaioppu. The ground for maintaining this more profound view that iruviṉaioppu denotes the soul's equally indifferent attitude to both good and bad deeds is that if iruviṉaioppu were considered not to concern the soul vitally,

11. Ś.P. v. 31.
12. Ś.P. v. 30.
13. F.D.G. Commentator's notes to chapter VI. v. 1., pp. 74-75.

then it could not be a means to release.[14] As malaparipāka and śaktinipāta are stages indicated by the condition of the soul, so iruviṉaioppu is also a state indicated by the condition of the soul.[15] It is the state of the soul and not the state of the deeds or merits and demerits that comes into question where iruviṉaioppu is concerned.[16] The soul has changed its attitude, and none of the things of the world can commend itself to the soul.

This state of disinclination for both good and bad deeds or iruviṉaioppu results in malaparipāka, which is the state when the power of mala is crushed so that it can no longer delude the soul into seeking experiences of the world, and when ripe, it is ready to be shed. A further definition given of malaparipāka is the conjoining of mala with the means that will crush its śakti.[17] Simultaneously with the undermining of mala, another phenomenon takes place, and this is the process of śaktinipāta or the gradual conversion of tirodhāyi, which hitherto seemed stern, into aruḷ śakti.[18] Śaktinipāta and with it malaparipāka take place in the four stages of : mandatara, manda, tīvra, and tīvratara.[19]

As souls advance from one stage to the other, mala decreases more than in the previous stage, and aruḷ śakti comes to abide in the soul in greater measure than in the preceding stage until in the final stage, mala disappears completely.[20] As noted on previous occasions, in śaktinipāta or the descent of grace, the soul does not come to possess śakti, which it did not have before ; but it is the indwelling grace

14. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 362.
15. Ś.J.B. Mā : pp. 362-363.
16. F.D.G. Commentary to chap. VI, v. 1. p. 75.
17. Ś.J.B. Mā. p. 362.
18. Ś.P. v. 48.
19. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 361.
20. Ś.J.S. Commentary to VIII, v. 2. pp. 333-334.

that now definitely manifests itself while simultaneously changing its action, so that while until now it performed the fourth work of concealment, it now fulfils the fifth work of enlightenment or release.[21]

When souls turn away from the vanities of the world, seeking the things of the spirit, the tattvas are no longer necessary, for these do not enable them to secure what they long to have. The tattvas have no doubt been indispensable to them until now; for, putting the soul into contact with the outer world, they have made it possible for it to learn its true nature. Further, endless embodiments have made it possible for the soul to wipe out its karma accumulated in the process of experiencing the world.[22] But now that the soul is to have experience not of asat but of sat, the tattvas withdraw themselves. The supreme, being beyond the reach of the tattvas, can be had by no other means than divine grace.[23] As the eye standing between the object and the soul, enables this to know that, so divine grace standing between God and the soul enables the one to know the other.[24] Hence, as bearers of the fire-brand hold it forth and stand behind it, so should the soul desiring to see Śiva give a prominent place to divine grace and stand behind it.[25] As brightness cannot exist without its source, the sun, so divine grace does not exist without God;[26] and as the bright rays dispelling darkness reveal the sun, so grace dispelling mala leads the soul to Śiva.[27]

Giving up the senses alone does not lead to mukti, for in that case, the eggs of fishes and of fowls, for instance, being without karaṇas, ought to be in enjoyment of mukti; and if the isolation of the soul from the senses should be considered mukti, then those that are asleep or in swoons should be con-

21. Also see Schomerus pp. 283-284.
22. Ś.J.S. II. v. 79.
23. F.D.G. VII. v. 9.
24. F.D.G. VI. v. 6.
25. F.D.G. VII. v. 8.
26. Ś.P. v. 74.
27. Ś.P. v. 75.

sidered to have attained mukti.[28] Such a negative condition is not the prospect offered to a soul that is asked to renounce the senses. It should not be considered that with giving up the senses, and with having to turn within oneself, one gives up all that can give joy to man.[29] A giving up of the senses does not lead to an existence that is blank. The aruḷ śakti that now takes the place of the discarded senses, leads the soul to the supreme sat as the senses lead the soul to gross asat. In order to attain the desired result of the bliss of mukti, the soul should surrender itself completely to śakti; and this of course necessitates that the soul should experience the profound depths of humility giving up all conceit of self. This removes all obstructions that could stand in the way of śakti, which therefore is free to work on the soul its full effects. When all the distractions lose their hold on the soul, and only śakti influences it, the soul comes to think of, desire, and act for Śiva only, as a photographic plate registers not a blur, but a well defined image when the light from unwanted objects is excluded, and the rays only from the object desired to be photographed fall on the plate.[30] This unreserved surrender on the part of the soul to śakti, and consequently to Śiva, is the inevitable result of śaktinipāta.

The soul which has experienced iruviṉaioppu, malaparipāka and śaktinipāta now enters the jñāna marga where it receives from the guru the true knowledge that will lead to release. This constitutes the śuddha avasthā, a state of aruḷ in opposition to the kevala avasthā, a state of darkness or iruḷ, and to the sakala avasthā, a state of confused knowledge called maruḷ.[31] The soul in kevala avasthā stands under the lordship of āṇava; in the sakala under the influence of the three-fold mala and that of Śiva; in śuddha avasthā it stands wholly under the influence of Śiva. The śuddha avasthā is distinguished from the kevala avasthā as the

28. Ś.J.S. IX. v. 3.
29. Schomerus, p. 314.
30. Schomerus, p. 315.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

bright day is distinguished from the dark night, and from sakala avasthā as the bright day from the dawn.[32] Other names for the śuddha avasthā are sanmārga and jñāna mārga ; this is the consummation of the caryā, kriyā and yoga stages. The śuddha avasthā signifies not, as the description indicates, a state of being pure, but chiefly the state of becoming pure. The pure being forms the end of the śuddha avasthā, and bears the special name of mukti or mōkṣa.[33]

When souls enter the jñāna stage, they are ready for direct help from God. And if now, distinguishing themselves from the material world, they concentrate on their likeness to God thinking, 'I am He', then at this point God appears to them[34] for their further enlightenment and happiness. He that thus manifests Himself is the indwelling grace.[35] He reveals Himself only to souls that are prepared to receive Him, even as the sun opens only the lotuses that are mature enough to burst into bloom.[36] His appearance to those not ready for Him would be in vain, because, being engrossed in worldly pleasures, and being without the true organ of knowledge, and having only a darkened intelligence, they are unable to perceive their Lord.[37]

The revelation of Himself to different souls is not granted to all in the same form. According as they are more or less advanced in spiritual life, He reveals Himself differently. To the sakalas (having three malas), He appears in human form ; to the praḷayā-'kalas (having karma and āṇava), He appears in a divine form ; and to the vijñānā-'kalas, He appears in their own intelligence so that they find the divine light in themselves by intuition.[38] The sakalas, praḷayā-'kalas and vijñāna-'kalas all have the termination "kalas" to indicate

32. Schomerus, p. 289.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 285.
34. Ś.J.S. IX. v. 7.
35. F.D.G. chap. V. v. 1.
36. Ś.J.S. XI, v. 8 ; Ś.J.B. XI, argt. 2. v. 1.
37. F.D.G. chap. V. v. 4.
38. Ś.J.B. VIII. argt. 2. v. 1 ; F.D.G. chap. V. v. 8.

their relation to kalā. Sakalas are the souls associated with kalā. Praḷayā-'kalas have the kalās removed in praḷaya. Vijñānā-'kalas have theirs removed by vijñāna or great wisdom. These have only āṇava mala and in order to instruct them to get rid of it, Śiva appears in their own intelligence. For the purpose of instruction, bodies, worlds, etc., made out of kalā and other tattvas, are required. These are furnished by śuddha māyā. Receiving the instruction with the help of tattvas, the souls are yet not bound by kalā, etc., because of the vijñāna (or pati jñāna,) which is superior to pāśa jñāna or paśu jñāna and which they have come to possess. During praḷaya, Śiva appears to the praḷayā-'kalas in His divine form and instructs them so that after praḷaya they cease to have births. The organs, etc., used for the removal of mala are furnished by aśuddha māyā. The sakalas undergo births in between one praḷaya and another. Their organs, etc., are provided by aśuddha māyā.[39]

In appearing to the sakalas, Śiva does not assume any of the forms taken on by Him for purposes of creation, etc., or any of those taken on for the purpose of being worshipped, but the form of a human guru without all the insignia that indicate god-head to the eye.[40] His appearance as a human guru leads one to consider whether this appearance is analogous to an incarnation.[41] That this cannot possibly be the Siddhāntin's view is obvious for two reasons. One of the important points of difference between God and souls, one which is considered to constitute His superiority to them, is that whereas they are subject to births and deaths, that are caused by karma, God is not subject to this limitation. This position of the Siddhāntin is further confirmed by his violent attack on the Pāñcarātra, which believes in incarnation.[42]

39. Ś.J.S. Commentary to VIII, v. 2. pp. 332-333.
40. Schomerus p. 292.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 292.
42. Ś.J.S. Parapakṣa, Refutation of Pāñcarātri.

Incarnation, as the Siddhāntin points out, besides involving God in births and deaths which are due to karma, reduces Him to the level of the being as which He appears, so that if God should be born as a wild animal, He would kill animals and men who become His prey.[43] Even if He were to be born as a human being, He would be obliged to contaminate Himself with using a karmic body, and would be subject to the avasthās, etc., and to the experience of the fruits of karma.[44] The appearance of God to the sakalas is conceived to be of a very different order. Being omniscient, God can at His will, take on any form He pleases,[45] and the substance which constitutes His form is His own cit-śakti.[46]

It has been noted that the different forms which Śiva takes on for instructing the different classes of souls are the ones most appropriate for the respective classes of souls, which are not all on the same level of spiritual life.[47] The human form taken on by Him when presenting Himself to the sakalas, is used as a decoy to capture those ready for instruction, just as domesticated animals are used as decoys by the hunter for the capture of wild animals.[48] According to this analogy, we may conjecture that as some wild animals would run away at the sight of the hunter for fear of their lives, whereas the sight of domestic animals tempts them to approach, so the sight of God in all His glory and purity would fill the hearts of the sakalas with despair of approaching one who, because of His purity, is so far removed from them, whereas the appearance of a guru makes it easy for them to approach Him. It has also been suggested that at this stage of disillusionment regarding the world, the souls long for some

43. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Sautrāntika. vv. 5-6.
44. Snk. Refutation of Nimitta-kāraṇa-pariṇāmavādi.
45. Ś.P. v. 15 ; Ś.J.S. I, vv. 39 & 45.
46. Ś.J.S. I, v. 41.
47. Ś.J.B. VIII, argt. 2, v. 2.
48. F.D.G. chap. V, v. 5.

one who would quench their thirst for spiritual enlightenment. The guru is he who is most likely to capture their attention as one that is most likely to offer what they long to have. Should God take on any other form, it is likely that He will be passed over as some one of no consequence to them.[49]

The necessity of a guru cannot be disputed as it is through His instruction that the true significance of the śāstras can be made known.[50] For the knowledge of God, however, not all the existing sciences are of any use; it is He Himself that can teach the soul about Himself.[51] It is impossible for the soul to know of God without the help of God as it is impossible for the crystal to reflect without the sun.[52] As the instruments of knowledge know neither themselves nor the soul that guides them, so the soul knows neither itself nor Pati who directs it.[53] Hence, Śiva that dwells within the soul as imperceptibly as ākāśa in water, will not be known by the soul unless He manifests Himself to it.[54] Further, only God can make clean the mala-fettered soul as it is He that knows best the unhappy condition of the soul, even as the inmates of the house know best the complaints of the patient in the house.[55] The complete cleansing of the soul is not possible without Śiva appearing as guru, as the charming away of snake poison is not possible without the aid of a charmer.[56] Further the attempt to attain mukti with the aid of any one other than Śiva is like the blind submitting to be led by the blind, for the mukti that transcends all the tattvas can be reached only through the aid of Śiva, who is pure cit.[57] We may now conclude that the learning through Śiva Himself is the *conditio sine qua non* for the attainment of blessedness.[58]

49. Schomerus p. 301.
50. F.D.G. Chap. V. v. 6.
51. Ś.J.S. XII, v. 6.
52. Ś.J.S. VIII, v. 28.
53. Ś.J.S. IX, v. 5.
54. Ś.J.B. VIII. argt. 2. v. 3.
55. F.D.G. chap. V. v. 2.
56. F.D.G. chap. V. v. 7.
57. F.D.G. V. v. 9.
58. Schomerus p. 304.

In order to make the most of the guru's instruction, one should attend to it with concentration, reflect on what is taught, ascertain the truth of it, and fix that result so as to attain the state where Śiva can come to be in union with the soul.[59] From the guru's instruction the soul learns of its nature so that it can aspire to realise all its inherent possibilities. As the king's son misspent his time among the gipsies, so the soul has degraded itself by its association with the senses;[60] and as the king's son is unaware of his royal descent, so is the soul ignorant of its kinship with God. The soul that by the guru's instructions is led to realise its kinship with God, will hardly think of desiring its past life lived on a low plane. Having seen the light, it realises as never before the degraded condition of those subject to darkness. Thus not only does knowledge lead to the goal, but it enables one ever to abide there. As he who has experience of medicines, does not need to fear poison,[61] so he that has attained wisdom with the resulting bliss will not slip back into ignorance entailing misery. As a rider borne by a horse running fast, does not lose his hold of the reins, so the devotee will not lose his hold on God though assailed by the senses.[62] As the bounding waters of the river breaking its banks and reaching the ocean remain there always, so will the soul that has attained Śiva never more be parted from Him.[63] It becomes one with God.[64]

Though with enlightenment, the soul sets its mind on God, yet as it continues in the same environment, the luring pleasures of the world imperil the security of the soul in its high status. As the potter's wheel continues to move for some time even after the potter has removed his hand, as the pot continues to smell of asafoetida even after removal of the stuff,[65] as the moss gradually screens the water cleared for a time by a stone thrown into the pond,[66] so, as long as the dis-

59. Ś.P. p. 83.
60. Ś.J.S. VIII, v. 1.
61. Ś.J.S. X. v. 6.
62. Ś.J.B. X. argt. 2. v. 4.
63. Ś.J.S. VIII, v. 37.
64. *Ibid.*, v. 39.
65. *Ibid.*, X, v. 6.
66. *Ibid.*, VIII, v. 39.

ciple is embodied, he will be assailed by all the temptations that flesh is heir to. To be unmoved by these allurements, Śiva's sacred name should be repeated according to the guru's instructions.[67] The five letters are śi, vā, ya, na and ma ; and each of them stands for a particular concept ; thus śi stands for Śiva, vā for aruḷ, ya for soul, na for tirodhāyi, and ma for mala. The importance attached to these letters is due to their conveying the essence of the teachings of the sacred writings.[68] A repetition of the five letters brings before one's mind all the important teachings of the Scriptures concerning the five concepts for which the five letters stand. There are two orders in which the prayer of the five letters can be uttered. The order of śi-vā-ya-na-ma, gives precedence to Śiva and aruḷ and the second order of na-ma-śi-vā-ya makes supreme tirodhāyi and mala. This second variety of prayer is used by those attached to wordly pleasures. However, this does not help one to get rid of the power of āṇava.[69] When souls advance in spiritual life so that their minds are set on things eternal, then they should give up their old form of prayer which is not suited to this higher stage, and use the other variety which acknowleges the supremacy of Śiva and His śakti. This helps to do away with mala that causes births.[70] While using this prayer, souls should meditate on the troubles caused by āṇava, and the bliss experienced on attaining Śiva. When temptations recur for the soul, the teachings of this prayer are remembered and the temptations lose their force. As mala gradually departs, śakti which hitherto performed the function of concealing begins to reveal. With this change, tirodhāyi and āṇava disappear, and the five letters are reduced to the three of śakti, soul and Śiva.[71] Śakti leads the soul to the blissful experience of Śiva. The soul then loses itself in śakti, leaving

67. Ś.P. v. 90.
68. F.D.G. IX, v. 1.
69. F.D.G. IX. v. 5.
70. F.D.G. IX, v. 7.
71. F.D.G. Commentary to IX, v. 33, foot-note pp. 104-105.

only the two letters of Śi and vā. Finally, śakti together with the soul sinks in Śiva, so that ultimately, there is only Śi left.[72]

When the soul is established in jñāna samādhi, it becomes a jīvanmukta or a soul released even while embodied. According to the Siddhāntin, one need not wait for the hereafter to attain enlightenment and the consequent bliss. The cause of bondage is mala and when by jñāna its potency is destroyed, the soul attains its true self-hood. The ignorance that was the cause of misery gives place to the enlightenment that yields bliss. The soul is pure without blemish, and has no leanings towards anything unclean. It can perform any action except the five offices of God;[73] and this limitation is what constitutes the inferiority of the soul compared with God.

One need not belittle the jīvanmukta's condition in this life, for though having the same environment as the bound souls, he has an inward peace, joy and vision which the world can neither give nor take away. The environment being the same to the two souls, each makes a different reaction to it as each views it differently. The bound soul, on seeing the tempting things of this world, rushes to experience them; whereas, the released soul, noting their trifling value, pays no further heed to them. The bound soul is mastered by its various impulses to satisfy its lower self, while the jīvanmukta, however, being filled with devotion to the "Holy One", thinks only of the things of the spirit.

Strong in the strength of Śiva whose power is unlimited, the soul is lifted up above every limiting element. Āṇava, though existent, is ineffective, its power being broken.[74] Sañcita karma that causes endless births, is like a roasted seed, and has its fruitfulness destroyed by the sacred look of the guru; āgāmi karma is dispelled like darkness before light, and prārabdha karma that lasts as long as the body lasts, ceases at death along with the body. The joyful contemplation of Śiva

72. F.D.G. foot-note to IX, v. 8, p. 108; Ś.P. v. 92.
73. F.D.G. X, v. 2.
74. Ś.P. v. 88.

to the exclusion of everything else makes him forget these other things. As from the hands of those that fall asleep, the objects hitherto grasped tight fall off, so all the religious observances and regulations drop out of the lives of the jīvanmuktas.[75] The spontaneity that marked the devotee's childhood returns to him once more in his jīvanmukta state, so that no longer bound by restrictions and conventions, he lives in an atmosphere of freedom, joyfully conscious of a developed personality.[76] His life is one of riotous joy. Joining the company of other jīvanmuktas, he spends his time in worship and praise, dance and song.

In studying the conditions of the jīvanmuktas, one meets with certain problems which must now be considered. The most obvious problem is why, if the jīvanmuktas are released souls, they should still continue their earthly life. In order to be freed from the fetter of karma, souls that discipline themselves in order to be loyal to the best in them, give up seeking the experiences of this world, except in so far as they must act in order to consume the remaining karma. In course of time, they reach a point when their sañcita (accumulated karma) both through its being consumed without being added to through several births, and through the guru's remission of the unripe sañcita, gets reduced, so that what yet remains of it can be exhausted in one life time. In the last of the births of the enlightened soul, the remaining sañcita is wiped out. When this begins to take effect, it becomes prārabdha karma (accumulated karma which has begun to take effect). Since prārabdha karma can only be wiped out by being consumed,[77] the soul still continues on earth until prārabdha is exhausted. At this point, the body is shed, and the soul goes through the death which leads not to another birth but to release.

The next problem we meet concerns the final disposal of the three-fold mala. Since complete release of all souls is not

75. Ś.P. v. 94.
76. Ś.J.S. XII, v. 1.
77. Ś.J.S. VIII, v. 10.

conceived of by the Siddhāntin he has no occasion to present his views concerning the final disposal of the malas. There is no reason why in agreement with the Siddhāntin the question should be dropped, since in the course of ages, release of all souls is not an unrealisable condition even in spite of formidable difficulties such as that "as fast as the clock of retribution runs down, it winds itself up again," with the consequence that the process of transmigration seems almost endless. When in spite of these conditions, general release is accomplished, māyā, karma and āṇava must exist under conditions different from those which prevailed while general release was in the process of being attained. The Siddhāntin's principle, that the existent cannot become non-existent, does not permit of the malas being reduced to nothing. Hence, the new conditions under which they would exist remain to be ascertained. Since during praḷaya, māyā reverts from the universe of changing forms to its primal condition of the formless cosmic stuff, the view that comes uppermost in one's mind in answer to the question is that similar conditions obtain during the world-rest that will not be broken by another creation.

The question of the disposal of karma is more complicated. As release is possible only when the soul lays down its burden of karma, the question arises as to what happens to the karma of the soul that is released. Inasmuch as the released soul is not exempted from consuming prārabdha karma, it will, according to the law of karma, necessarily incur āgāmi karma in the course of consuming its prārabdha karma. And unless something happened to break the cycle of events whereby the consuming of past karma leads to further karma, and so on *ad infinitum*, the soul could never be redeemed from births and deaths. The suggestion given to those desiring to emerge from this intolerable situation is that one should give up all conceit, and the false notion that it is the self that acts, and realise and acknowledge that Śiva is the author of all events. Should a soul that has been enlightened remember that the senses are not itself, that it is not responsible for their actions, and that it is itself the servant of Hara, then the actions of the

soul will not taint it.[77a] Whereas Śiva will make those that do not approach Him eat the fruits of their own karma,[78] He will take on Himself the responsibility for the deeds of those who acknowledge that through them God acts, and that actions aimed at them by others are also actuated by Śiva.[79] Those deeds performed by the jīvanmuktas and which Śiva takes on Himself are considered not to give rise to any further karma. They are like seeds that have not the power of germination. And the reason for their lacking this capacity to fructify is that they have been untainted by self-conceit on the part of the doer. Here at last seems to be a way out from what would otherwise be a closed circle of karma. Concerning similar efforts to modify the law of karma, it has been pointed out[80] how hard it is to accept the doctrine of karma in its entirety. The human spirit cannot but attempt to escape from such an iron cage.

What Śiva does with the remaining karma is a matter of conjecture, for no one definite view is offered by the sources. The suggestion that the good and bad deeds of the released are passed to those who did good and bad to him[81] must be rejected as contrary to the Siddhānta principle that the transference of karma from one soul to another is impossible. Niyati finds justification for its existence on the ground that it prevents souls from appropriating to themselves the merits that are not theirs, and hinders them from rejecting the demerits that should fall to their share. Because of this careful regulation, not one of all the experiences of a soul comes to it without being the consequence of the soul's past karma.[82] Moreover, as it is conceit that makes karma bear fruit for the future,[83] and as the karma in question that has been left unconsumed by released souls, being produced without such conceit, necessarily

77a. Ś.J.B. X, argt. 2, v. 1.
78. Ś.J.B. X, argt. 2, v. 2 ; Ś.J.S. X, v. 2.
79. Ś.J.S. X, v. 4.
80. C.H. p. 148.
81. Ś.J.S. X, v. 1.
82. Ś.P. v. 29.
83. Ś.P. v. 30.

lacks the power to bear fruit, there is no point in transferring this to any of the unreleased souls, since it will be as ineffective as the āṇava robbed of its potency is ineffective even though standing in conjunction with released souls. The view that this impaired karma sinks in māyā[84] is in keeping with the Siddhānta view that when not functioning, e.g., during praḷaya, karma abides in māyā.[85]

A further point to be noticed with regard to the law of karma is that after all it is not as inexorable as at first it seemed to be. Good actions were considered not to cancel bad ones, and the good or evil one did could not be transferred to another. And yet when considering how souls are ultimately free from karma, it is seen how the law of karma is put aside from operating when the guru thinks it meet to reduce considerably the sañcita karma of redeemed souls thereby obviating the necessity of endless births. It seems then as if karma depended on God not only for its functioning, but also for its manner of functioning, so that the sañcita karma that would normally lead to endless births, is robbed of its potency by the guru, as a seed loses its power of germination by being roasted.[86] This deviation can only be explained if karma is an expression of God's will, and not something extraneous that blindly and mechanically functions as long as its action is set going by Śiva. The Siddhāntin while readily admitting that the law of karma is God's own law, yet destroys the significance of this admission by saying that karma is a mala or matter that exists eternally apart from God. Moreover, being one of the three eternal elements of impurity or acit, it cannot be consistently thought at the same time that it is God's will. The discrepancy arises because the Siddhāntin shifts his ground; he maintains at one time that karma is a law or a principle, in which case it coincides with Śiva's will, while at another time he says that karma is a mala, or impurity that obscures souls and when not functioning finds a resting place in its substrate, māyā; in this latter case, it is something alien to Śiva as much

84. Ś.J.B. X, argt. 2, v. 3.
85. Ś.J.S. II, v. 40.
86. Ś.P. v. 89.

as āṇava is alien to Him ; the third basis on which karma is explained is that it consists of the good and bad deeds together with their fruits of merit and demerit. Wavering among these varied views he can give no consistent account as to why the law of karma at one time seems uncompromising, and at other times is seen to relax considerably. Nor yet does the Siddhāntin give a complete account of karma, for as one wonders at its origin, so one is left conjecturing as to what happens to it when it ceases to fetter the released soul.

In considering the disposal of āṇava again we meet with more than one view. One of these is that āṇava and the soul are disconnected as the husk is separated from the rice.[87] The other view is that no such dissociation takes place, but that the power of āṇava over the soul is overcome by Śiva-Śakti,[88] as darkness is overcome by light,[89] as poison is counteracted by medicine and as dirt in the muddy water is precipitated by the clearing nut.[90] The first view that the connection is destroyed forthwith raises the question as to what link connects āṇava and the soul, and if no link is admitted, how the two come to be in conjunction with each other. Either alternative leads to further difficulties. Should the existence of any link be conceded, then the felt need for a link to unite the soul and āṇava arises also in the case of uniting the link itself to āṇava on one side, and to the soul on the other, and so on endlessly. Further, the destruction of these links is contrary to the Siddhānta principle that nothing existent can become non-existent. The other alternative that no such connecting medium exists raises the problem of how the respective entities of cit and acit come to be in union. The second view that cit-śakti overpowers āṇava so that it loses its evil effect on the soul requires that cit-śakti should always be functioning in order to keep āṇava in subjection, for as darkness will re-appear when the light disappears, and as the dirt that subsided will rise again to pollute the water when the precipitating effect of the

87. Ś.J.S. XI, v. 6.
88. Ś.S.P. p. 60.
89. Ś.P. v. 88.
90. Ś.J.S. XI, v. 4.

clearing nut is lost, and as the effect of the poison will re-assert itself when the counteracting effect of the medicine weakens, so āṇava will exercise its power the moment the sway of śakti ceases. For unless the power of āṇava is destroyed, there is need for such perpetual control ; but, for such destruction, the Siddhāntin can give no sanction, as it would be in violent contradiction to his principle that what is, cannot not be. Moreover, the destruction of a capacity cannot be conceived without a corresponding destruction of the substrate. Should the power of āṇava persist, however, śakti needs to exercise its role too. But in mukti, śakti is considered to subside in Śiva. If so, how is āṇava controlled ? Also, how is mukti realised ?

The necessity for the release of souls arises because they are fettered by āṇava ; and release is conceived to be possible because the grace of Śiva is assumed to dwell in souls and to manifest itself at first as tirodhāyi and later as aruḷ. This position, however, bristles with various problems. The first of these, which has already been noted in another connection, is the problem of how āṇava, which is a mala can fetter the soul, which is pure spirit. Though the Siddhāntin realises that if the connection between the two be said to occur in time, the question would arise as to what occasioned such a connection, he fails to see that the theory of a beginningless association gives room for the question of how acit can be in association with cit. The second problem engendered by the above position, and which is also passed over, is how the śakti of Śiva changes from tirodhāyi to aruḷ śakti, so that from concealing the true nature of the world, it reveals the same. There is yet another difficulty. Owing to the concealment effected by tirodhāyi in co-operation with āṇava it is called a mala, in which case it should become acit. The defence that it is called a mala only by a figure of speech, as for a while it performs the same function as āṇava,[91] is not of much help. The śakti which dwells within the soul is either cit or acit. If it is cit, it must be made clear how it is enabled to act on āṇava, which

91. Ś.P. v. 20.

is acit. If it is acit like āṇava, then it can be of no help to the soul in attempting to reach Śiva, who is cit. It might, however, be claimed that the śakti of Śiva is neither cit nor acit, but cidacit, a kind of hybrid between cit and acit, which therefore serves as an intermediary to link God and soul. Even this compromise does not solve difficulties. There will be affinity between this and God to the extent that it is cit, but its acit nature will still be at variance with God, who is pure cit. If so, God and śakti cannot be identical in nature; and consequently, in mukti, śakti cannot sink back into God, at least to the extent that it is acit.

The process of effecting release requires that at a certain stage, God should take on the form of a guru and instruct souls. In bringing the infinite God into the world of space and time, the Siddhāntin feels the necessity for safe-guarding the absolute nature of God. With this intent, he rejects the idea of incarnation, which would subject God to births and deaths, and conceives of His coming into the world just at the time needed, and leaving when the needful is accomplished. The body taken on for the purpose is not the effect of karma, but one that is taken at His will and is constituted of His own cit-śakti. With all these precautions, however, to ensure the absolute power of God, in investing Him with a form which souls observing take for that of a guru, and in bringing Him into the world of space and time and change, where in conformity with the laws of the same, He conducts the various dīkṣās, the Siddhāntin lets God slip into those very finitising processes of change above which he at first attempted to place God by using cit-śakti and śuddha māyā as bolsters.

The view that the release of souls is due to the combined efforts of God and souls leads to the question of the respective shares which God and souls have in the matter. It is reasonable to expect the soul to shoulder the greater share of the responsibility in making good the opportunities for strife and victory in the moral realm. The actual situation, however, is the reverse of what one expects, so that the major part of the work

of effecting release rests with God rather than with man. The mala-bound soul is not even aware of its fettered state, and has no notion of its true self-hood. God who creates neither souls nor mala, finds the two linked togther. Out of His fatherly compassion for the soul, He resolves to achieve its freedom. He does for the soul all that it cannot do for itself. If mala is to be made powerless, the soul must undergo experiences through endless births ; and for this purpose, it needs bodies, worlds, objects of enjoyment etc. Though the primal matter is not created by God, yet it is He that gives form to the world. Though the nature of the body that the soul is to have is determined by karma, yet it is He that unites body and soul. Thus far, it is all purely the work of God. Once the soul endowed with icchā, kriyā and jñāna śaktis is embodied, it is capable of effort though even now it still continues to be a dependent being, so that God still has to continue His guidance and help to such an extent that He has the lion's share of the work in bringing about release. As long as the soul needs to acquaint itself with the external world, God provides it with the tattvas necessary for cognising the world. He also stands within the soul as the tirodhāyi śakti and makes it possible for it to experience the world. The soul is naturally intelligent ; yet it needs the help of Śiva to gain knowledge. When the soul is ready to gain knowledge of Śiva, it is He that instructs. Thus throughout its career, the soul has the help of God ; and His help counts for very much indeed.

All that the soul needs to do is to put forth the effort to better its condition. And so long as the soul is a self-conserving entity, it will necessarily put forth the effort necessary to better its condition. In its mad rush to experience the world, it almost seems impelled to do so under the double effect of āṇava and tirodhāyi. When finally it does turn towards the things of the spirit, it does so because even the pleasures of the world only bring pain in their wake. Opportunity for exercising its will seems to occur only when, having set its mind on higher things, the pull of the past seems so great that it feels tempted to turn back. In choosing to present a firm front

to the temptations of the world rather than yield to them, the soul does its part in bringing about its own release.

It is obvious from all this that the soul is like a reed shaken by the wind. This leads one to wonder why God does not by a mere command get the souls to shed their malas or so constitute them that at every stage, they will be automatically led to shed their impurities, instead of so patiently leading them step by step. The answer to this question is that God is so benevolent that He is unwilling to pass over the least chance for self-improvement that souls may have in themselves. He encourages the feeble will of the devotee until leaning on Him the soul is able to make a stand for itself. There is the type of great man who is self-asserting as well, and so dominates the situation that in his presence every other person feels small. There is the other type of individual who, forgetful of his greatness, encourages the self-expression of even the humblest person. God's greatness and benevolence combined lead Him to give due recognition even to the weak wills of His devotees.

The question arises as to whether this is not to finitise God. To the extent that God has to reckon with the individuals and to the extent that the working out of His purposes depends on the will of the individual, God is a limited being. If such limitation is sought to be done away with so that unlimited power can be assigned to God, the attempt can be accomplished only if the soul is reduced to an appearance. For so long as it exists as an independent individual, its will comes into conflict with that of God. When, however, instead of thus existing over against God and limiting Him, it is made into an element of the Absolute, then there remains no entity to give rise to any conflict of wills that would be a limitation of the power of God. In changing souls into appearance to magnify the power of God, however, we at the same time transform God into the Absolute. "Hence, short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and having reached that goal, He is lost, and religion with Him."[92]

92. A.R. p. 447.

CHAPTER VIII

RELEASE

The souls that, being disillusioned concerning the fleeting pleasures of the world, diligently seek the abiding bliss of things spiritual, ultimately attain what they strive to reach. The attainment of release or mukti follows with as great certainty as that the man, who has been swinging, necessarily reaches the ground when the cord of the swing gives way. The hindrance that shuts out the soul from mukti is āṇava, and the moment this is completely overcome by śiva-jñāna, the soul has experience of release. This view seems strange to those who consider release as the state to be attained on the termination of the last embodiment of the soul undergoing the process of transmigration. Accordingly, the jīvanmukta is considered to have a lower status than the released soul that has shed its body. In support of this view, the twelfth sūtra of the 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham' is considered to contain injunctions to the jīvanmuktas who are supposed to be still subject to vāsanāmala. This view, however, is not that of all Siddhāntins. Between jīvanmukti and final release, there is according to the Siddhānta no intervening stage where the soul has to undergo further preparation for the final state of release. Since jīvanmukti is the threshold to release, it is a state of a very high order. Souls cannot attain to this state unless they have been through preparation of the most rigorous kind. No imperfection of any kind can be tolerated in this state. It is free even of the taint of vāsanāmala. The last sūtra of the 'Śiva-jñāna-bōdham' does not give injunctions to those who have yet to attain release, for if it did so set forth the means to release, it would have been grouped under 'sādhanaviyal' or section dealing with the means of attaining release. Two considerations are said to have led to the composition of the last sūtra. There were some who wondered how the icchā, kriyā and jñāna śaktis of the released function. Others said

that the jīvanmuktas who are released souls, have no office to perform in this world. To meet these positions, the twelfth sūtra was written describing the life of the jīvanmuktas.[1] They are given to prayer, and meditation, to participation in the society of the bhaktas, and to worshipping śivaliṅgas. These are some of the fruits accruing to them in their state of release. The sūtra describing such fruits is grouped under 'payaniyal' or section describing the fruits of release. These facts further confirm the view of the Siddhānta that the jīvanmuktas are those who experience release even in this life.

Regarding this important state of release, which is considered to explain the offices of God, the strivings of the soul and the evolution of the worlds, there are but meagre accounts set forth by the Siddhāntin in his śāstras. However, he finds himself committed to express some views on mukti because he is stirred into doing so in attacking the views of mukti of alien schools that fall short of his own standard. From these refutations, however, one learns more of the negative aspects of his view than of its positive aspects. However, both in order to set forth his conception of mukti with reference to the views of other schools and in order to glean material on a topic concerning which he has very little to say elsewhere, it is necessary to consider his refutation of alien views of mukti.

The mukti of the Siddhāntin is as different from that of the Lōkāyata as day is from night. Whereas to the Lōkāyata, mukti consists in the enjoyment of the senses, to the other, mukti is a spiritual experience, for participation in which the soul needs to be cleansed of every taint of sense-attachment and illumined by divine grace. Whereas the Lōkāyata knows only the lusts of the flesh, the Siddhāntin by the continual refinement of his spiritual nature has experience of the joys of the spirit that, not cloying the soul, abide for ever giving supreme satisfaction and sweet contentment.[2]

1. Ś.J.B. Mā : pp. 429-430.
2. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Cārvāka. vv. 28-31.

The Buddhist nirvāṇa is considered to be attained by man on the annihilation of the five skandhas ; but, as the Siddhāntin points out, considering that the Buddhist believes that any individual jīva is made up only of the skandhas, when these are annihilated at death, there is no one to experience any bliss in the next life.[3] Nirvāṇa is a mere blank of non-existence attained by the destruction of the skandhas ; and this offers no satisfaction except that of ending suffering, which unfortunately is had only by curtailing existence. The Siddhāntin hopes not only for a cessation of pain, but also for an experience of pure and everlasting bliss. What man may look forward to is not a negation of existence, but an affirmation of that as well as of all moral values, and of the consequent bliss.

The Jaina theory of nirvāṇa is an improvement on the Sautrāntika view as there is not an escape from existence but only from bodily existence ; and moreover, besides cessation of pain, there is experience of a peaceful condition. The Siddhāntin while admitting these points, raises objections to the means of attaining release. While the Jaina is of opinion that the soul can achieve this by its own effort, the Siddhāntin feels that inasmuch as the soul is subject to the serious limitation of being mala-covered, it is as absurd for the soul to attempt to attain enlightenment and mukti purely by its effort as it is for the pot at the bottom of the well to attempt to reach the top all by itself.[4] Further, though the released, according to the Jaina, experience bliss in mukti, stress is not laid on this aspect as in the Siddhānta.

The atheistic Sāṅkhya like the Jaina believes that puruṣa can achieve his salvation without the help of God. But on its own assumptions, the necessity of God for the release of souls becomes obvious ; for if puruṣa is not self-luminous and prakṛti is insentient, how can even a co-operation of the two bring about the goal sought ? The Sāṅkhya lays great stress

3. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Sautrāntika. vv. 38-40.
4. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Jainism. v. 14.

on knowledge as being the means to release and in this respect, it accords with the Siddhānta ; yet in respect of the nature of the knowledge to be attained, the Sāṅkhya falls short of the Siddhānta, for the knowledge, which is considered to result in release, is the realisation on the part of puruṣa that it is not prakṛti, and this according to the Siddhānta is the second order of knowledge called 'paśu-jñāna' ; for release, one must progress further and attain 'pati-jñāna', whereby one learns one's kinship with God. For such a knowledge, the Sāṅkhya has no scope since, ruling out God, it rules out also pati-jñāna set forth by the Siddhāntin. Further, the mukti of the Sāṅkhya consisting in the isolation of puruṣa from prakṛti amounts merely to the negative condition of being freed from the senses, which souls must fulfil to attain the release of the Siddhāntin. The further stage, union with God, can find no place in the Sāṅkhya system as a consequence of its ruling out God.

The mukti of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is shown by the Siddhāntin to be transient. By ceremonials and sacrifices, one may attain the heaven of the gods, but the bliss of this region is only of short duration ; for when the merit that entitled one to this enjoyment is exhausted, one is again subject to births and deaths. The heaven of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is not the final and lasting state of mukti, but is merely a transitory stage in the career of souls. The real mukti is the blissful experience of Śiva, which when once won is ever retained.

The ekātmavādin's conception of mukti is based on the view that the ātmā is one with Brahman, and that the limiting adjunct of avidyā makes it appear to be different from it and to have an individuality of its own. When avidyā is dispelled, then the soul realises its oneness with Brahman. In mukti, the soul becomes one with God. The Siddhāntin though maintaining that God and soul are both intelligence, yet does not take up the extreme position that the ātmā is the paramātmā. God and soul are on different levels both in bondage and release. In bondage, the soul is rendered ignorant because of its association with āṇava ; it undergoes the avasthās and is

subject to births and deaths. God, on the other hand, who is the luminous intelligence itself, is lifted up above every change, and limiting condition. In release, in which the soul is cleansed from impurities, so that it can attain its fullest development, the soul still continues in its lower status, so that whereas God is the supreme king, the soul is the lover of the foot of Hara, and can never rise to fulfilling the five offices peculiar to Śiva; and whereas Śiva is bliss itself, the soul is merely capable of enjoying the bliss of Śiva. As the soul, which is always inferior to Śiva is a separate entity that is eternal, the Siddhāntin cannot agree that in mukti there can be any destruction of the individuality of the soul. Nor yet can he accept the view that as water loses itself in water, so the soul loses itself in God, for this would mean that God and soul become identical in nature.[5]

Whereas the Māyāvādin maintains that Brahman is the only real, and all plurality is an appearance due to avidyā, the Pāñcarātra, Vāma, and Bhairava systems maintain that the plural universe of souls and of material things, instead of being an appearance of the one, is an actual transformation of God. The soul, according to this view, instead of being an eternal entity becomes a phenomenal manifestation of the non-manifest; and release for the soul consists in its becoming non-manifest again or losing itself in the substrate. This is opposed to the Siddhānta view in that it denies eternality and individuality to the soul. Morever, since the manifest and non-manifest are of the same nature and different only with regard to form, God and soul are the same, and in mukti, the soul loses itself in God. This view denies the difference that the Siddhānta postulates between God and soul.

The other schools which similarly ignore any difference between God and soul in mukti are Pāśupata, Mahāvrata, Kāpāla and Śivādvaita. As a consequence of God and soul becoming equal in mukti, the soul is considered to perform all

5. Ś.J.S. XI, v. 9.

the five functions of Śiva. The analogy used by the Pāśupata to illustrate this point is that as a father determining to become a hermit entrusts all his duties as a householder to his son, so God entrusts His function to the soul on its attaining mukti.[6] The analogy used by the Śivasamavādin is that as the little green worm by contemplating its captor, the wasp, ultimately becomes a wasp, so the soul by its meditation of Śiva grows to be like Him, and is able to perform all His offices.[7] The Siddhāntin, in criticising this analogy, concentrates on petty and irrelevant points, and misses the real point of weakness. He shows that this analogy is not appropriate, for as the guru gives instruction to the soul, the wasp does not capture the worm to give instruction to it. The real point of weakness of these analogies is that they assume what they need to prove—that the soul has the potential capacity to become like God, and that this capacity merely needs to be developed, as the son has the potential capacity of becoming as efficient as the father, and as the larvae of the wasp have the potential capacity to do all that the wasp can do. The Siddhāntin, on the other hand, holds that the soul even on attaining its fullest development cannot become like God because of the important point of difference between the two intelligences, one being prone to being polluted by āṅava, and the other not subject to this defect.[8] Of course, the Siddhāntin has no answer to the question why the intelligence of the soul is thus inferior to that of God so that whereas this is free of danger from āṇava, the other is not.[9] He can no more account for

6. Ś.J.B. Ck. p. 26.

7. Snk. Statement of Śivasamavādi. It was not known in those days that the green worm was captured not in order that it might take on the form of the wasp, but to serve as food for the young of the wasp; and what finally came out of the nest was not the green worm, but the young of the wasp which coming out of the eggs feed on the green worms provided as food, and leave the nest when grown into little wasps.

8. Ś.S.P. p. 61.

9. *Ibid.*

one intelligence being smaller than the other than he can account for the existence of the three substances; the nature of these seems to be as much given to him as their existence. Though he gives up in despair the problem of why the soul is inferior to God, yet he starts with the fact that in bondage the soul is inferior to God, and proceeds to say that the soul retains its dependent nature even in mukti; for unless flowers can grow in the sky, the dependent nature of the soul cannot be replaced by independence. As a man both blind and dumb, when possessed of a demon, can give expression to the powers of the demon through every channel of expression other than his tongue and eyes, so also a small intelligence when cleansed of impurities obscuring it, can exercise its powers to the maximum capacity ; this, however, can never equal the maximum capacity of a great intelligence. The same principle is illustrated by the fact that a measure even when filled to the brim cannot vie with the capacity of the ocean and contain all the water of the ocean. Similarly, boiling water, which has as much heat as the fire itself, cannot reduce anything to ashes as fire can do. These differences in the functioning of the substances must persist so long as there are differences in the nature of the substances themselves. Hence, if the Śivasamavādin is to gain credence for his view that the soul can perform the five functions of God in mukti, he must prove that there is no difference between the natures of God and soul.

There is not as much difference between the Siddhāntin's position and that of the Bhedavādin as one is led to think by the Siddhāntin's criticisms of his opponent. The position of the Bhedavādin is that the mala-fettered soul is inferior to Śiva. Being eternal, it persists in mukti, and being inferior to Śiva, it is a being different from Him. So far, there is agreement between the two schools. The point of divergence comes in when the Siddhāntin goes further and says that in spite of the difference, there is also union between God and soul in mukti. The points of contact noted above, however, are completely lost sight of by the Siddhāntin in his vehement attack on the Bhedavādin's analogy. The Bhedavādin means to say that the soul gets rid of its impurities as copper gets cleansed of its

verdigris. The Siddhāntin distorts the analogy to mean that the copper when chemically purified becomes gold, and that, according to this, the soul should become God, in which case, the bheda which the Bhedavādin seeks to maintain between God and the soul vanishes. This rendering of the analogy does not do justice to the Bhedavādin who merely says that as copper becomes bright on being purified, so the soul is better for being rid of impurities.[10]

The Siddhāntin is more discreet in his criticism of the Aikyavādin, and points out how on the assumption that māyā attaches itself to the soul at an intermediate stage, the soul should experience the bliss of mukti before māyā came to obscure it; and that if at one time, māyā thus conjoined itself to the soul without any reason, there is nothing to prevent a similar occurrence in mukti. Further, the analogy that in mukti soul and God unite to become one as water joins water, is shown to be based on the two assumptions that God and soul are of the same nature, and that the two entities unite to become one, both of which postulates are shown to be absurd.[11]

The Pāṣāṇavādin of the innermost school agrees with the Siddhāntin in maintaining that the bondage of souls is due to mala; but in his eagerness to get rid of the evil, he loses sight of the resulting advantages of bliss, all-pervasiveness etc., on which the Siddhāntin is as intent as on ousting the cause of bondage. The result is that the Pāṣāṇavādin's account of mukti is one-sided and negative compared with that of the Siddhāntin. Mukti consists merely in being free from mala without the positive blessings of enlightenment and bliss. In short, the condition of the soul in this state may be compared to that of a stone which is unconscious and inactive. Comparing this view with that of the Siddhāntin, one may say that excepting for the mala-free condition of the soul, it is in all other respects not to be distinguished from the soul in the Siddhāntin's kevala avasthā.

10. Snk. Refutation of Bhedavādin.
11. Snk. Refutation of Aikyavādin.

The points concerning which there is most agreement between the Siddhāntin and the majority of the alien systems are the negative aspects of mukti. The bondage of the soul is due to its association with impurity which brings in its train a series of evils. It causes ignorance, and ignorance leads to births and this leads to suffering. The release of the soul is attained when the soul, cleansed from its impurities, is *ipso facto* freed of the resulting evils of ignorance, birth and suffering.

The positive aspects of the Siddhāntin's mukti, however, make for a considerable difference between his position and those of alien schools. According to such schools as the Pāṣāṇavāda, the soul is so worn out by its trials in life that it is happy enough to look forward to a mere cessation of suffering. Accordingly, mukti is conceived of as a state in which the soul exists, but does not meet with suffering. No elements of value characterise this state which is, therefore, treated with contempt by the Siddhāntin. Mere existence though painless is not a thing to be coveted; if it were desirable, one might ask to be a stone that, experiencing no pain, continues to exist through the ages. An intelligent soul that has chosen virtue in preference to vice, future happiness in preference to immediate pleasures, and the high ideal of realisation of the highest self in preference to the low aim of satisfying the flesh, cannot possibly accept this for the goal of all its aspirations. As a blind man, if blest with sight, would long to experience the blessings of sight, and as a prisoner, if set free, would long to taste the privileges of freedom, so the soul on having its limitations dispelled, would long to realise the powers that are its birth-right.

Shedding its body for which there is now no use, the soul becomes all-pervasive. One should consider that the soul being intelligent, the natural corollary of its omnipresence would be its omniscience as well. On overcoming the three malas and attaining mukti, the small intelligence of the soul

is replaced by a larger one.[12] But is the intelligence of the soul augmented and refined until it becomes omniscient ? The Śivasamavādin owns this as his position, and for this reason incurs criticism at the hands of the Siddhāntin, who has a different answer to the question. Even in mukti, when the power of āṇava is overcome, the soul cannot become omniscient like Śiva because there is a radical difference between the two intelligences. The vital point that marks off the one intelligence from the other is that whereas the intelligence of the soul is prone to being covered by mala, the intelligence of God is never at any time exposed to such a peril.[13] There is then a difference in nature between the two intelligences justifying the discrimination of them into the subtle intelligence of Śiva and the gross intelligence of the soul.[14] It is this persistent gross nature that makes for the intelligence of the soul being on a level lower than the intelligence of God. As a measure though immersed deep into the sea, can contain no more of the sea-water than its small capacity will allow, so the intelligence of the soul, even when rid of all impurities, can only rank below omniscience. As an eye that is cured of blindness is yet dependent on the light of the sun to perceive objects, so the intelligence of the soul even when freed of impurities, depends on the intelligence of Śiva in order to know.[15] In thus noting the inferiority of the intelligence of the soul to that of God, it must also be noted that in mukti the intelligence of the soul is inferior only to that of God. It has knowledge of the three padārthas, and also of its kinship with God.

Mukti has yet further gifts in store for the soul. Rest, peace and bliss that are subject to no change, are some of the blessings of inestimable worth, which the soul experiences. The wearying round of births and deaths is over, and the soul has at last reached the long-sought-for haven of rest and peace ; and here it will abide for ever, for unlike the svargas,

12. Ś.J.S. IV, v. 40.
13. Ś.S.P. p. 61.
14. Ś.J.B. Cu. pp. 28-29.
15. *Ibid.*

which have their day of decline, mukti endures without end. Śiva with whom the soul unites is the source of bliss, and in communing with Him, the soul experiences bliss[16] that cannot be equalled for its purity, loftiness and permanence.

This review of the positive and negative aspects of the mukti experienced by the soul, leads one to wonder at the status of the soul in mukti with reference to that of God. That it cannot be one of equality with God appears from what was already noted. Added to this is the further limitation that the five offices of creation, etc., are above the capacities of the soul, and remain therefore the exclusive work of God. In this respect, the soul is no son and heir of God as the Śiva-samavādin thinks. Further, the soul's dependence on God even in mukti is seen from the fact that for its experience of bliss in this state, the soul looks to God. Śiva is ānanda, and to have experience of this, the soul waits on God. Śiva is the source of bliss, and the soul, the experiencer of it.

Some of the schools that have ruled out the experience of bliss from their conceptions of mukti have done so on the assumption that for any experience of happiness a body is required, and since, in mukti, the soul is disembodied, it can have no enjoyment. To the Siddhāntin, however, the non-existence of a body in mukti presents no difficulty at all as the enjoyment he conceives of is not the type that the Lōkāyata commends, and for which a body is indispensable, but an enjoyment which, being of the spirit, is so exalted above every taint of matter that a body is unnecessary. The body is brought into being and is bestowed on the soul for the removal of āṇava; and when āṇava is removed, the task for which the body was intended being fulfilled, it becomes superfluous to the soul. Hence, on entering mukti, the soul must necessarily discard the body.

For the experience of bliss, of which Śiva is the source, the soul must necessarily come into some kind of contact with Śiva.

16. Ś.P. v. 93.

In his attempt to define his position regarding the nature of union between God and soul in mukti, the Siddhāntin attacks those views that differ from his. The Advaita view of the jīva, which was all along Brahman, becoming one with Brahman on casting off avidyā, is opposed to the Siddhānta view that God and soul are not of the same nature.[17] This view of mukti is criticised on the ground that if the jīva and Brahman are one, there is no need for them to become one.[18] The view that the two entities, God and soul, become one in mukti would be possible only if one of the two perished, so as to allow one to survive as the result of the union.[19] If it be said that the entities do not come together even in mukti, then there is no sense in speaking of a union, or of the soul experiencing the bliss of God.[20]

Proceeding to define his own position, the Siddhāntin says that as in bondage, the soul is in union with āṇava, without either the one or the other being destroyed, so in mukti God and soul are in close union. It is an advaita union of two in one as obtains in the word, 'tāḍalai', which is neither two separate words, nor one word, being composed of the words of 'tāḷ' and 'talai'. As this is an example of two in one, so is mukti a union of two in one.[21] It cannot be objected that in consequence, one gets neither Śiva nor soul, but a compound that is a result of the union. Such a compound would be a substance that has the characteristics of neither of its elements. If this were the result of the union of God and soul, we should be left with a being having the characteristics of neither the soul nor God. The mukti union, however, obliterates neither the nature of God nor that of the soul. God remains the supreme being and the soul His humble devotee.

17. Ś.P. v. 87.
18. F.D.G. VIII, v. 5.
19. Ś.P. v. 87.
20. Ś.P. v. 87 ; F.D.G. VIII, v. 5.
21. F.D.G. VIII, v. 4, also Commentator's notes ; 'tāḷ' and 'talai' are the feet of Śiva and the head of the devotee respectively.

Neither the being of God or soul, nor the nature of either perishes. It is a mysterious communion of each with the other, without prejudice to their existence or nature, so that both God and the soul exist, while God is the giver and the soul the recipient of eternal bliss. They are neither two substances nor one, but a two in one.[22]

Of the bliss that this mysterious union leads to, no estimate can be given in words as it is past all description; experience alone can make one realise its nature. The reason for this experience being indescribable lies in the nature of the union between Śiva and the soul, who exist not as separate beings, but as two in one. As it is difficult to determine the nature of knower, known and knowledge when they unite, whereas they are easy of analysis when standing outside the conjunction, so the nature of Śiva and the soul may be determined when they exist apart, but the complex experience that arises due to their union defies any analysis.[23] The soul, the subject, which is the experiencer, is so fully one with Śiva, the object experienced, that for experiencing Śiva an act is no longer necessary on the part of the soul. The knower, known and knowledge, which in the time of bondage stood over against one another as the three substances of a triad, come together so close in release that they appear as one point. As long as subject and object stood against each other, it was possible to notice the effect of one on the other; but when in mukti, subject and object appear as one, and a change is no longer noticeable, then a describing of the same and a depicting of the effect of one on the other are no longer possible.[24]

Such a union of two in one is mysterious, especially considering that the union is said to be intimate and yet to leave intact the integrity of the two entities that participate in the union. With a view to explain this strange situation analogies are used. But these, as will be pointed out, still leave the problem unsolved or are difficult in themselves. The union of two

22. F.D.G. VIII, v. 5.
23. F.D.G. VIII, v. 9.
24. Schomerus p. 406.

in one is compared to that of the elements in the word, 'tāḍalai'. This word is said to be a combination of two in one, for the words 'tāḷ' and 'talai' are here combined to form the word, 'tāḍalai', which is neither one word nor two, but a two-in-one combination. The transformation of 'tāḷ' and 'talai' into 'tāḍalai' is in accordance with certain rules of Tamil grammar. The changes that occur are the conversion of the first letter 't' of the second word (talai) into 'ḍ' and the disappearance of the last letter of the first word (ḷ of tāḷ). The first change of 't' to 'ḍ' is due to the rule that 't' succeeding 'ḷ' becomes 'ṭ' (pronounced in the present context as 'ḍ') because of the proximity of 'ḷ' in 'tāḷ'. The second change, the disppearance of the last letter 'ḷ' in the first word, is due to the rule that final 'ḷ' when not preceded by a short vowel loses itself, after having induced change in a succeeding 't'; thus the 'ḷ' of 'tāḷ' is lost, and the resulting compound word is 'tāḍalai'.

The Siddhāntin would apply the analogy to the problem of mukti union on some such lines as follows. The change in the soul represented by 'talai' is only partial because though 't' becomes 'ḍ', 'lai' remains as it is. The soul, similarly, undergoes change in part, and in part remains unaffected. The changes to which it is subject are that from the state of bondage it has attained to that of freedom, and from knowing through pāśa and paśu jñāna, to knowing through pati jñāna. The aspect of the soul which transcends the change is its essence as a dependent being taking on the nature of what is proximate. The loss in 'tāḷ' representing Śiva is only apparent, for in truth, it is only a merger. The two components of that word may stand for Śiva and aruḷ śakti. The latter has to appear and to function until the release of the jīva is accomplished, and when this is done it merges into Śiva, a process symbolised by the vanishing of 'ḷ'.

The solution, which the analogy is considered to offer is only apparent. The analogy passes over the question of how the jīva, a single entity can be the substrate of change and

changelessness at the same time, and also how the mukti union leaves room for God to be exalted above the transience overwhelming the soul with which God is in intimate union.

The analogy of āṇava and the soul has already, in another connection, been noted to be defective. It is not clear how āṇava and the soul, being of opposite natures, come to be together. The assumption of a beginningless association is no whit effective in dispelling the persistent question. If the union between the two is of a saṃyoga kind, then a connecting medium is required to bring about such an external connection. A samavāya union is highly prejudicial to the integrity of the entities concerned in the union. It is this analogy, which in itself is not sound, that is used by the Siddhāntin to explain the mukti union between God and soul.

If any service is rendered by these analogies, it is that of intensifying one's wonder as to the conceivability of the mukti union. The mystic union is considered to make possible a union between two spiritual selves and to conserve their individualities. Investigation of the case reveals, however, that a participation of the entities in the union at once makes them participate also in a process of change. A withholding from such a communion is also a withholding of the process of union from coming into being. Thus the mukti union takes the Siddhāntin between the two horns of a dilemma. He may either advance the mukti union, and in that case, he must give up his notion of God and soul being eternal entities, or he may preserve the eternality of souls, and in that case, give up his mukti union. The two alternatives together are impossible of realisation.

In his eagerness to hold to the immutability of God, the Siddhāntin lands himself in a further difficulty. In giving his reason for the bliss of mukti being beyond description, he points out that the mukti union is so intimate that the relation between the two entities is impossible to be determined. On the basis of this ignorance of the conditions obtaining between God and soul he asserts that the mukti union leaves

God immutable.[25] This is an instance of his eagerness to make God absolute. It has been noticed above that so long as the relation between God and soul in mukti is conceived to be brought about by a process of communion, the absolute nature of God necessarily suffers compromise. Should he desire a mukti union between God and soul where the absolute nature of God could also obtain, he should acknowledge the soul to be the appearance to which he has been noted to reduce it, and exalt God to the absolute to which status God must necessarily rise, if He is to have all the attributes with which the Siddhāntin would invest Him ; and the relation between the two entities must be conceived as one of reality and appearance.

Since mukti is the final state attained by the soul and the Siddhāntin closes his system with release as his last theme, some of the points not dealt by him up to this press for comment. The various religious rites and ethical principles thought to bring about release, have been considered. Among these, there is no mention of the duties that any one should fulfil to companion souls. This omission gives room for the criticism that social ethics finds no place in the Siddhānta, and that each individual beyond caring for his own salvation does not concern himself with what happens to his fellowmen.[26] The omission of this point cannot, however, be construed to mean that the Siddhānta does not encourage individuals to think beyond themselves. Social ethics obtains in the practical life of the Hindu. The philosophical works are primarily intended as an answer to criticisms made by rival systems so that all the points raised by their opponents are met. The question of a man's obligations to his fellow-beings, however, was not a point of contention between the various schools, but rather a point on which all were agreed. The practice of such duties was so much a part of their social and religious custom that it was

25. In this connection, see also Schomerus, p. 386.
26. Schomerus, p. 420.

taken for granted. There being no dispute over this, it does not come up for discussion or presentation in the writings. The hospitality of the East and its charity which are some of the virtues engendered by social ethics, are too proverbially known to require further mention.

A further criticism incurred by the Siddhāntin is that he does not follow up the logical results of his various postulates, and that, therefore, his system lacks the finish implied in his assumptions. For however long a time it may take for some souls to attain the goal, and however innumerable may be the souls to attain the goal, the time must come when all souls will be released. And as the world has for its purpose the release of souls, a time will come when, transmigration being over, the universe will be no longer necessary. One therefore expects a theory of last things, for which one seeks in vain.[27] By way of accounting for this omission, it has been said that, perhaps, the Siddhānta writers considered it impossible that the process of transmigration, which is beginningless, could have an end, considering that there are innumerable souls and that the process which each soul has to go through is so long. Perhaps also the practical unthinkability of an end quelled all efforts to follow the logical conclusion of their theory. If, in accordance with the view that what is beginningless is also endless, transmigration is thought to be endless, then transmigration will go on even after release is accomplished, and this is an absurd conclusion contrary to the Siddhāntin's principle that transmigration is for the sake of the release of souls. The general release of souls cannot be regarded as unattainable because though souls are great in number, their number is not increased by any process of multiplication; through all eternity there is neither increase nor decrease in the number of souls; hence, the release of all souls must some time be attained. If transmigration is to continue even after the release of souls, then it must be assigned a goal other than that of serving the release of souls.

27. Schomerus, p. 421.

It is perhaps these and other difficulties that account for the Siddhāntin fighting shy of arriving at a definite view.[28]

Another such omission is with regard to whether the Siddhāntin considers it impossible for souls consistently to choose to follow evil throughout their manifold births and deaths so that ultimately, they come to deserve eternal hell, as souls that have followed the good throughout come to merit mukti. There is no definite statement of the Siddhāntin's view on this point. But the implication of his theory seems to be that such souls that accumulate evil karma, will have the penalty of continuing to be subject to transmigration as long as they continue to choose evil. Transmigration is, as it were, a school for disciplining the soul to learn that evil leads to bondage and misery, and good to release and happiness ; and as long as any soul by means of its experience has not learnt the lessons pertaining to the stage of transmigration, it cannot transcend saṃsāra but should continue therein until such time as its ignorance yields place to knowledge. Moreover, there is also the implication in the Siddhānta system that though the evils of this world are very alluring so that souls love to have experience of them, yet in the long run, souls are bound to learn that these attractive things have their limitations, and that they cannot possibly offer abiding satisfaction which alone will content souls. Some souls may take longer than others to learn this lesson, yet every soul is bound to learn it in the end ; for release is the birth-right of the soul, even as king-ship is the birth-right of the prince brought up by the gipsies. So ultimately, there seems only one way for souls, and that is that from transmigration, short or long as the case may be, they press towards release. Eternal hell seems ruled out ; and such a ruling out, whether conscious or unconscious, is considered to be[29] all to the credit of the Siddhāntin, for the conception of an eternal hell serves the interest of neither God nor soul, being justifia-

28. Schomerus, p. 421.
29. E.H., L.Ś.S. pp. 93-98.

ble neither on the ground of justice nor on the plea of doing good to souls. If within an allotted time, souls have not made good their opportunities, the punishment of unspeakable suffering throughout eternity is far too severe; and while justice may err on the side of mercy, it should not incline towards severity. Further, when souls are doomed to eternal suffering, they are at the same time denied every possibility of mending their ways. The argument that their suffering because of its severity serves to prevent other souls from bringing on themselves a similar fate is not acceptable unless at the same time one agrees that one man could be used merly as a means to serve the ends of another.

The certainty of release, in which the Siddhāntin believes, cannot, however, be admitted to be metaphysically well based. If it belongs to the nature of the soul to be bound in saṃsāra, then it cannot come to have the opposite attribute of freedom from bondage in release. The possibility of freedom in release requires to be based on freedom even in saṃsāra, so that the soul passing from one state to the other has no need to acquire qualities that are opposed to those possessed in the previous state. This, however, does away with the absolute reality of bondage, which comes to be regarded as a super-imposition on an eternally free soul. But this is to pass beyond the Siddhānta into Advaita.

CHAPTER IX

THE ALIEN SCHOOLS IN RELATION TO THE ŚAIVA SIDDHĀNTA

The Siddhāntin in coming into contact with the schools of thought that are at variance with his position, accounts for these differing views on the ground that the revelation of truth was bound to be given in different degrees dependent on the measure of enlightenment attained by various sets of souls.[1] These different faiths are therefore not condemned as entirely erroneous,[1a] but are regarded as intermediate steps that must be ascended by souls before they come to the pinnacle of the Śaiva Siddhānta revealing ultimate truth. The Siddhānta is thus considered as the highest revelation of absolute truth, and the other religions as partial revelations of relative truths.

The schools are grouped under the four main headings of outermost, outer, inner and innermost faiths.[2] By means of this classification, the various schools are graded in the order in which they differ from the Śaiva Siddhānta school.

1. *The outermost schools consisting of* i. Lōkāyata, ii. Buddhism, and iii. Jainism do not accept either the Vedas or the Śaivāgamas.

2. *The outer schools consisting of* i. Tarka, ii. Mīmaṃsā, iii. Ekātmavāda, iv. Sāṅkhya, v. Yoga, and vi. Pāñcarātra accept only the Vedās.[2a]

3. The inner schools of i. Pāśupata, ii. Mahāvrata, iii. Kāpāla, iv. Vāma, v. Bhairava, and vi. Aikyavāda accept

1. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 9 of Introduction.
1a. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 15 of Introduction.
2. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 33.
2a. This is not strictly true, for the Pāñcarātra has faith in its own set of Āgamas.

both sets of sacred books though at the same time recognising also the human works criticising the sacred works.

4. *The innermost schools of* i. Pāṣāṇavāda Śaiva, ii. Bhedavāda Śaiva, iii. Śivasamavāda Śaiva, iv. Śivasaṅkrāntavāda Śaiva, v. Īśvara-avikāra-vāda Śaiva, and vi. Śivādvaita Śaiva acknowledge the authority of the Vedas and Śaivāgamas, but differ in their conceptions of mukti.[3]

Lōkāyata.

Lōkāyata, which ranks foremost among the outermost schools, sets forth teachings contrary to the spirit of the Siddhānta system ; and it is so different from even any other system to be considered here that it needs to be placed in a class by itself. Though Buddhism and Jainism are atheistic, they are at least ethical. Lōkāyata, however, is a materialistic school that has no appreciation of the values of life, of the True, the Good and the Beautiful. Thus missing the true goal altogether, there is absent also the ethical discipline that leads to it. Further, whereas other schools are of opinion that the sufferings of this life are so intense that one should seek the way of escape from existence, the Lōkāyata finds in life a balance of pleasure over pain. Before regarding this as a commendable optimistic attitude towards life, it should be noted that what serves as a source of enjoyment to the Lōkāyata in this life is what is repulsive to the spiritually minded. For what is considered by the Lōkāyata to be the only worthwhile end in life is the pursuit of the pleasures of the senses. To the Siddhāntin, however, and others of his mind, this end offers no abiding satisfaction, but is, on the contrary, hurtful to the soul ; and the goal of life has therefore to be sought elsewhere. Thus in having no ethical system, and in commending the pursuit of pleasure, the Lōkāyata is different even from the alien systems condemned by the Siddhāntin.

There are still other important points that differentiate the doctrine of the Lōkāyata from that of the Siddhāntin. Be-

3. Ś.J.B. Mā : p. 34 ; Ś.J.B. Ck. p. 2.

ing a materialist and having trust only in the tangible, he maintains that perception is the only means of valid knowledge, and that only things perceived exist. Inference that gains wide acceptance among various philosophical sects is repudiated by the Lōkāyata on the ground that it is based on the universal proposition which cannot be attained through sense perception, that can give knowledge only of particular instances, and does not cover past and future examples. The Lōkāyata also renounces verbal testimony, and with it the Vedas. These latter are condemned on the ground that they contain mantras some of which have no sense, while others are ambiguous or absurd, and still others merely repeat what is already known. Further, some of the followers of the Vedas themselves reject certain portions of the Scripture as being interpolations.

With regard to the Lōkāyata's epistemological position, the Siddhāntin points out that it is not possible for the Lōkāyata to abandon inference as of no value in attaining knowledge. The assertion that it will rain (made on observation of lightning, thunder and clouds) and the assertion that it has rained on the mountain (made on observing the swollen river speeding away with trees and vegetation that have been wrenched off) are not based on direct perception. They are inferences.[4] Though the Lōkāyata may claim these too to be perception on the ground that they are based on perceptual knowledge of past instances, he cannot so easily dispose of such difficulties as that intelligence arises in the body composed of four elements, and that it is this intelligence which perceives by means of the senses; nor yet can he derive the physical frame from the union of invisible elements.[5]

The Siddhāntin's love of truth, which shines resplendent throughout his śāstras, will not allow him to accept any but the most rigorous norms of truth. In accepting śabda pramāṇa,

4. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Cārvāka v. 2.
5. *Ibid.*, v. 3.

it seems to some minds as if he is taking a retrograde step. This position, however, falls to the ground in the light of all the facts concerned. The Scriptures gain recognition not merely because they are the works of Śiva, but because they are found not to conflict with experience. Again, the attitude of the devotee in studying the Scriptures is not to be one of meek acceptance, but one of open-minded investigation. The reason for advocating such a critical searching of the Scriptures is that the enlightenment attained thus is far more likely to become a permanent part of one's experience than if the information be accepted on authority. It is obvious that the laying open of the Scriptures to searching criticism would be possible only if the Siddhāntin had entire confidence in the genuineness of the Scriptures. Since they reflect human religious experiences, which can be borne out by repeated experience through the ages, there is no need to fight shy of rational analysis. Śabda pramāṇa does not have to be apologised for before it is accepted as a pramāṇa. A further reason for its acceptance is that it often gives the accumulated wisdom of ages. No generation can afford to depend entirely on itself for progress and enlightenment. It has often to build on the experience of the past ; and this can be passed on to succeeding generations only through verbal testimony.[5a]

The attempt to reduce it to inference is based on superficial considerations. Those inclined to reduce it thus to inference maintain that in understanding the sense of words spoken, there is inference. If the listener is to grasp the significance of the uttered words, he must interpret them, and in doing so, he must invest the datum presented with his mental

5a. Cf. "If the amount of information accumulated by the normal five-year-old had all to be discovered *ab initio* by his own experience, he could live out his three score years and ten, or hypothetically attain to the ripe old age of Methuselah, and still know a good deal less than he has acquired by the kindly aid of parental authority by his fifth birthday." Georgia Harkness, *The Recovery of Ideals*, p. 105.

content. The same obtains in perception too, where the material presented to the eye may be a patch of green and brown, and the observer giving meaning to this presentation cognises it to be a tree. Thus in understanding the words of the speaker, no more than in perceiving a tree, is there justification for detecting inference. It may further be said that though in cognising by means of śabda pramāṇa, there is no inference, yet the truth of it has to be established by means of inference, and that therefore, it is not an independent source of knowledge. This view, again, does not gain support. Not every perception is correct ; and not every inference valid. And just as in cases of erroneous perception and of invalid inference, there are attempts to test their validity, so it happens that doubtful verbal testimony will have to be tested. With regard to the Lōkāyata criticism of the Vedas that they are inconsistent etc., it should be borne in mind that before judging the purport of any passage, the six marks of purport viz., the harmony of beginning and end, repetition, novelty, fruitfulness, eulogy or condemnation and intelligibility should be taken into consideration.

In keeping with his epistemology is the Lōkāyata's cosmology that the four perceptible elements of fire, air, earth and water are the tattvas, and that these suffice to produce the universe as they constitute both the material and efficient causes. The Siddhānta view is that these elements can constitute neither the material cause nor the efficient cause. Since whatever is manifold and inert is produced, these four elements are evolutes. Their ultimate substrate is māyā, which, not being manifold, serves as the material cause. Further, as the creation, preservation and destruction of the world can only be produced by a being transcending these processes, the four elements, which are subject to the three processes, cannot serve as efficient cause.[6] Over and above this world of change, is Śiva, the efficient cause of the world.

6. Ś.J.S. sūtra I, v. 4.

Since the ultimate realities of the universe are considered to be the four elements, the self is not recognised as an entity other than the elements. It is a mere by-product of the elements, and hence has no significance. As when the betel, nut and lime come together, redness arises, so the union of these elements (of fire, earth, air and water) produces intelligence,[7] and this increases or decreases as the body grows bigger or smaller.[8] The various sects of the Lōkāyata system agree that apart from the physical organism, there is no soul, but they differ as to what part of the physical organism corresponds to what is popularly known as the soul. According to the Deha-ātma-vādin, it is the body that is meant when the self is spoken of. The Indriyātmavādin maintains that the five indriyās of hearing, taste, sight, smell and touch constitute the soul. The sūkṣma-deha-ātma-vādin believes that it is the subtle body that from within controls the indriyās and through them learns of the external world, and that this is the soul. The Prāṇātma-vādin argues that when prāṇa-vāyu is present in the body, the body can eat and work; and prāṇa-vāyu, which, unlike the subtle body functioning in sleep alone, functions in suṣupti and turīya as well, is the soul. The Tattva-samūha-ātma-vādin's contention is that as in the absence of any one of the following, subtle body, indriyās and prāṇa-vāyu, intelligence is absent, and in the presence of all of them, intelligence is present also, it is the conjunction of these tattvas that is the soul. The Antaḥkaraṇa-ātma-vādin's plea for maintaining that the antaḥkaraṇas constitute the soul is that all other organs have their respective names; but the terms citta and jīva are used interchangeably, and so the antaḥkaraṇas are the soul.[9]

The Siddhāntin's destructive criticisms of these various arguments have already been dealt with in another connection.[10] It will be noted that the criterion adopted by these thinkers in denying that there is an entity, the soul, which is over and above the organs, is solely the pramāṇa of perception.

7. Ś.J.B. Mā: pp. 35-36.

8. Ś.J.B. Ck. p. 4.

9. Ś.J.B. Ck. pp. 5-7.

10 See chapter V.

In their opinion, the assertion of anything that cannot be cognised by perception is similar to measuring the length of a hare's horn.[11] The Siddhāntin's apt reply to this is that the non-perception of the soul by the senses is no proof of its non-existence ; for as the pot does not cognise the eye which saw it,[12] it can well be that the senses cannot perceive the soul above them.

Levelling down every trace of spiritual elements, the Lōkāyata denies God also on the ground that He is inconceivable. If He is formless, then like the sky, which also is formless, He must be non-intelligent. If He has form, then He must be on a level with the objects of this world. If however, He is declared to partake of both form and formlessness, this would be as impossible to achieve as it would be to suspend a stone from the sky.[13]

The Lōkāyata thinks that he can explain the development of the universe on the analogy of the formation of bubbles in water, for which there is apparently no cause.[14] The Siddhāntin's reply to this is not far-reaching enough. To attribute the formation of bubbles to the agency of air,[15] is to take up the materialist position that the changes in the world are due to the movements of elements. The Siddhāntin needs to go further in search of the true cause. As he says in another place, just as, to bring together betel and nut, an agent is required, so for all material causation, an agent is required.[16]

The Lōkāyata, who is a thorough-going materialist, denies karma also. The notion of a man's merits and demerits attaching to him in his next life is not conceded by him, as with his pramāṇa of pratyakṣa, he can see the body die, but nothing re-

11. Ś.J.S. Statement of Cārvāka, v. 11.
12. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Cārvāka v. 19.
13. Ś.J.S. Statement of Cārvāka. v. 12.
14. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Cārvāka. v. 5.
15. *Ibid.*, v. 5.
16. *Ibid.*, v. 7.

mains after that. The suggestion that karma continues in a subtle form is to him as absurd as saying that there can be flame apart from the wick of the lamp.[17] He feels also that the differences of bodies, intelligences etc., that exist among human beings cannot be attributed to karma, but that they are really due to quantitative differences of the elements.[18] The experiences of pain and pleasure are said to be due to the nature of the body. Karma is thus dispensed with as imperceptible and unnecessary.

The existence of karma is to the Siddhāntin not absurd as the flame existing apart from the wick; for, after the dissolution of the body at death, karma finds a substrate in māyā. Nor is it unnecessary, for it is required to account for the diversity in the world.[19] Though quantitative differences of elements can account for diversity in the world to some extent, yet they cannot account for existing differences. If, as the Lōkāyata contends, the body were naturally subject to pain and pleasure, then the corpse should also experience them. As the Siddhāntin says, it is the soul that has this experience of pain and pleasure;[20] and for this experience, the soul requires the body.

The Lōkāyata belief that man is only the physical organism leads him to deny the future life, and the transmigration of souls. As karma and future life according to him are fictitious, man need not school himself to any ethical discipline aiming at something other than the satisfaction of the physical needs. If mukti is happiness, it consists in man satisfying the needs of his body.

The Siddhāntin severely condemns all this gross and sensual living. The body is merely an instrument for the soul

17. Ś.J.S. Statement of Cārvāka. v. 7.
18. *Ibid.*, v. 9.
19. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Cārvāka. v. 9.
20. *Ibid.*, v. 16.

in its earthly career to enable it to learn the utter worthlessness of the pleasures of this world. The soul then comes to know of its spiritual nature, its heritage of eternal life and of its kinship with God. And by means of holy living, it attains mukti, reaching the feet of Śiva.

The materialist position of the Lōkāyata is so revolting to the Siddhāntin that he places it at the farthest point from his own spiritual position. In contending against this opponent of his, the Siddhāntin points out the inadequacy of any materialistic account of the universe. God is not a product of the imagination. He is what explains the universe with all its richness of content. Man is more than his body; and to be true to his real self, he should not be heedless of the unseen and the eternal. The Lōkāyata contention that perception is the only valid pramāṇa, in confining one's attention to the here and now, impoverishes one's knowledge very much. The Siddhāntin points out how the Lōkāyata cannot consistently ignore other recognised pramāṇas.

Buddhism.

Buddhism, which is different from the Lōkāyata doctrine in that it is an ethical system, is still very different from the Siddhāntin's position, and hence is placed in the class of outermost schools. The Sautrāntika Buddhist believing neither in God nor soul, which to the Siddhāntin are important entities, and repudiating the authority of the Vedas, which to the Siddhāntin are authoritative books, develops a system of thought that calls for severe criticism from the Siddhāntin.

To the Sautrāntika, the existence of God appears inconceivable because of the difficulties involved in the concept of creation, because of the inconsistencies involved in the concept of God, because of the nature of the world of experience, which apparently does not bear out the concept of God as an omnipotent and benevolent being, and because of the circular reasoning involved in the appeal to the Scriptures to support the existence of God.

The Siddhāntin's theory that God created the world as a potter makes pots out of clay, gives rise to the Sautrāntika's query as to where God stood when He created the world. If it be replied that He is omnipresent, the Sautrāntika has the further difficulty that in that case, ' everywhere ' must have existed before God and have created Him.[21] According to the Siddhāntin, space and time are not ultimate realites, but are derived from māyā. If so, space cannot give rise to God ; on the contrary, He transcends space as well as time.

The concept of God also presents difficulties such as whether He is to be considered as having form or having no form. If He is thought to have form, then there must be either some one before Him who created this form, or if it is due to karma, this must have existed before Him. If it be said that He assumes a form out of His mere wish, the Sautrāntika sees no reason why every one in the world cannot do the same.[22] Should He be conceived as formless, then like ākāśa, He cannot have the capacity to redeem us from sin.[23]

According to the Siddhāntin, all form is given to the world by Śiva operating on the formless māyā through His śakti. Śiva, being pure spirit, is all pervasive. On this account, He need not be said to lack the power to redeem souls. The immutable God operates through His śakti, which is a power as much as magnetism contained in a magnet is a power.

A further difficulty regarding creation is its purpose. The various alternatives that could have led to the Lord creating the world are His consideration for mortals, the manifestation of His play activity, and the necessity of karma. But none of these suggestions seems acceptable to the Sautrāntika. If it was His kindness that led to the creation of

21. Ś.J.S. Statement of Sautrāntika. v. 22.
22. *Ibid.*, v. 25.
23. *Ibid.*, v. 26.

the world, the purpose does not explain the suffering in the world. If the creation of the world is an expression of His play activity, it proves His childishness. If creation is due to karma, then the persons performing karma must have existed before creation.[24]

Creation, according to the Siddhāntin, is due to God's kindly intention that souls by eating the fruits of their karma should shed their mala and realise their true nature. The sufferings of the world serve to wean the soul from the world which is not its proper environment. Karma is beginningless; and souls are eternal. But neither of these conditions need interfere with the Lord's creation of the world.

The Sautrāntika says that the Siddhāntin's appeal to the Scriptures to prove the existence of God is arguing in a circle,[25] for God is supposed to have given out the Scriptures, and these are appealed to in support of His existence. The Siddhāntin, however, bases his arguments for the existence of God on reason, and not on blind faith. Commencing with the empirical world of he, she and it, he sets forth various arguments based on reason for the existence of God.

Though the Sautrāntika believes not in God, yet he deifies Buddha and invests him with various perfections, which in the light of his other assumptions disappear into thin air. His belief that Buddha is omniscient[26] is up-rooted by his theory of momentariness and annihilation. Buddha is said to have given out the Dharma. If this was accomplished before he attained mukti, then it falls short of one's expectation and cannot lead to mukti. If it was given out after he attained nirvāṇa, it amounts to saying that a man who died came back to life to warn his friends against the experiences by which he came to harm.[27]

24. Ś.J.S. Statement of Sautrāntika. vv. 23-24.
25. *Ibid.*, v. 27.
26. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Sautrāntika. v. 1.
27. *Ibid.*, v. 2.

The self is explained away by the Sautrāntika as the mere aggregate of the five skandhas.[28] This is the very opposite of the Siddhāntin's view that over against the physical organism is a further entity, the soul. He points out the absurdity of the Sautrāntika position as considered from different angles of approach. If according to the Sautrāntika, there is no self beyond the mind, which is born from moment to moment, then past experiences such as, 'I said so', cannot be accounted for. What is meant by the 'I' here is not the mouth that uttered the words, but an intelligent self.[29] When a man falls asleep, it is the self and not anything else that produces the waking state.[30] None of the senses either external or internal can synthesise the various sensations. What does this is the ego.[31] A particular object may either be desired and sought after or disliked and avoided. This behaviour of the organism is explained by memory and past experience. It is only an eternal soul that can be the basis of memory, etc.[32] If the skandhas constitute the soul, then at their dissolution, there is nothing that can taste the bliss of nirvāṇa.[33]

The Sautrāntika belief in Buddha as the supreme being leads him to recognise the 'Piṭakas' as sacred writings. The Siddhāntin rejects these on the ground that they do not come under any of the three recognised classes of authoritative books.[34] The really destructive criticism levelled against these writings is that the Buddhist theory of momentariness gives no chance for any book to come into being,[35] considering that the author's intelligence will be subject to the processes

28. Ś.J.S. Statement of Sautrāntika. v. 7.
29. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Sautrāntika. v. 28.
30. *Ibid.*, v. 29.
31. *Ibid.*, v. 30.
32. *Ibid.*, v. 32.
33. *Ibid.*, v. 39.
34. *Ibid.*, v. 10.
35. *Ibid.*, v. 7.

of origin and decay from moment to moment. The Sautrāntika professes that he recognises, as valid means of knowledge, only perception and inference.[36] The Siddhāntin points out that his opponent in rejecting śabda pramāṇa fails to note the obvious result that his own Piṭakas are robbed of validity.[37]

Though in saying that bondage is due to ignorance, there is agreement between the two schools, yet in the difference of content of which the bound soul is ignorant, the two systems differ. The Sautrāntika says that ignorance relates to the five skandhas;[38] and the Siddhāntin says that it relates to the soul's divine nature. Accordingly, release is to be attained by knowledge of the annihilation of the five skandhas,[39] in the one case, and of the divine nature of the soul in the other.

Mukti, to the Siddhāntin, holds forth rich experiences of bliss and enlightenment to the soul. To the Sautrāntika, it is merely samādhi or quieting of the soul's unrest; and as pointed out already, even to experience this bare existence, there is no soul left on the assumption of the theory of annihilation.

It is this theory which undermines everything positive that the Sautrāntika contributes, and makes his position absurd. Its pernicious effect on the soul and on the validity of the Scriptures has already been noted. The beliefs that in succession there is no continuity,[40] and that things are not reduced to their cause, but are annihilated[41] seriously affect the causal concept. If the cause is to produce the effect, it cannot vanish completely before the effect even begins to come into being. If the theory of momentariness were to hold good, what pre-

36. Ś.J.S. Statement of Sautrāntika. v. 3.
37. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Sautrāntika. v. 10.
38. Ś.J.S., Statement of Sautrāntika. v. 30.
39. *Ibid.*, v. 30.
40. *Ibid.*, v. 8.
41. *Ibid.*, v. 30.

cedes the effect would be not the cause (which has perished) but non-existence. And how any effect can arise from nothing, or how something can be reduced, not to its original substrate but to nothing, is by no means clear. The destructive analysis of the Sautrāntika is not without its value. The problem of how, in spite of change, there can be permanence, is brought before the mind in all its various phases.

Jainism.

The difficulties involved in creation, etc., lead the Jainas to reject belief in God. If creation of the world is attributed to Him, it is not clear why God suddenly determines to create the world. Further, the substance out of which God created the world must be determined. If this matter is dependent on His will, then why does it manifest settled properties instead of an erratic nature such as that fire should sometimes burn and sometimes cool ? Moreover, one cannot stop with a first cause. We are led into infinite regress in inquiring for the cause of the cause. If to avoid this difficulty, an eternal substance is assumed, then there is no reason why only one substance should be assumed to be eternal.

In answer to these points, the Siddhāntin would say that the reason for determining to create the world is to help souls to be rid of their bondage. For the world substrate, the Siddhāntin offers māyā, which like God is eternal. Inasmuch as māyā exists, it serves as the substrate of the physical universe, which being non-intelligent, cannot be derived from Śiva, who is pure intelligence. At the same time, in providing the world stuff the Siddhāntin makes of God not an absolute creator of both form and matter of the universe, but only a designer, who with the given material, gives to the world its form. Having conceded the existence of matter as another eternal entity, it is not difficult for the Siddhāntin to assume the existence of other eternal entities, the souls. So instead of starting with only one first cause, there is a plurality of eternal entities. However, God cannot be said to be without His

mission. The physical universe has to be evolved from its substrate, and the bound souls are to be released. And these tasks are so great that only God can fulfil them.

The Jaina admits that souls have bodies in accordance with their merits and demerits; but is of opinion that karma automatically links itself to the souls without the need of an agent like God. But just as an arrow shot from a bow travels to its target, only when there is an archer, so karma can find its way only when God controls it, and therefore God must exist.

Dispensing with God, the Jaina continues to say that the universe consists of two entities, the jīva and the ajīva. The released jīva is the soul purified from the taint of matter. The bound jīva is a composite of soul and body. Its embodiment is due to its association with matter with which the soul ignorantly identifies itself. Matter taints the soul depriving it of its knowledge and intuition.

Though the Siddhāntin would agree thus far with the Jaina in his conception of the soul, he would not accede to his view regarding the size of the soul. The soul is said to be capable of expanding and contracting. At the birth of the jīva, the soul is supposed to be quite small, and to grow up along with the body. At death, the soul contracts again, and so on the process is repeated until the time of release. This view of the soul having various dimensions is open to objection. If it is smaller than the body, then the experiences of certain parts of the body will not be secured by the soul. If it is larger than the body, then a certain portion of the ātmā will be without its physical counterpart. Should the soul in order to suit the size of the body, either contract or expand by the subtraction or addition of parts, the soul would be subject to change. The Jainas seek to avoid this difficulty by explaining through analogies such as that the soul fills a body large or small as a lamp illumines a room whether large or small. In the case of the lamp, of course, illumination of a large or small

sized room is possible without alteration of the size of the flame because the rays of the lamp spread over a larger or smaller area. If the soul is to occupy a larger or smaller body without altering its size, then the soul should emit some kind of influence which can cover a large or small organism without making any difference to the size of the soul. The Siddhāntin's criticism of this point of the size of the soul is that, if as the Jaina maintains, the soul filled the whole body, then if the body became defective in part, the soul also must be defective in proportion.[42]

As the Buddhist conceived of Buddha as having greater perfections than an ordinary soul, and laid himself open to severe criticism from the Siddhāntin, so does the Jaina elevate to a supreme status his God Aruka, thereby exposing himself to similar criticism from the Siddhāntin. The absurdity of their positions is due to their investing an ordinary human being with the perfections of the supreme being. The goodness of Aruka cannot be part of his nature as coolness is part of the nature of the moon, for before becoming God, he was evil.[43]

The means of attaining release according to the Jainas are through the three jewels, faith in Jina, knowledge of his doctrine and perfect conduct. If, however, Jina is nothing higher than other released souls, it is not clear how faith in him can help towards release. The Jaina renounces his faith in God, and tries to secure release without His aid. The released souls by no means extend a helping hand to souls struggling to reach the desired haven. The soul then has only itself to depend on for attaining mukti. The Siddhāntin likens the soul's attempt to reach heaven by itself to the pot at the bottom of the well seeking to get to the top by itself.[44] The Jaina emphasis on knowledge and conduct

42. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Jainism. v. 7.
43. *Ibid.*, v. 1.
44. *Ibid.*, v. 14.

as means of release, resembles the Siddhāntin's stress on intellectual and ethical development, that constitute the preparation for attaining mukti. The Jaina approval of self-torture, however, as leading to fuller development of the soul, is severely condemned by the Siddhāntin. According to him, if persons subjecting their bodies to great privations get nearer to heaven, then those undergoing physical suffering caused by sickness should be the first to reach heaven.[45]

Nirvāṇa, according to the Jaina, is a quiet and peaceful condition of the purified soul that will continue for ever without being involved in the sorrow of saṃsāra. Sometimes it is said that the soul besides being at peace has also 'infinite consciousness, pure understanding, absolute freedom and eternal bliss'. These aspects, however, are not given as great emphasis as they receive in the Siddhāntin's system.

The main points of divergence between these outermost schools and the Siddhānta system are their atheism, and their rejection of the sacred writings of the Siddhāntin, namely, the Vedas and Śaivāgamas. The outer schools consisting of Tarka, Mīmāṃsā, Ekātmavāda, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Pāñcarātra accept the Vedas and are considered to be a step nearer to the Siddhānta than the outermost schools.

Tarka

To the points of difference noted[46] between the Nyāya and Siddhānta systems, we may here add their points of view concerning causality. The Nyāya view of causality is opposed to that of the Siddhānta. According to the former's theory of ārambhavāda or new beginnings, the effect is not contained in the cause, but comes into being afresh. The saree (effect) is not in the threads (cause). If however, as the Naiyāyika maintains, the effect is something new that is not contained in the cause, and there is no principle of

45. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Jainism. v. 12.
46. See chapter II.

identity between them, then there is a breach between cause and effect, so that a certain effect need not be preceded by one cause rather than another, but any cause would do, or even no cause would do. Though the concept of cause is in itself not without contradictions, and is hence unsatisfactory as an ultimate principle, yet the Siddhāntin's view of satkāryavāda, identical with that of the Sāṅkhya, is far in advance of the Naiyāyika view of new beginnings.

With regard to the Nyāya attitude to theism, it may be noted that only the later Naiyāyikas held belief in God, and even these had neither the conviction nor the zeal which the Siddhāntin had in the matter.

Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system accepts the Vedas, but beyond this and a few other points of contact, it is essentially different from the Siddhānta system. Having no spontaneous leanings towards God, it says that the Vedas are eternal. The Siddhāntin, who believes Śiva to be the author of the sacred books, points out that if God were not the author of them, then the words of the Scriptures would sound merely like the noises from the sky without any meaning.[47] If words and their meanings are considered to come together naturally as the flowers and their fragrance, even then there must be some one to choose the words; otherwise, they will be no better than the senseless roar of the sea.[48] The Siddhāntin explains that the reason for considering the Vedas to be eternal is because they have been revealed by the eternal and uncaused being. This is analagous to describing a letter from the king as 'tirumuham' or the royal presence itself.[49]

The ceremonials and rites of the Vedas are what appeal to the Mīmāṃsaka; and the fulfilment of sacrifices is considered

47. Ś.J.S. Refutation of Bhaṭṭācārya. v. 2.
48. *Ibid.*, v. 4.
49. *Ibid.*, v. 5.

to be the highest duty of man. In the Siddhānta system, however, these play a very subordinate part. They may be included in the preliminary stages, which lead the soul to highest perfection; and in these higher stages, the means of release is not sacrifice or ritual but knowledge. Even when sacrifices are attempted, they are to be performed in a disinterested attitude and not, as in the Mīmāṃsā, with a view to obtain heaven. Further, the insignificant part assigned to sacrifices in the Siddhānta is obvious from the fact that many saints are said to have reached the highest perfection without performing sacrifices at any stage of their career. The difference of view between the two schools with regard to rituals shows that the Mīmāṃsā attaches more importance to the overt acts of souls, while the Siddhānta emphasises the inner development of man. The goal to be won by means of these sacrifices is; according to the Mīmāṃsā, the attainment of heaven and the experience of bliss that is the portion of the gods. This hedonist goal is no release for the Siddhāntin, for the enjoyment in heaven leads the soul to desire more happiness, so that the soul instead of being a liberated entity, becomes a slave to its cravings.

Māyāvāda.

The main points of contention between the Māyāvādin and the Siddhāntin are the questions how cit can produce acit, how the one can become the many, and how the jīva with its limitations can be Brahman.

The Māyāvādin's analogies to illustrate how cit can produce acit are critically examined by the Siddhāntin. The material world is said to proceed from Brahman, who is pure spirit, as the inert web proceeds from the intelligent spider.[50] The Siddhāntin subjects this analogy to such criticism as that the creator does not incessantly engage himself in creating the

50. Snk. Statement of Māyāvāda. Lines 15-16.

world as the spider unceasingly works at the web.[51] The points noted by the Siddhāntin are irrelevant, for the question under consideration is how God, who is of a certain nature, can produce the world that is of the opposite nature. The critic's consideration as to whether the analogy and the matter to be illustrated correspond in every respect is not justifiable, for such close correspondence is never expected. Morever, the Siddhāntin overlooks his own inaccurate assumptions such as that the spider is unceasingly engaged in making the web, and that the web is uniform.

The Siddhāntin, in focussing his attention on petty considerations, misses the important criticism that the analogies of the spider producing the web, and the flame producing the soot[52] do not answer the purpose for which they are intended, which is to prove that a spiritual entity can produce something material. The web arises from the bodily secretions of the spider, and both web and bodily secretions are material. Similarly, the flame that produces the soot is as material as the product to which it gives rise.

As for the relation between God and the world, the final position taken up by the Māyāvādin is that the relation is one of non-difference. This position is different from that of the Siddhāntin that God, the spiritual being, is the opposite of the universe, which is material, so that in order to act on this, which is so contrary to His nature, He needs His cit-śakti.

The pluralistic position of the Siddhāntin, again, is different from the monism of the Māyāvādin. The analogies of one string running through many beads, and of the milk being the same though drawn from many cows,[53] are considered by the Māyāvādin to explain his position of the one Brahman dwelling in many souls. As in the case of the other analogies, these are also criticised by the Siddhāntin for petty considerations,

51. Snk. Refutation of Māyāvāda. Lines 76-77.
52. *Ibid.*, Lines 93-94.
53. *Ibid.*, Line 116.

and their serious weaknesses are passed over. These illustrations fail to serve the purpose for which they are intended. The one string running through many beads does not explain how a single entity becomes split into many entities, for the one string that is passed through several beads is still one ; and hence, this example does not serve to illustrate how one thing splits into many. The analogy of the milk and cows again, fails to illustrate the process of the one becoming many. The cows are separate entities with physical organisms that are approximately of the same nature so that they yield milk that is approximately the same. This is an example of like producing the like and not an example of one becoming many.

The final explanation of the Māyāvādin on the subject of the one and the many is that the world is an appearance of Brahman. This results in denying to the world the reality that belongs to the supreme being; and to this the Siddhāntin would not agree, for it is contrary to his assumption that māyā, the substrate of the physical universe, is an entity as much as God, and is as eternal as He.

Of all points of difference between the two systems, the chief one is their view of the supreme being and the jīva. To the Māyāvādin, as space enclosed in a pot is the general space itself, so the jīva is the Paramātmā apparently embodied for the time being. The Siddhāntin investing God with all the perfections of a supreme being, cannot conceive of His being the bound soul subject to suffering, delusion and folly.

Sāṅkhya.

While the Sāṅkhya believes in the existence of the two eternal entities of puruṣa and prakṛti, the Siddhānta system in common with the Sāṅkhya believes in the existence of what roughly correspond to these, and in the third eternal entity, Pati. Following from these points of similarity and of difference, it is seen that while there is very much that is common to the two systems, there is also a considerable difference.

The Sāṅkhya system certainly does not uphold theism. The 'Sāṅkhya Kārikā,' though silent about the matter, has nevertheless the clear implication that God is superfluous; for all such offices as creation, which most other systems assign to God, are explained by the 'Kārikā' without reference to Him. Thus though the 'Kārikā' nowhere denies the existence of God, yet inasmuch as it nowhere supports His existence, and expounds a system intended to be self-sufficient without reference to Him, it practically rules Him out. The Siddhāntin, however, asserts that of the three eternal entities in which he believes Pati is the highest;[54] and He, being responsible for all the changes in the world,[55] is indispensable. This difference of attitude of the two systems to God, affects their views on cosmology, teleology, the way of salvation and the future life.

Examining their cosmologies, it will be found that both systems agree in maintaining the existence of an original cosmic stuff.[56] According to the Sāṅkhya, this is prakṛti; and according to the Siddhāntin, it is māyā. The latter by his more searching analysis derives from his material substrate a greater number of tattvas than the Sāṅkhya derives from his. While the latter has only twenty-five tattvas altogether, the former has thirty-six, and with still further refinements, has a total of ninety-six. Though by means of the additional tattvas, the Siddhāntin includes in his system many of the features found in experience and overlooked by the Sāṅkhya, yet it cannot be maintained that in every case, the Siddhāntin is justified in holding the additional tattvas.

The view that prakṛti is the ground of the psychical as well as of the physical is common to the two systems. From prakṛti arise not only the tanmātras, and the elements which constitute the objects of cognition, but also manas, ahaṅkāra, and buddhi, which go to make up the intellectual apparatus used by the soul for cognition.

54. Ś.P. v. 13.
55. Ś.P. v. 17.
56. S.K. vv. 15-16.

An important point of difference between the cosmologies of the two systems concerns the origin of the cosmic processes. This, according to the Siddhāntin, is due to the Lord's operating on it through His śakti. The Siddhāntin realises that māyā, being inert, cannot of itself evolve. Moreover, there must be some cause for the world at rest beginning to develop. Since this evolution is orderly and purposive, it must be an intelligence that is responsible for the process. Souls are eternal and intelligent; nevertheless, on account of their finitude, they cannot perform the cosmic processes. It is only God with His infinite intelligence and unlimited power that can perform the office. Yet, since He is eternal and incorporeal, He cannot come into direct contact with the changing, corporeal world. For this reason, He acts on the world through His śakti, so that though the cosmic processes are carried on by Him through His śakti, He remains unaltered, as the sun remains unchanging, though due to its heat, the lotuses go through various stages of development.[57] The Siddhāntin's view, though not without its merits in that it notes existing difficulties, does not solve the problem intended to be solved by it. For as long as God and the world are independent entities having each its own nature, they cannot by any kind of third element be brought into connection with each other. Unless they become parts of a whole in which they are somehow transmuted, they will continue to remain isolated elements which no medium such as śakti can bring together. The explanation of the cosmic process which the Sāṅkhya has to offer falls short of even the defective one offered by the Siddhāntin. Whereas the Siddhāntin attributes the creation of the world to God, the Sāṅkhya makes puruṣa responsible for the same. The limitations of the finite puruṣa offer no difficulty; for, the Sāṅkhya anxious to maintain a consistent dualism between puruṣa and prakṛti, does not bring them together even for the sake of commencing the evolution of the world. The mere proximity of the two suffices to disturb the equilibrium of the

57. Ś.P. v. 17.

three guṇas constituting prakṛti and the process of development begins.[58] If puruṣa and prakṛti are opposed in nature as they are said to be, it is not clear how the one can be amenable to the influence of the other.

In respect of the teleology in the universe also, the two systems offer different explanations. Śiva, filled with compassion for the souls subject to their wearisome bondage, purposes the creation of the world for affording to souls the experience that will result in the maturation of mala. The destruction of the world is for the sake of giving rest to souls. Preservation makes it possible for the soul to secure experiences. All these cosmic processes are willed by God for the welfare of souls.[59] Provided that the Siddhāntin can establish a connection between God and the world, the teleology in the world is explained as the purpose of God underlying the universe.

The Sāṅkhya, in common with the Siddhānta, believes that the development of the universe is for the benefit of souls. However, having no belief in God, it is led to account for the teleology in the universe differently from the Siddhāntin. The souls, which are as yet ignorant even of their bondage, cannot entertain thoughts of the universe. Even if such were possible, it does not help to any degree as there is no contact between puruṣa and prakṛti. So the teleology of the universe is supposed to be inherent in it without any one being responble for it. The analogy used in support of this view is that prakṛti blindly functions for the welfare of the spirit, as milk, which is non-intelilgent, gets secreted in order to nourish the calf.[60] This analogy cannot be cited in support of the above point, for the milk is secreted not of itself, but as a result of the agency of the cow. If the carcase of a cow could secrete milk for the calf, then could the Sāṅkhya use this analogy in support of its theory. In using the other well-known analogy also, an

58. S.K. v. 21.

59. Ś.P. v. 18.

60. S.K. v. 57.

important fact is similarly overlooked. There is co-operation between the lame man and the blind man for a common purpose,[61] because, both being intelligent beings, they are of the same nature. Such similarity does not obtain between prakṛti and the soul; and this makes all the difference between the two sets of conditions compared. This still leaves unsolved the problem of how matter, having a different nature from spirit, and having no contact with it, can yet develop in an orderly way so as to benefit souls. Nature's workings are rational; yet there is no reason to which its workings are traced by the Sāṅkhya system. Non-intelligent nature thus developing for the soul, which is as yet helpless, clearly points to an intelligence cognisant of both soul and nature; but this the Sāṅkhya fails to see. The two entities, which are not without relation to each other, must find their basis in a third substance.

The two schools believe in the existence and plurality of souls. According to the Sāṅkhya, the group of elements arising from prakṛti must serve the purpose of some being, different in nature from them; these evolutes imply an enjoyer, who must be a spiritual being. Further, there is activity for the purpose of release; and this would not be if there were not a being who sought to end its bondage.[62] The Siddhāntin arguing for the existence of the soul dispels the confusion created by rival schools in their attempts to identify the soul with different parts of the body. This is the soul. It is neither māyā with which it is closely associated, nor God who is supreme.[63] As one's wife or one's town is thought to be different from oneself, so on examination it will be found that the parts of one's body are different from the soul.[64]

The souls, which in this life are bound, need to be released. Bondage is caused by ignorance. The Siddhāntin believes that it is mala which causes darkness; and the Sāṅkhya says

61. S.K. v. 21.
62. S.K. v. 17.
63. Ś.J.B. III, argt. 1. v. 1.
64. *Ibid.*, argt. 2, v. 1.

that it is due to the soul not differentiating itself from prakṛti. However it may be caused, it results in the soul being bound. If release is desired, it can be won only through enlightenment. Though both agree that knowledge is the means to release, they differ as to how knowledge is acquired. Whereas the Sāṅkhya assigns to prakṛti nearly all the work involved so that the soul has merely to be a witness and by its presence, shed its light of intelligence, the Siddhāntin makes the soul an agent, which is so guided by God that at first using prakṛti as an instrument, and later śiva-jñāna, it attains the feet of Śiva.

The Sāṅkhya view of release lacks all the positive content that is contributed by the Siddhāntin. Since, according to the Sāṅkhya, the soul is not affected by the body, it has nothing to gain in release. Even granting that in bondage it was deluded into thinking that it suffered, release is said to consist in that delusion being absent. The release of the Siddhāntin however, is characterised by bliss. Whereas in the state of bondage, the soul suffered, in release, there is not merely an absence of suffering, but positive bliss. As the waters of the rivers reach the sea, and do not return thence, so the released soul will not slip back into the state of bondage, since the power of mala that formerly brought about its bondage is destroyed through the power of Śiva.

Yoga.

The Yoga system believes that the suffering of the self in its earthly career is due to its association with matter. In order to be rid of this impurity, yogic discipline must be undertaken so that the soul trained in concentration will attain samāḍhi and eventually nirvāṇa. Meditation, according to the Siddhāntin, may be practised in the earlier stages of preparation, but must be transcended in the advanced stages. Meditation involves the use of karaṇas, and cannot lead to grace. The intelligence of the soul must allow itself to be supplemented by śiva-jñāna, and this alone can lead to Śiva. God is not essential to the Yoga system as He is to the

Siddhānta. He may serve as an object of meditation, and may be expected to help the soul in casting off its impurity; but for neither of these processes is He indispensable. Consequently, mukti to the Yoga system does not consist in attaining the feet of God as in the Siddhānta system, but in the soul becoming independent of the hold of matter.

Pāñcarātra.

According to the Pāñcarātra, Vāsudeva is the supreme being from whom arise the four deities who create the world of intelligent and non-intelligent beings. Thus in the end, the world is a transformation of Vāsudeva.[65] This system gives rise to certain difficulties. The supreme soul cannot become matter, and yet be separate from matter. If only part of Brahman is said to be thus transformed, then this part is subject to temporal processes of origin and decay. Brahman cannot develop into the world, and at the same time be eternal. This is not compatible with the theory of karma according to which there is a soul, which through manifold transmigrations experiences the fruits of its deeds, and after expiation continues for ever in mukti. Mukti, according to the Pāñcarātri, is becoming like God, and the goal is attained by the worship of Vāsudeva.

It may be noted how these schools, in spite of recognising the Vedas, diverge from the Siddhāntin's position in various points so as to need to be classed as outer schools. The main points of difference are with regard to the means of release, and the concept of mukti.

Pāśupata.

The inner schools of Pāśupata, Mahāvrata, Kāpāla, Vāma, Bhairava and Aikyavāda, accept both the Śaivāgamas and Vedas, and they also recognise the human works that criticise these sacred works. Pāśupata differs from the Siddhānta

65. Ś.J.B. Ck. p. 25.

system mainly on the points of mala and the state of release. Mala, which is the cause of ignorance, is not admitted by the Pāśupata. In mukti souls are said to become the equals of God, performing His offices. As a father, wishing to become a hermit entrusts all family responsibilities to his sons and retires to the forest, so God frees Himself from His duties by assigning them to souls that attain mukti.[66] According to the Siddhāntin, even in the state of release, the soul though purified, is inferior to God and dependent on Him.

Mahāvrata and Kāpāla.

The conception of mukti, according to Mahāvrata and Kāpāla, is identical with that of Pāśupata; and it is to be attained by religious rites.

Vāma.

Vāma, like the Pāñcarātra system, believes, that the universe consisting of both intelligent and non-intelligent beings is a transformation of the supreme being. Accordingly, release consists in the soul losing itself in its substrate, the Supreme Deity.[67]

Bhairava.

Bhairava differs from Vāma in certain religious rites.

Aikyavāda.

The chief points of contention between the Aikyavādin and the Siddhāntin are with regard to mala and the status of the soul. The Aikyavādin, who does not believe in the existence of mala says that pāśa is of two kinds,[68] namely, māyā and karma. The Siddhāntin points out that in spite of the full exercise of the sense organs, man is sometimes ignorant, e.g., when a man forgets that the ring belonging to him

66. Ś.J.B. Ck. p. 26.
67. Ś.J.B. Mā: p. 50.
68. Snk. Refutation of Aikyavādin, line 4.

has been returned to him. This ignorance, the Siddhāntin attributes to the presence of mala.[69] The Aikyavādin, however, says that it is due to māyā linking itself to the soul at some intermediate stage. This position, as the Śiddhāntin points out, leads to three difficulties :

1. There must be some cause for māyā suddenly enveloping the soul.[70]

2. If it is in the nature of māyā thus to envelop the soul, then there is no guarantee that in mukti such a conjunction will not be repeated.[71]

3. If the association of impurity occurred at an intermediate stage, then the souls should at one time have been all intelligent and happy. In saṃsāra, there is no life free from suffering.

The Siddhāntin's assumption of the beginninglessness of māyā frees him from these difficulties.

With regard to the Aikyavādin's view of the soul that it is pure intelligence, the Siddhāntin feels that if it be such, there is no need for it to mingle with another intelligence.

The inner schools are at variance with the Siddhānta in holding that there is no mala, and that in mukti the soul becomes the equal of God. Two of the systems believe that God Himself changes into the universe of intelligent and non-intelligent beings.

Pāṣāṇavāda Śaiva.

The innermost schools of Pāṣāṇavāḍa Śaiva, Bhedavāda Saiva, Sivasamavada Saiva, Sivasānkrāntavada Śaiva, Īśvara-avikāra-vāda Śaiva and Śivādvaita Śaiva, acknowledge the authority of the Vedas and the Śaivāgamas. The Pāṣāṇavādin believes in the existence of mala, and

69. Snk. Refutation of Aikyavādin, lines 16-24.
70. *Ibid.*, line 6.
71. *Ibid.*, lines 6-7.

differs from the Siddhāntin only in his conception of mukti. There is nothing of positive value in the mukti conceived by the Pāṣāṇavādin. He is content if the mala that causes ignorance is removed. The Siddhāntin goes further in making the soul realise its essential nature of pervasiveness, intelligence and bliss. His idea of mukti is so advanced in comparison with that of the Pāṣāṇavādin that the latter's can compare only with the kevala avasthā of the Siddhāntin.

Bhedavāda Śaiva.

The Bhedavādin maintains that when, by the functioning of God's grace, souls get rid of their mala, they attain mukti, in which state they do not lose their identity, so that they stand over against God, as independent entities. This view is not very different from that of the Siddhāntin, who emphasises that, though souls do not lose their individuality, so that they still continue to be separate entities, yet they have something in common with God, so that He is said to be immanent in them and yet transcendent. The Bhedavādin, however, making an unfortunate choice of analogies,[72] renders his position ambiguous, if not ridiculous, so that the Siddhāntin finds that theory to be very different from his own. But if one could get back of these imperfect expressions, one would find really not much difference between the two. The Siddhāntin, while pointing out that in mukti God and soul are different entities, at the same time emphasises the points of identity between God and souls.

Śivasamavāda Śaiva.

The Śivasamavāda, as its name indicates, maintains that the soul in mukti becomes the equal of God, and can perform the functions of creating, preserving and destroying the world.[73] According to the Siddhāntin, the soul even in the

72. Snk. Statement of Bhedavādin. lines 1-5.
73. Snk. Statement of Śivasamavāda. lines 10-15.

released state when it has all its powers restored to it, is not on a par with God, and hence cannot perform His offices.

Śivasaṅkrāntavāda.

According to this system, mukti consists in the qualities of God coming over and attaching themselves to the soul. This is opposed to the Siddhānta position that even when, in mukti, the soul attains its maximum capacities, it is not on a par with God, so that it does not, for instance, have the divine attributes of independent omniscience and omnipotence.

Īśvara-avikāra-vāda.

Of all the schools considered so far, the Īśvara-avikāra-vāda conceives of mukti very much along the lines of the Siddhāntin's conception of it. The soul on casting off its impurity attains the feet of Śiva, and is happy as weary travellers reaching the cool shade of trees, are filled with happy thoughts.[74] The Siddhāntin, however, branching off into petty criticisms of views where the Īśvara-avikāra-vādin owing to inaccuracies of expression commits himself, fails to see the points that he has in common with this school of thought.

Śivādvaita.

Śivādvaita or Nimitta-kāraṇa-pariṇāmavāda is a monistic system which maintains that the whole world is only a transformation of Śiva,[75] who is pure intelligence. The Siddhāntin examines this theory from the following standpoints :

i. the causal concept ; ii. purpose of creation ; iii. cit not accounting for acit.

Causes are of three kinds, namely, material, instrumental and efficient ; and if Śiva is the only cause of the world, He cannot

74. Snk., Īśvara-avikāra-vāda. lines 10-13.
75. *Ibid.*, Nimitta-kāraṇa-pariṇāma-vāda. line 1.

be all the three causes ; hence, He can produce no effects. If God is the only reality, then on what ground is the purpose of the universe to be explained ? Souls are not supposed to exist, so that the world cannot be said to exist for their sake. If it be for the sake of God, this view overthrows the conception of God as self-sufficient. If it be in vain, God ranks with the foolish whose activities are purposeless. If God is pure intelligence, the material world cannot arise from Him.

These innermost schools differ from the Siddhāntin in their concept of mukti which they regard as the state in which the released soul becomes the equal of God, whereas the Siddhāntin thinks of the future kingdom as consisting of Śiva, who is the king, and the souls, who are the subjects. Apart from this difference, however, it will be noted that there are many important points of contact between these schools and the Siddhānta. But these points of agreement are not admitted by the Siddhāntin, who concentrates wholly on the points of difference.

In thus noting the divergences, to the exclusion of other considerations, he fails also to discern how at times the difficult problems arising from his own assumptions lead him to incline towards the Advaita position against which he revolts. In fact, the very contradictions of his system lead him to identify himself entirely with the Advaita position. Regarding the points raised, viz., how cit can become acit, how the one can become many, and how the jīva can be Brahman, these two schools of thought hold opposite views. But the Siddhāntin's answers to these problems are by no means consistent ; and if he should strive for consistency, he would be imperceptibly led into upholding the very Advaita position from which he would zealously differentiate his doctrine. He creates between God, who is defined as cit, and the world, defined as acit, a vast gulf of contrariness of nature. But when faced with the inevitable consequences of the creation of such a cleavage, the Siddhāntin makes his ineffectual attempt at bridging the gulf by means of cit-śakti. In essaying to unite the entities of cit

and acit by means of the link, cit-śakti, he is taken unawares by even more discreteness; if he should try to overcome this by the method of introducing connecting links, he would find himself up against even more discreteness. And the only way out of the difficulty for him seems to be to re-trace his steps so as to avoid creating between God and the world an insurmountable cleavage brought into being by the sharp distinctions of cit and acit.

The Siddhāntin criticises the Māyāvādin's attempt to find a common basis for his plurality. This, however, is just what the Siddhāntin also tries to accomplish, though in a much less obvious way. The vast plurality of souls and of worlds, has a common basis in God since it is actuated by His cit-śakti. As the vowel "a" (அ) is indispensable to every other letter of the alphabet, so is God the central reality of all other realities. So both by means of a monism of events and by means of an indwelling presence, he seeks to embrace the diversity of his system in a unity, and in doing so, leans towards the Advaita position.

The further point, divergence between the jīva and the supreme being, is also found to involve contradictions, the removal of which again lands the Siddhāntin in the Advaita position with which he refuses to ally himself. Should the jīva be not non-different from Brahman, but an integral entity over against the supreme being, then the irreconcilable positions of a God, who is omnipotent, and of the soul endowed with a free will, create a deadlock. To avoid what the Siddhāntin considers the more serious of the alternatives, which is that of deposing God from the status of an omnipotent being, he deprives the soul of more and more of its initiative until it is reduced to a plaything in the hands of God. In this process of giving God the power that would make Him omnipotent, the Siddhāntin labours at a task involving the two-fold consequences of reducing the soul to an appearance, and of exalting God to the Absolute, the very cardinal tenets of Advaitism!

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